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THE SYSTEM of international relations that existed on the eve of World
War II was altered considerably in the· years which followed that costly conflict.
Before the war what was called "international" relations was essentially the
relations among the countries of Europe, where the nation-state had developed.
The United States and Japan, both located outside Europe, had been drawn into
the system and were, as a matter of fact, the major belligerents in the Pacific
phase of the war between 1941 and 1945. The other major powers, however,
were European states (Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union), and
large areas of fhe world were colonies of the first two countries as well as of such
smaller nations as the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The Americans and the
Japanese, moreover, had earlier become colonial powers in their own right. The
system, which was becoming truly international before World War II, was still
nonetheless mainly Europe-centered when the decade of the forties began.
The war accelerated the process of internationalization of the system of
relations among countries. The major European colonial powers were so weak-
ened by this most devastating war among themselves that they were unable in
the war's wake to maintain their dominance over their subject territories of Asia
and Africa, although, with the exception of the United States and Britain, they
tried to do so. Japan's conquests in Southeast Asia in particular were to have a
catalytic effect in ending European colonial rule in this part of the world, as
Burmese, Indonesians, and Vietnamese, among others, vowed never again to
allow themselves to be governed by aliens. This surge to independence subse-
quently spread to other parts of the world, particularly Africa. The nationalist
movements of these emergent states thus combined with the weakened circum-
stances of the European colonial powers to transform the system of international
relations in revolutionary ways.
By the start of the 1960's the international system was altogether different
from what it had been before the war, although it resembled the old system in
enough ways to blind some observers-and even a few participants-to the
dimensions of the changes involved. In the old system the participants, whatever
their size, were at more or less the same level of development. The concept of
the sovereign equality of states was in this sense an accurate reflection of the
relations among the nations that made up the system. The admission of the
United States and Japan to the system marked the beginning of its revolutionary
transformation. Their entrance into the international system was the result
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primarily of their acquisition of those characteristics that seemed to separate
the European state~ from most of the other peoples of the world, that is, their
level of development economically, technologically, and politically.
There are at least three ~ain differences between the nature of the system of
international relations as it existed in 1939 and as it functions today: its scope,
its decreasing domination by the states of western Europe, and, perhaps most
important, the unparalleled variation in the levels of development of the partici-
pants in the system. France and Holland may have differed in size (and military
power) historically, but never in the history of the European system of inter-
national relations did they differ in their levels of general development as, say,
Germany and Indonesia or Japan and Algeria do today.
There is today growing recognition of the relationship between development
and international relations, however vague and inadequately formulated the
perception of this relationship may sometimes be. The contemporary use of aid
or assistance as a foreign policy tool is the most conspicuous evidence of this
recognition. Immediate postwar American aid to Europe, Japan, and the Philip-
pines was rehabilitative. Later, aid was designed, as some of its critics claimed, to
win, if not buy, friends (and American foreign assistance, unfortunately, is even
today too frequently defended in such terms to win necessary congressional
financing). But those who formulate and direct United States aid programs in
the executive branch of the government are, for the most part, concerned with
assisting less developed countries through the often painful process of modern-
ization. They see this as a way of making the world more the kind of one in
which the United States and other "have" nations can themselves continue to
develop and prosper.
Foreign aid, accordingly, may be viewed as testimony to two beliefs existent
among American (and other) foreign policymakers: (a) that differing levels of
development may influence, possibly adversely, the very system of interstate
relations that has become universal in the years since World War II, and (b) that
external agents can playa part in raising the level of living-and of the state of
the economy and of the governmental and other organizations that direct it-of
the less developed states of the world.
The drive to development, on the other hand, is by no means mainly ex-
ternally stimulated. The nationalist surge to independence was not simply
motivated; it sought independence politically from alien rule, but it was also
motivated by a belief that low living standards and other dimensions of under-
development were primarily the result of foreign control and exploitation. The
termination of colonial rule, it was believed, would be followed by a veritable
millennium of progress and prosperity. Independence came much earlier than
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most Asians and Africans believed it would, but, for the most part, it did not
prove to be the dramatic beginning of a new and exciting era of rapid material
development or improved living standards. But neither did it prove-again, for
the most part-to be frustrating to the point of resignation and abandonment.
Trying and often bitter setbacks notwithstanding, the new states have remained
true to their previously proclaimed goals of modernizing in various ways their
still largely underdeveloped societies.
Both the new system of interstate relations and the multifaceted phenomenon
of development, achieved and desired, have been studied by growing numbers of
sch()lars. But the relationship between foreign policy and development has been
only modestly explored. This is surprising in view of the increasingly empha-
sized influence of "internal" factors upon foreign policy formulation and execu-
tion in the literature of international relations since the early 1950's. The impact
upon foreign policy of ideology, public opinion, elite composition, and the press
-among other variables-has been studied. But no studies have sought to in-
vestigate the influence upon foreign policy of the level of development of a state
or states seeking to influence one or more other states, or the states toward which
such efforts are directed. Often some of the factors that have come to be con-
sidered within the general concept of development, such as the level of technical
education in a country, have been treated but almost always as separate factors
in their own right.
Development, as is being realized, is by no means wholly an economic
phenomenon. Indeed, many of the most exciting studies in the social sciences in
recent years have been those that have broken genuinely new ground in the
pursuit of greater understanding of political development. And some have even
explored the relationship between political and economic development. Develop-
ment, as employed here, refers to the array of characteristics by which some
!tates are judged to be more advanced than others: the organization and tech-
nology by which production is pursued, to be sure-that is, economic develop-
ment-but also role specialization in general in the society, swift and mass
communication and transportation systems, political processes in which whole
populations are involved (though the nature of this involvement may vary), and
educational facilities that are widespread as well as increasingly technically
oriented.
This complex phenomenon, so much the concern of governments and scholars
today, has received little more than passing notice in the literature of interna-
tional relations. This is especially surprising since most of the studies of inter-
national relations-and of the foreign policies of particular states-have dealt
with Britain or France or the United States or others of the western countries
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even in the years since the emergence of the new states in Asia and Africa. Given
the fact that the European countries dominated most of the rest of the world
during the heyday of colonialism largely because of their greater development
(including their administrative and political organization as well as their tech-
nological and productive superiority), it is surprising that level of development
has not been treated as a major variable in any of the leading studies in the
international relations field. In part this is a consequence of the unnatural historic
division in political science between the fields of "international" relations and
"internal" politics (w'hether the latter be "American" or "comparative" politics).
This parochiality is breaking down, but this has been a development of only the
last few years. Its legacy, unfortunately, is still very much with us.
Students of the underdeveloped states have played a major role in pioneering
the developmental approach to comparative political analysis. The link between
level of development, however-political, economic, or technological-and
foreign policy has not yet been vigorously pursued. The fact is that we know far
too little about the influence of the level of development upon either initiating
or responding states in the international political arena. We also need to know
much more about the ways in which international politics itself has changed as a
consequence of the fact that a majority of its present-day participants would un-
doubtedly be classified as "underdeveloped" by most scholars. Capability
analysts, primarily but not exclusively in government, have long sought to
evaluate the influence of diverse domestic factors-ranging from energy re-
sources to imprecisely calculated considerations of national "character" or "will"
-upon various countries' warmaking, or defense, capacities. The fact alone of
stalemated American military activity in Vietnam ought to raise serious doubts
respecting just how much we really know about the complex interaction be-
tween ~/developed" and ~~underdeveloped" countries.
Behavior-of which foreign policy is a part-is a reaction to stimulus. This
has long been recognized in the literature of international relations. However,
what reacts and how it reacts are probably a function of what have conven-
tionally been considered "internal" factors. Of course, they are no longer wholly
"internal" factors-being themselves much influenced by external example and
even assistance. Indeed, the whole notion of separate spheres of "international"
and "internal" politics-or economics, for that matter-appears anachronistic.
Recognition of this condition, however, does not make the task of analysis any
easier, but it does improve the likelihood of more accurate and realistic answers
to any questions that may be posed.
Given ever-increasing relations among peoples across traditional national
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lines and the widening (rather than narrowing) gap between the more advanced
countries and the less developed ones, the questions posed by the relationship
between foreign policy and development may be among the most important of
our times. For example, how is international politics influenced by the modest
levels of economic development and sometimes pronounced political instability
of many of its participants who, as former colonies that have been recently
emancipated, have yet to achieve effective integration as states in fact as well as
in form? Do these states behave differently from those that are more econom-
ically advanced and possess increasingly complex and specialized economic,
political, and other social institutions? Is level of development-economic, po-
litical, or otherwise-a more or less important variable than, say, size, location,
or historical animosities and friendships?
States are invariably targets of other countries' foreign policies, which raises
other questions of vulnerability or receptivity as a function of the level of de-
velopment. Is it easier for the United States, for example, to influence the be-
havior of an underdeveloped country than to influence a more developed
country? Or, to put the question in slightly different form, are there special
limitations faced by the American government (or those of the U.S.S.R., Britain,
or Japan) in seeking to provoke particular responses from nations less advanced
than itself? And, if it is easier to influence such states, is success, so to speak,
worth the effort in view of the more limited capabilities and contributions of such
states to the resolution of the major problems that are the main concerns of in-
ternational politics today?
If the behavior of a country is influenced by such factors as its landholding
arrangements or the nature of its economy, how effectively can another nation
induce change in these areas? The United States, for example, is constantly
criticized by its own citizens and others for cooperating with governments of
countries ruled by narrowly based political elites who allegedly run their lands
in veritable feudal fashion. Some say that the United States should not cooperate
with such governments, which might mean limited relations with more than
half the nations in the world today; others assert that the United States should
use the power allegedly implicit in its level of development and wealth as well as
its size to force such countries to change themselves in various ways. But, even
given the much more developed economy and advanced technology of the
United States, can it (or the Soviet Union or any other country) shape in a
formative fashion the development of other nations? In what circumstances is
it likely to succeed, in what circumstances likely to fail?
There has been disagreement even in the area of economic change, the most
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extensively studied dimension of development, as to how to go about the task.
Should capital-deficient underdeveloped countries encourage, or discourage,
foreign private investment? To what extent should an answer to this question be
governed by the levels of development of the investing and recipient countries?
Can trade, historically an important type of foreign relations, play a major role
in economic development, and has it done so in the past? Can too much (as well
as too little) economic and technical assistance be given an underdeveloped
country? And how is the appropriate level to be determined?
A major controversy has existed for several years in the United States re-
specting the relative merits of economic and military aid. It has been claimed,
among other things, that military aid strengthens recipient states in such ways,
and to such an extent, as to prejudice the possibility of the democratic political
development of these lands. This in turn raises the question of why military aid
is given and also why it is.solicited or accepted by new states lacking in so many
other dimensions of development. Does foreign military assistance, for example,
free internally generated resources for other purposes, or does it increase the
likelihood that a country will spend an even higher percentage of its limited
resources on its military organization? Does military aid increase the likelihood
of soldiers' coming to political power in a developing country?
Foreign policy behaviors almost always are possessed of both political and
economic consequences. Because it can be measured more easily and because so
much more (at least comparatively) is. known about it, economic development
has received far more attention to date than has its less ~asily defined and under-
stood political counterpart. But political development may well influence the
economic development of a country at least as much as this same political de-
velopment is itself affected by the character and state of a country's economy.
Military and paramilitary operations may be employed to topple or salvage a
friendly government among the developing states, although the case of Vietnam
suggests that this may be a very costly and possibly unsuccessful enterprise,
while foreign agents have long sought to influence both the policies and the
politics of other states. But can outside powers advance to any significant degree
the political development of even weaker, less developed states in directions not
deemed desirable by the leaders and peoples of these countries? And to what
extent do the character and stability of their national politics effect their foreign
policy?
Obviously, comprehensive answers to all these questions cannot be given in
seven short studies. But the questions are raised in these studies, and suggestions
of answers-in some cases quite specific, if tentative, suggestions-are made.
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The papers that pose and seek to answer these questions were prepared for a
monthlong conference on "Foreign Policy and Development" held in August 1967
at the University of Kentucky by the William Andrew Patterson School of
Diplomacy and International Commerce. The participants in this conference
were eight distinguished scholars seriously devoted to questions of both foreign
policy and development.
Wilson Carey McWilliams of the Department of Political Science, Brooklyn
College, deals with the theoretical framework basic to a study of the relationship
of foreign policy and political development. Gayl D. Ness of the Department of
Sociology, University of Michigan, examines three cases of successful American
influence brought to bear in a special area of social change in other countries-
and two cases of failure. Henry Bienen of the Department of Politics, Princeton
University, concerns himself with the question of United States military assist-
ance and political change on the continent of Africa. Benjamin Higgins of the
Department of Economics, Uniyersity of Montreal, surveys the subject of foreign
economic policy and development, particularly the role of the still-young foreign
policy tool of aid. Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend of the Department of Po-
litical Science and the Department of Psychology, San Diego State College,
present an analysis dealing with all the world's countries which is suggestive of
several relationships between the level of development and foreign policy be-
havior. Lloyd Jensen of the Department of Political Science, University of Ken-
tucky, inquires into the relationship between political stability as an aspect of
political development and the conflict behavior of India and Pakistan. Rupert
Emerson of the Department of Government, Harvard University, addresses
himself to the problem of American relations with the less developed countries
and the contrasts between such relations and those with the more developed
European states.
These papers are proof not only of the importance of the problems inherent
in their subject but also of the value of various methodological approaches used
by scholars from the different social sciences. Because the Kentucky conference's
main emphasis was upon foreign policy, most of the participants were political
scientists. Their approaches to the question differed, however, as did those of
the economist and the sociologist. The Feierabends' paper uses gross data analy-
sis, Jensen's is a case study of the Indian-Pakistani relationship, Ness compares
American behavior in five situations separated by time and geography, Bienen
looks at military aid in a particular regional setting, McWilliams approaches his
subject primarily from a theoretical viewpoint, Emerson's contribution is his-
torical and analytical, and that of Higgins is both analytical and prescriptive.
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If there is something to learn from the results of these studies, there may also
be something to learn from the various approaches they reflect. It may be that
no other area is as much in need of the insights of various social sciences and
their differing methodologies as the complex relationship between foreign policy
and development.
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CHAPTER ONE
POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT
AND
FOREIGN POLICY
WILSON CAREY McWILLIAMS
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DE TOCQUEVILLE wrote, "A new science of politics is needed for a new
world." 1 In our time, change has created what seems more a bewildering series
of unfamiliar worlds than a single new one, and it is no' surprise that political
scientists have felt the same need. Yet they have not always understood, as
de Tocqueville did, that a new science must return to old questions, that the
perennial is never more important than in the transition from the obsolete to
the untried.
No scien~e of politics is possible without a definition of "the political," yet
no satisfactory definition exists among students of political development. It is
easy to understand why men eager to confront the fascinating variety and
troubling problems of contemporary life are tempted to avoid the question;
millennia of debate have not produced agreement among political philosophers.
Yet in a new world, confusion is a protection against dogma, a surety against a
narrow vision blind to much of reality. In fact, the effort to avoid timeless con-
fusions only results in the pursuit of lines that are time-bound without being
less confused.
"Political development" has meant for most social scientists the politics of
development. Politics, whatever it may mean, has been secondary; development,
the direction of historical change, primary. The concept of development has
itself been peculiar: as Michael Walzer writes, it is not an idea of progress but
of "progress realized" that informs research.2 Developing states are separated
from developed ones in ways which suggest that change, or at least qualitative
change, has come to an end in the latter.
Such categories may be useful in the making of policy: a developing state is
one that humbles itself sufficiently to ask for assistance from another which may
then regard itself as developed.3 Even in this sense, dichotomy dissolves into con-
tinuity: Ghana, Israel, China, and a host of others would have to be classified as
developing in comparison to some states and developed in relation to others.
In a more genuine sense, all states are developing, for all are subject to the
universal history resulting from the expansion of the European state system into
a single, global political process. Associated with that expansion has been the
whole complex of tendencies, uncertain at the edges, which has been termed
"modern": science, secularism, empathy, social mobilization, mass communica-
tion, and the like.4
To forget the universality of history is to forget that all states are modern:
13
the environment of Ghana is not that of England in 1689 but of the superpowers
in the 1960's.0 The demands of that environment are greater on all states than
in any past time. Moreover, many problems of the developing states are not
specific but general: they result from a total international environment and can-
not be solved by those states themselves.
Comparative politics inevitably involves categories of similarity and unlike-
ness, and the dichotomy between developed and developing states conceals more
than it reveals. Moreover, it is a Western doctrine, vaguely contemptuous in
tone; it suggests that to learn the universal and general, men should study those
states that are developed, whereas to learn the exotic and particular, men should
study those states that are developing.
De Tocqueville suggested, by c~ntrast, that in a world of a truly international
politics and universal history, the study of the n,ew states may teach the old
much about themselves. The forces of change and the direction of movement,
he argued, are harder to discern in states insulated by wealth and established
institutions, easier in states where the tasks are harder and stark confrontation
exists between men and the forces of their times. The new states may, then, be
developing not in the direction of the old, but in the direction that will be fol-
lowed by the old.
Each state is unique in some ways, yet if due allowance is made for such
peculiarities, we may be able to perceive in the new states the outlines of our
future political condition. Insofar as that condition is unappealing, it may allow
us to consider in time measures that may serve to avert it.
For one school of political theorists, politics and foreign policy are essentially
identical. Man is isolated, individualistic, self-seeking, and always a foreigner to
his fellows. Such states as he contrives are little more than alliances in which men
are bound together by fear of foes--of nature, of one another, and of other men
-and by hope for gain at the expense of nature and men who remain outside.
The word "foreign" belies the theory. It derives from foras, "out-of-doQrs"
or "outside," what is distinct from the hearth and away from home. "Foreign"
is a term without content, meaning only "that which is not domestic." At least
in the origin of the word, there would have been no foreigners unless there were
some with whom a man was "at home."
Man is a social animal in this, if nothing else: that he is born to dependence,
and his security depends on inherited things. The "domestic" is that social space
which is the given of man's early life. He need only accept the terms of the gift,
the habits and commandments of his blood kin, to find it a world that is peaceful,
predictable, and even friendly. Ignorant and weak, man approaches the world
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hesitantly and with suspicion: the domestic order proves to be trustworthy, until
man comes to expect it to be hospitable. The "foreign," by contrast, is an en-
vironment that has not offered such proof, or that has givens which conflict
with and endanger those of domesticity: in either case, the burden of proof lies
with the foreigner and peace is not to be expected without some overt act of
friendship.
Providing for man's physical survival and emotional security earns for the
domestic order man's deepest gratitude. Indeed, so essential are its benefits that
man identifies himself with the domestic, a sentiment that is best called patriot-
ism, the devotion to the land and people of one's fathers. De Tocqueville wrote:
"There is one sort of patriotic attachment which principally arises from that
instinctive, disi~terested, and undefined feeling which connects the affections
of man with his birthplace. This natural fondness is united to a taste for ancient
customs and to a reverence for ancestral traditions; those who cherish it love
their country as they love the mansion of their fathers. They enjoy the tran-
quility which it affords them; they are attached to the reminiscences which it
awakens; they cling to the peaceful habits which they have contracted in its
bosom; and they are pleased by the state of obedience in which they are
placed." 6
The horror of treason is, in part, that it introduces (or reintroduces) foreign-
ness into domestic space. In early definitions, in fact, crimes against kindred or
the peace were as much parts of treason as was betrayal of the state.7
Yet as men grow in security, they begin to question the distinction between
domestic and foreign things. Patriotism is the first refuge of man but it is also
"the last refuge of a scoundrel" because it is at best a low-ranking sentiment in
the hierarchy of human excellence.
Socrates found the origins of patriotism by examining the behavior of dogs,
not that of men. Dogs, he pointed out, are "by instinct perfectly gentle to those
they know and are accustomed to, and fierce to enemies." This, S.ocrates sug-
gested, is very "philosophic" of the canine: "the only mark by which the dog
distinguishes a friendly and an unfriendly face is that he knows one and does
not know the other, and if a creature makes that the test of what it finds con-
genial or otherwise, how can you deny that it has a passion for knowledge and
understanding?" 8
The irony, of course, only calls attention to the radical defect of "knowledge"
which is based on no more than appearance and habit. But the patriotic behavior
of men is based on a knowledge no more precise. Earlier in The Republic the
patriotic thesis that justice is helping friends and hurting enemies is defended
by Polemarchus who has inherited the argument from his father as most men
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inherit home, kinsmen, and political loyalties. Men, Polemarchus is forced to
admit, often mistake for friends those who are really enemies (and vice versa),
and men's obligations lie to their true friends, the good and the just.9
Trust of blood kin and of friends-by-inheritance is at best an approximate
tool: blood kin may still betray, and strangers may befriend. Moreover, inherited
loyalties are impersonal: they are based on a love of my ancestors and not of me
and are automatic only at the cost of personal meaning. The painful experience
of unexpected betrayal, the joyous encounter with unexpected friendship, the
search for affection that is personal, all combine with men's reason to challenge
patriotism. Moreover, since patriotism is based on the feeling that loyalties are
given, once challenged it can never be recovered.
"Government," Paine once wrote, "is a badge of lost innocence." In this much
he was right: that political society emerges only when men become conscious of
uncertainty in the meaning of justice and of choice in their relations with their
fellows. Blood kinship must be subordinated to the demands of unity with those
we believe to be our true friends, who share with us an idea of justice. De Toc-
queville observed that in addition to patriotism, "there is another species of
attachment to a country which is more rational. ... It is perhaps less generous
and less ardent, but it is more fruitful and more lasting; it is coeval with the
spread of knowledge, it is nurtured by the laws, it grows by the exercise of civil
rights and, in the end, it is confounded with the personal interest of the
citizen." 10
Relations based on choice and justice make the boundaries of the state
permeable: one not born among us may aspire to become a citizen. Moreover,
the claims of justice-that we must do what is due another-ehange relations
with outsiders. A citizen must help his friends, who have a claim o~ ~im, but he
ought not to harm outsiders unless they have proved hostile. In foreign policy,
the principle of political society is innocent until proved guilty; the principle of
patriotism is the reverse. Hence, aliens may live among citizens without neces-
sarily introducing foreignness among them or threatening the state. (Pole-
marchus, who was a resident alien in Athens, should have seen as much.)
Yet political society is not simply the empire of reason. Men will demand
the good life only when they are certain that mere life is secure: they will not
surrender the physical and emotional security of domesticity until those goods
are guaranteed by another society. As Ignazio Silone wrote of intellectuals who
broke their ties with family in order to devote themselves to the proletarian
cause, political loyalty begins with a "choice of comrades" and not of doctrines.11
Civic loyalty, being based on choice, is never so secure as patriotism. Those
who choose to be with us may choose to desert us; we ourselves may find that
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an idea of justice that once seemed good now seems inadequate; we may find
friends who seem truer than our fellow citizens. Even under the best circum-
stances, the emotions of man hesitate at the brink of commitment and hold
something back: the sentiment, as de Tocqueville remarked, is "less ardent" than
patriotism.
The best circumstances require that the security of civic relations be strength-
ened as much as possible. Oaths and pledges may help to provide it, and the
earliest political societies strove to make a man's word so identical with his self
that he would regard the breaking of it as moral suicide. (Our modern idea of
treason partly derives from Treubruch, the breaking of a pledge.) 12
We can accept the word of another, or can bind ours~lves to him, only to
the extent that we know him. We can find the security of shared emotions only
with those we know within the limited boundaries that are the outer limits of
sensation. In this sense, political society can emerge and can be at its most
secure only among a comparatively small number of friends and citizens: the
population of a polis, Aristotle observed, must always be surveyable.1s
Great states and empires have more than one appeal to men, yet they con-
tain the seeds of political decay. As de Tocqueville put it, "The ambition of the
citizens increases with the power of the state; the strength of parties, with the
importance of the ends they have in view; but that of devotion to the common-
weal ... is not stronger than in a small republic. It might, indeed, be proved
without difficulty to be less powerful and less sincere." 14
Whatever the devotion of the founders of empire to one another, the second
generation-like that of any state-will be born to domesticity: the political
order will be an inherited given, a fatherland. In all states, political education
must combat this tendency for citizenship to disintegrate into patriotism by seek-
ing to reproduce in the child the experience of the father.
If, to achieve this end, the great empire restricts citizenship to a surveyable
few, those who are excluded become, in effect, aliens: the state is many, not one,
with all the instability and weakness which follows from that fact. Moreover,
the cares of governing will naturally scatter citizens about their domains: they
are likely to become emotionally distant from one another.
But, if all men are admitted to citizenship, even if they share political ideals,
the commandments of justice and the good to the mind of man will be at war
with his emotions. Not only will most of his fellow citizens remain unknown,
man will feel himself insignificant, unimportant, and threatened among them.
He may obey the dictates of political authority, but he will retain his emotions
within the domestic sphere, changing their objects only when he moves from his
family of birth to a family of which he is head. In a recent study, Robert Wesson
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confirms the classic thesis: "it may be considered a bit unnatural that the area
of the state should be much larger than the limits of human interaction. It is
understandable that those who live and work together and know their common
needs should manage their common affairs, defend their community, and give
their resources for the general good. On the other hand, that men should obey
and give ... the fruit of their labors to a distant authority that they know only
by hearsay, that they should fight and risk their skins to defend far-off borders
against peoples of whom they know nothing-all this represents great institu-
tional development over the simpler state of mankind." 15 Yet the"development"
to which Wesson refers is that of institutions, not of men: "The empire can tell
men, in its accepted ideology or style that they should give of themselves, but it
strives in vain to make them feel why. . .. In the city-state, love of homeland
means love of the state; in the empire, they are virtually opposites.... the em-
pire raises conflicts between conformity to the official order and devotion to
one's own. . .. Only a handful can see themselves as responsible and important
in making the future of the community. . .. Civic spirit means involvement in
something, responsibility before equals, a sense that our world needs us to make
justice and prosperity.... the great political order ... turns loose hearts while
subjecting minds." 16
Whatever the dreams of his imagination or the dictates of his reason, the
emotions of man would keep all his loyalty in the narrowest compass possible:
beyond a certain number of men, he gives no loyalty at all and is induced to act
only for gain or fear for self, and neither sentiment is political.
Yet the small state has difficulties of its own. It is weakened when reason
sweeps beyond its parochial boundaries and sees justice as a universal and man-
kind as a kindred; emotion resists loyalties but the mind shatters them. More
important, perhaps, is the fact that defeat in war may well mean the extinction
of a small state and only an inconvenience for a large one. (In our times, how-
ever, this distinction may have almost vanished.)
Fear of defeat is dangerous because it contributes to a concern for the re-
quirements of foreign policy. The proper center for a political society is internal,
on its ideal of justice between citizens. In foreign policy, though policy may be
guided by justice, the means are commanded not by what is just but by what is
necessary. The attitudes of citizens are less important than the attitudes of
foreigners. Democracy is most endangered, for foreign policy tends to demand a
sure and swift hand and a cosmopolitan expertise. The classical political theorists
presumed that a truly excellent state could exist only if it were so situated as to
need no foreign policy; it is significant that it is soldiers, men with the virtue of
dogs, who Plato predicts would be the first to overthrow the republic. There is,
in other words, a conflict between the political and foreign policy.
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Political development, then, entails, in addition to its other requirements, a
low salience of foreign affairs. That alone is a gloomy conclusion when applied
to the circumstances of our time. No more cheering is the belief that a true
political order must be a small one: "in this matter, as in many others, the argu-
ment derived from the necessity of the case predominates over all others. If
none but small nations existed, I do not doubt that mankind would be more
happy and more free; but the existence of great nations is unavoidable." 17
That there is thought to be one process of development for mankind is a re-
flection of the universalization of politics. The expansion of human power over
man and nature, originating in the West, has created an international politics
to which all states must respond or perish; the effort to acquire that power pro-
vides the logic of development.18
The motives that have induced men to pursue such power are plural. In part,
the quest has resulted from threat; imperialism made clear, if men's fears had
not, that the choices of men had narrowed to the alternatives of changing or
being changed. In part, it has been the consequence of ridicule; science has made
many of the religions and cosmologies which served as the intellectual bases of
human cultures seem a tissue of folly, and men fear to play the fool. Perhaps
most basic and original to the pursuit of power has been the desire for physical
well-being-for greater health and for the prospect of greater and now nearly
unlimited affluence. "Low prices," wrote Karl Marx, "are the heavy artillery of
the bourgeoisie," more effective than cannon in inducing change because they
undermine walls from within. Yet all these motives share a common quality: they
appeal to passions that are essentially individual, if not individualizing, in na-
ture. Moreover, and partly as a consequence, they have implied" a decline of the
political: they have made foreign policy not only salient but the most vital con-
sideration of political life, and they have commanded the great state which
could acquire and protect power as small states could not. The small states of
the world survive only as dependencies of, or by the sufferance of, the greater.
Many have observed that the desire for dignity, the yearning to "matter," is
a central motive of the developing states.19 As that term is commonly used, in
fact, "developing states" refers to the "undignified states": to the passive units
of international life that have been forced to change regardless of their desires,
to those that must humble themselves to ask others for assistance. Economic
backwardness or military weakness cannot account for the fact that Brazil or
Mexico are often classed with the developing states whereas Spain, Portugal,
and Greece are not. The latter states, however, once had a moment when they
flashed on the pages of universal history and their present feelings of indignity
are assuaged, in part, by memories of past glory.20
The yearning for dignity, however, is part of a general reaction to the mod-
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ern world-a product of it and a reaction against it-and is not limited in
locale. As it shatters the traditional structures that invested men with dignity,
modern life inhibits, where it does not prevent, the formation of new ones.
Reason is largely inadequate for the creative task. The rationalism of modern
life is functional, not substantive: it fulfills the needs of the system and not of
men. To ignore the emotional needs of men is to undermine the foundation on
which reason must rest, and in modern societies groups that are large enough to
effect results tend to be too large to be meaningful to the individual. Even groups
that might express the deepest desires of many are often stillborn. It is not
enough for men to share attitudes: they must be able to communicate that fact
to others and, once that has been achieved, they must find the resources of
wealth and organizational skill to give these attitudes a political reality. In wide
areas of life, citizens of the industrial states become subject to great organiza-
tions, public or private, which they did not create and to which they can create
no alternative-to which the individual matters very little indeed. Such groups
will be resented whatever benefits they convey.21
The nation itself, modern man's effort to recapture the atmosphere of the
patria or the polis, is an abstraction and not a community. Cemented by habit, by
appearance, or by symbol, it is vastly larger than the emotional universe of men,
and their devotion to it is always ambiguous and tinged with resentment. Aggres-
sion toward outsiders is not only an outlet for such resentment: our still-greater
difference from foreigners provides the major positive basis for loyalty toward
those we do not know and who are unlike us in vital respects. The loyalty of
men to the polis entails hostility as a secondary consequence of affection; na-
tionalism demands it from its very nature, and is necessarily and not inci-
dentally an "anti-feeling." 22
Private emotion and public reason are radically separated. In the great indus-
trial states, the former may be quieted by affluence; public frustration finds a
compensation in private gratification. Yet the "primordial sentiments" which
Clifford Geertz observes in developing states are present in all and find expres-
sion in moments of economic failure or political anxiety.23
Morally confused and uncertain men in the least developed nations, finding
no dignified place in modern settings, may find release in internal aggression,
asserting the claims of embattled traditionalism against the state. The most
developed have shattered traditional groups almost beyond repair but may allow
men the luxury of an affluent privatism and familism-sentiments truly pri-
mordial. The "mid-modern" state, finding either alternative difficult, may be
driven to external aggression in consequence. Yet such assertions and retreats
only partly mask the conviction that the self is worthless, a necessary conse-
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quence when a state of war exists between emotion and reason and man be-
comes a foreigner to himself.24
The search for dignity in a world of expanded scale and accelerated change
tends to reinforce, not to weaken, the direction and pace of change. Seemingly
unable to control the process, men have hoped to find dignity by leading it; men
find solace for their passivity in being able to compel others to follow their
lead.25
The new nations, long forced to follow, seek to escape that necessity and, in
an ultimate sense, to lead others in their turn. Indeed, the .ability to control one's
_own destiny in an interdependent world requires the ability to control others.
Yet it is a sad fact that the undignified men of the great states will regard the
self-assertion of the new states as a threat to their qwn dignity. Indeed, the long
history of leadership by the great states only leads their citizens to regard that
status as a matter of right and threats to it as a violation, and not a measure,
of justice.
Samuel Huntington's model of political development suggests that most
developing states have moved from "primitive" or "contained" political systems
to a "corrupt" variety based on high mobilization and low institutionalization.26
This is probably accurate, yet Huntington implies that developed states are in a
different, /Icivic" situation in which institutionalization is high.
Organization, however, is not institution: it may be effective, but it has no
claim on the loyalties of men. An institutional system presumes that certain
patterns of organization and behavior become so deeply identified with goals
and values as to acquire a moral value themselves. Institutionalization, then,
tends to require a history of successful action. Yet, as Huntington points out, any
transformation of the political environment threatens institutions, for in a new
environment prescribed procedures may fail to attain the desired result.
In part, it has been the cumulative effect of change that has forced political
scientists to discard institutional models in favor of the study of process. Seventy
years ago, if not earlier, political observers noted that politics had evaded the
constraints of the American constitutional order.27 Increasingly, in all states, the
statute law, tortuous in enactment and rigid in structure, is replaced by vague
statements whose substance is supplied by administrative decision; "unconstitu-
tional delegation of power" has almost vanished as a category of law.28
This tendency is especially marked in foreign policy. When war and peace
are no longer distinct states, the declaration of war becomes a formality or is
ignored. Constitutional dictatorship, once a resort in desperate situations, be-
comes the rule in an international environment that makes ever greater demands
for expertise, speed, and secrecy. Constraints on these tendencies are provided
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by the unofficial pressures of groups and the inertia of complex organization,
not from institutions associated with public values.29
That these conditions exist in states with longstanding constitutional tradi-
tions, as well as the goods of modern social and economic organization, sug-
gests a general movement in the direction of corrupt systems. The person of the
executive bulks large in all systems. Lack of organization may allow the leaders
of new states greater latitude in changes of policy and alignment; the smaller
latitude of the leaders of great states is more than compensated for by the
magnitude of power available to them. The choice between war and peace may
be narrow, but dimensions become irrelevant when the result of the choice is
human survival.
Charisma is a necessity of all states: where institutions fail, men must trust
those men on whom they depend. Indeed, modern charisma emphasizes not the
difference between leader and led but their essential identity; the mass audience
is on a first-name basigo with truly modern leaders.
Political parties are, as Huntington suggests, a possible source for new
institutions, but they are not a panacea. The more institutional a party system,
the greater its tendency to obsolescence: it may ignore the concerns of its
constituents and lose its claim to their .loyalty.so Moreover, in any moment of
crisis it is not the party that decides; decisions must be made by a few men or
by one. Nor is the party exempt from the effects of size; to be successful, it must
be so large as to threaten its meaningfulness to its partisans.
Modern ·states demanded institutionalization b~cause the community was
too large and fissiparous to act for itself, especially in crisis situations, and
required the constraint of institutions to guarantee that government acted
within the limits of public purpose. As institutions decline, there is a need for
new constraints; those who by situation or by personal character are able to act
may have a duty to act for the community. Old concepts are beginning to
emerge from the dusty files of political thought: civil disobedience, military
intervention, and even tyrannicide. It is suggestive that in the new nations such
ideas have completely conquered the barrier between conception and action.
Indeed, civil disobedience, now fashionable in the great states, owes much of its
modern origin to its success in India. In this, as in many things, the new states
may be the prophets for the old.
Ideas are vital to the survival-or to the recovery-of such aspects of
politics as may be possible in modern life. To be able -to control the process of
change, men must overleap events; they must use their minds to foresee the·
tendency of things and how they may be altered. More important, they must be
able to conceive that those tendencies ought to be altered, to construct an ideal
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of the political good independent of history or probability. It is as essential to
human freedom to be able to resist history as to resist the state. Yet the empire
of development tends to extend its sway over the minds, as well as the actions,
of statesmen and citizens.
The advent of the modern world involved, necessarily, a break with the
older notion that had seen time as an almost changeless dimension of human
ex~stence through which men sometimes were able to glimpse ultimate reality.
It involved an effort by men to control their destiny by mastering the forces of
nature. Put another way, it involved a deprecation of aspiration-the longing
of men for ideal things-and an elevation of expectation-the anticipation of
receiving them. Even at best, however, expectation is a lower standard; it is
(limited, as aspiration is not, by the standard of probability: "many have
imagined principalities and republics which have never been seen or known to
exist in reality [wrote Machiavelli]; for how we live is so far removed from how
we ought to live that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done
will rather learn to bring qbout his own ruin than his preservation ... it is
necessary for a prince ... to learn how not to be good and to use this knowl-
edge or not to use it according to the necessity of the case." Sl
Yet the Florentine hoped that men might control half of the circumstances of
their lives; mOen should seek to understand natural and political necessity in
order to master it. Human purpose remained logically sovereign over prediction.
By the nineteenth century, however, the expanded scale of poli~ical life, the
birth of technology, and the growth of organizational power had so far de-
veloped that men began to doubt the capacity of ideas to control history. The
ideas of men gain strength slowly, even with expanded facilities for education
and communication, and are forced to begin again with each new generation.
The forces of technical and organizational power could transform the environ-
ment in a historical moment. Ideas tended to be obsolescent: "Minerva's owl
takes wing only as dusk descends." Yet the "scientific" historians of the nine-
teenth century ventured to hope that if men could not control history they could
at least predict it; unable to win a victory himself, man could at least be on the
winning side. Even Marx, who saw the real task as that of changing the world,
felt impelled to base his vision on an inevitable process and to mock the
utopians who trusted the force of ideas alone.32
Even that creed has been denied to contemporary men. Predicting the
advance of science and technology has proved almost impossible; Wohlstetter
writes that it amounts to guessing what darkness will reveal when made light.sS
Theories of political progress, moreover, have been rendered desperately un-
certain when they have not been shattered beyond repair.
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In a period of accelerated change, the past becomes psychologically more
distant, the unpredictable future ever more immediate. The safe haven of
experience becomes the backwater of obsolescence. Ortega commented that the
experience of generations has become so radically distinct as drastically to limit
the possibilities of communication between them.34 Yet that too is a doctrine of
the past: in the too-often-quoted advice to distrust those over thirty it is not
hard to hear a yearning to be able to trust those under thirty, to escape the
boundaries of time which separate one man from his fellows. As the unpredicta-
ble future has rushed nearer, thoughts have centered on dark anxieties, a
tendency which reflects not only prudence but the growth of human power,
which has given men more to fear and more to lose.
The end of ideology is, in fact, the final triumph of development over the
frail barriers of doctrine with which men had sought to surround it. The effort
to predict history, like ..the effort to control it, is surrendered and men are
counseled to adapt themselves to the present as best they may.
Political life has always moderated the enthusiasm for ideas with the
sobriety of responsibility. Amid the perils and uncertainties of the time, it is to
be expected that political men should shorten their perspective; each day's
survival may seem a sufficient success. Moreover, the intellectual climate of
modernity imposes the same result. Expectation is anticipation, a "taking
before," laying mental hands on what is not yet possessed. To deny men what
they expect is to commit theft, to ste~l what has already been psychologically
acquired; theft, in turn, demands that one locate the thief. Failure to meet
expectation is a crime to be punished, and the environment of constantly rising
expectations-a nearly universal aspect of modern politics-puts great pres-
sures on government to be successful (or, at least, to locate another thief).
Whatever the causes, preoccupation with the day-to-day and with immediate
success makes politics, in an age of change, little more than organized drift.
Symbols bulk larger in the politics of developing nations than in those of
the industrial· states. Yet the importance of symbols is a mark of material weak-
ness, an effort to "tie the hands of one's enemy with his own inhibitions" and to
strengthen one's own morale with the inspiration of rhetoric.35 Doctrines are
valued only secondarily for intellectual content or logical structure (the vague-
ness and incoherence of ideologies in new states would suggest as much). The
first principle is simple: those beliefs are felt true which are thought to advance
the quest for dignity.
Formal creeds, for example, are heavily influenced by international fashion-
ableness. Fascist doctrines, prominent before World War II, have almost van-
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ished. Nonviolence had a vogue, especially because it is suited to the militarily
weak, but India, its principal exponent, has demonstrated few qualms in the use
of force when it seemed to further national aims.36
New states, insistent on narrowing the "domestic jurisdiction" clause of the
U.N. Charter, have been sensitive when that clause touched their own cases,
resolving the ambiguity only by the doctrine that colonialism is an "objective
crime" and a "permanent aggression." National self-determination, the basis of
that doctrine, has always been ambiguous; in multiethnic new states, it has been
interpreted so tortuously as to lose almost all meaning.37
Even more bizarre cases are available; the doctrinaire Chinese were able to
support the feudal aristocracy of Burundi, to trade with South Africa (data are
no longer public), and even, according to some reports, to sell steel and
equipment to the United States for use in Vietnam.38
Leaders of the new states have often assumed striking and propagandistic
poses that have appealed to Wester!} intellectuals offended by the lack of sym-
bolic luster in the politics of their own states. Yet such leaders have also demon-
strated great agility in deserting one set of symbols for another. Fidel Castro's
opportune discovery of his lifelong attachment to Leninism is paralleled by
Sekou Toure's announcement that he was returning nationalized industries to
private hands, having only assumed control in order to delude communist states
into providing aid. 39
Such rapid changes of front are made possible by the weakness of new
states. The same logic of complex society which makes economic costs inflexible
downward makes foreign policies inflexible backward; past commitments con-
strain, change must proceed slowly, tempered by reassurance. This ponderous
diplomacy is a mark of power; lack of constraint in new states is a mark of
weakness. In fact, leaders in new states are often compelled by the lack of a
trained diplomatic service to assume a dominant role in foreign policy.40 The
term "charisma" conceals more than it reveals; as the magnetism of a leader
must vary with the followers he would attract, so the style of the statesman
differs depending on whether his state is a lion or a fox.
Symbols affect the conduct of policy i they may be indicators of what states
prefer. Preference may exclude some forms of action. Modibo Keita's assertion
that only states of similar ideology should attempt regional union excludes such
attempts where symbols are too radically different. Yet Keita did not promise
success where symbols are similar; preference will he abandoned when the costs
are too great. Julius Kambarage Nyerere, for example, offered to delay Tangan-
yikan independence to promote East African Federation, yet felt compelled to
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follow policies that rendered that federation improbable. Nor will states seek to
extract a price, if one can be had, for even painless stands on principle; various
abortive West African unions were cemented with Ghanaian loans.41
Even at their most powerful, symbols are neither ideologies nor political
philosophies, and it seems likely that even symbols will decline in importance as
new states develop material and organizational resources. The great states,
unable entirely to free themselves from the encumbrance of ideology, lag behind.
However peripheral, our continued concern for doctrine is a remnant of a more
distant past; the new states are closer to the future.
The concept of a sharp distinction between domestic and foreign politics has
close associations with the modern nation-state. It was related to the expansion
of central administration until it controlled the entire territory of the state; to
the rise of an internal market which decreased the relative economic importance
of international trade; most importantly, to the rise of internal communication
relative to communication across frontiers.42
Even in this period, however, participation in domestic politics (even if only
as a conscious observer) entailed participation in international politics. The
process of mobilizing men and resources was dual; domestic societies could make
no claim on the loyalty of men without making them more attentive to the
currents of internationallife.43
To be sure, the early nation-state was assisted by natural and technical
barriers in trade, communications, and defense whi'ch made it a more autono-
mous unit and enabled it to place a more exclusive claim on the loyalties of men.
Yet as a price of that loyalty, internally mobilized men made claims on foreign
policy for the advancement of their own goals, and the uniformity of national
policy disappeared with the coherence of its old governing elite. Appealing to
journalists and historical romantics, the term "national interest" has been more
and more deprived of content as claims and the groups making them have
multiplied. The consensual basis of the national interest is likely, insofar as it
remains at all, to -be so abstract as to be useless as a guide to policy. (The fact
that most Americans believe in democracy says little, obviously, about our
international behavior.) And, in the twentieth century, the old barriers that
supported the territorial state hardly exist; what survives is not a result of
human limitations but of the conscious policy of governments imposed on quite
different processes.
Sovereignty has been progressively eroded in organizational terms. Once
the powers of the sovereign were fragmented among ministers; now, the old
state ministries that once monopolized the conduct of war and foreign policy are
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forced to share their functions with specialized agencies and with private groups.
If the mind of the state has become more confused, the problem is exacerbated
by the fact that it no longer speaks with one voice.
There is scarcely an area of politics that does not demonstrate the inseparable
unity of politics in our time. Ernst Haas has referred to the process by which
problems, insoluble inside the state, "spillover" into internation relations.
Equally, and often more compellingly, problems insoluble in international
politics "spill in" and demand domestic solutions.44
One result of this interpenetration is that more and more domestic groups
find themselves united to foreign counterparts by similarities of attitude, train-
ing, value, and concern which they do not share with their compatriots. This
responsiveness, always a part of international politics, has tended to grow and
become stronger in our times; ad hoc alignments become semipermanent, vague
sentiments acquire organized form. The positive appeals of international re-
sponsiveness are seconded by feelings of estrangement or alienation from one's
own state. The result has been a weakened, if not divided, loyalty responsive to
a dual diplomacy in which foreign states contact unofficial as well as official
agencies abroad (and, in fact, often pursue diplomacy through unofficial
channels).
Tendencies toward dual diplomacy are even more apparent in the develop-
ing states. Domestic and international politics are more clearly inseparable;
rudimentary consensus and assimilation make it more difficult to speak of a
national interest than in states which have some remnants of a past reality of
that vague symbol. Such consensus as exists is likely to be negative, hostility to
an imperial or foreign foe. In former colonial territories, the politics of inde-
pendence was international politics; domestic support was mobilized to win
victories abroad. The foreign offices of such states often developed as party
bureaus during the struggle for independence, resulting in a closer tie to
domestic politics but also having a greater propensity to dual diplomacy.45
New nations pursue the classic aim of economic nationalism: the attempt to
decrease dependence on the external sector of the economy in order to maximize
control over the conditions of economic life. Yet the means employed only
emphasize the change from the environment of past efforts to attain autarchy.
The tools of new states are by preference political and not economic; the terms
of aid may be more easily manipulated than terms of trade. Aside from the
obvious devices-such as threats of aid from the "other side" in the Cold War
-states have developed attitudes that are comparatively new. African leaders
have been fairly receptive to foreign private investment despite its dubious
economic benefits and its violation of the canons of nationalism. They have
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observed a tendency for aid to follow investment (after all, investment increases
the interest of the donor country by adding economic to political considerations)
and hope for a stronger position in negotiations because of it. Also, to a socialist
planner, the rise of foreign investment may be preferable to the rise of a
domestic bourgeoisie; the former, as Lenin was aware, remains politically
vulnerable. This last aspect only emphasizes the indivisibility of modern politics.
New attitudes are only encouraged by the fact that new states are heavily
influenced by Marxist versions of theories of international "functionalism"
which see international politics as determined by international stratification.
Such theories may emphasize the common interest of various sectors of the
third world; they also suggest that national economies are a thing of the past
and that the world is-or will be-a single economic order.46 Accurate or not,
such theories represent a mood that correctly reflects the forces of the time.
Great powers may feel it less, but reason should point out that the universality
of their interests and concerns, military as well as economic, makes the indi-
visibility of foreign and domestic politics even more a fact in their political life.
If the great powers have not yet learned the lesson, they will find the task of
ignoring it increasingly difficult.
More than one political theory has come to grief by trusting the strength of
functional loyalties.47 An individual may share much with, or may fear much
from, a distant other; the fear and the threat lack the immediacy of the need for
minimal trust and stable expectations in his relations with those he encounters
daily. The psychological bases of territorial loyalty remain intact, if challenged
by new forces and portents.
Confronted with divided interests or loyalties, men seek to avoid choice.
Where possible they will seek to combine the two i specialized residential areas
unite, in part, functional and territorial loyalties. Yet even where choice cannot
be avoided, men can make themselves believe that loyalty to one set of interests
is possible with little or no loss to another. Our experience would indicate that
men will give preference to territorial loyalty and will abandon it only in the
last extremity.
The importance of territorial loyalty is only one aspect of the choice. It
unites with men's desire for dignity, which leads them-all other considerations
aside-to prefer the smaller group, in which they matter more, to the larger, in
which they are only vague statistical considerations. It unites with resentment
of the impersonality of functional loyalties. Finally, it combines with a fear of
the unfamiliar in a universe of pervasive and threatening change.
Men have always sought to recapture lost domesticity, and those who have
seemed to symbolize the inroads of foreign things into domestic space have
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been subjected to persecution and to exile. In the twentieth century, this perse-
cution has assumed peculiarly virulent forms. Yet the odious inhumanities of the
times reflect both the vulnerability of the state and the desperation of men's
desire to protect it.48 The permeability of the state has not been the means to the
liberation of man; that the state is vulnerable only emphasizes to the individual
his own defenselessness and makes clear that citizenship in some states is the
basis of even a "right to have righ~s." True political orders may have become
impossible, but men will strive to retain or to acquire as close an approximation
as possible. Man remains a political animal.
Many an impressive functional argument can be made for regional organiza-
tion and integration. In Africa, regionalist doctrine has had high symbolic
appeal. Leaders have shared experience, friendship, and common political strug-
gles to an unusual extent, and the mass of men feel no inherited loyalty to the
nation. Moreover, states are felt to be too small or too weak to meet the needs
of individuals. All these factors would seem to remove barriers to integration.
In Asia, for example, where states are larger and the beneficiaries of compara-
tively ancient national traditions, there has been less interest in regional
organization.49
The fact that the mass has not been assimilated to the state and that it still
gives its loyalty to smaller groups of tribe and kindred appears, at first glance,
less significant than the factors impelling states toward regionalism. Africa
shares a common experience of "cultural shame." More frequently lumped into
a single category by Europeans, Africans also felt the brup.t .,Q'f ,theories of racial
and cultural inferiority. A common experience of indignity and a common
object of resentment create at least one bond across tribal and state frontiers. 50
Yet the results of widespread verbal acceptance of pan-African doctrines
have been meager. In part, this indicates that common indignity is a poor bond
between men. It unites men only on the basis of a shame they seek to escape
and can be sustained only by the pressure of necessity. As states in Africa have
won independence, the salience of necessity, the common struggle, has declined.
In fact, the seeds of division were sown long before independence; not only the
diversity of nature and custom in Africa, but the impact of European colonialism
produced different values, attitudes, and patterns of communication. Before
independence movements were of serious proportion, schisms developed which
reflected many of the post-independence divisions of Black Africa.51 The passing
of necessity deprived regionalist argument of much of its impact on men.
To be sure, the functional case for regionalism is debatable. The colonial
economies of the developing world, competitive and tied to metropolitan mar-
kets, hold out little appeal of immediate economic gain from regionalism. Indeed,
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if unity involved a loss of protected markets, the result might be economic
decline. Such arguments can be countered by the hope of greater gains in the
long term, however, and the important political fact is not the economic merits
of either case (economic soundness never being a guarantee of policy) but why
the former has seemed more compelling than the latter.52
In part, the African states (and the other new nations) suffer from a paralysis
of hope; weakness overrides it, and states fear to lose the little they possess.53
In one sense, it is the analogue of an identical paralysis in many of the great
powers-the fear of the future, the surrender to the present.
Division into many states also entails an immediate cost. As the votaries
of pan-Africanism constantly point out, individual African states are more
dependent on, and subject to ''influence by, non-African powers. The leaders of
states, however, have found that dependence; though onerous, is the preferable
alternative. They have feared that regional organization would entail a domina-
tion of their states by others, and dependence on many states combined with
autonomy of decision is felt preferable to the risk of deeper dependence on a
few. The African nation may have little meaning to the mass of its citizens and
may seem inadequate even to leaders, yet it is some sort of polity and its
structure is somewhat familiar. Here the "bond" of indignity becomes divisive
indeed; having conquered one form of dominion, men become doubly suspicious
of submitting to a new one and losing whatever gains they have achieved.
Resentment against indignity is only a negative value; its positive side is the
desire for dignity and significance, for a political order in which one matters.
And men will not surrender a state in which they matter more for one in which
they matter less without the compulsion of perceived necessity.54
Indeed, the resolution of the early ideological divisions within Africa in the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), never highly successful, owed whatever
success it achieved to the adoption of a legitimist formula. Legal governments
demanded unqualified acceptance as a price of cooperation. (Recently, the
influence of such sentiments has been suggested in the Nigerian crisis: more
ideological sympathy with Biafra exists among African states than has appeared,
but the OAU has steadily supported the Federal regime.) 55
The experience of Africa reinforces the conclusion that Haas and Schmitter
reached in their study of Latin America: accelerated regional dynamics are
unlikely unless alternatives outside the region fail. 56 African states have found
the international order at least sufficiently responsive to prevent those dynamics
from developing beyond the most embryonic stage. Barring .a closing off of
alternatives by the industrial states, regional organization would be likely only
if the United States or the EEC were to provide powerful economic and
30 WILSON CAREY McWILLIAMS
diplomatic support-as European regionalism received from the United
States.
If the declining salience of resentment limits regional unity, it also endangers
the basis of the state itself. Anticolonialism is still the core of legitimacy of most
non-Western regimes. Neocolonialism is, at best, an abstract threat and men
grow accustomed to any given level of peril if it is prolonged. States based on a
reaction against foreign policy remain based on it; there is a tendency to follow
a policy more and more assertive as development progresses, as expectations and
frustrations expand, and as the original unifying danger seems more remote. Yet
such a policy, which seeks to create (or reveal) dangers that once seemed
apparent has a danger of its own: that the escalation of words tends to leak over
into deeds,.. whether by terrifying the enemy or by words' ceasing to move men.
Nasser can survive a defeat by Israel, but not an accommodation with her.57
No dilemma is more common to new states than that posed by the second
generation. Rapid mobilization makes it much larger than the first; its demands
are harder to meet, both from sheer size and from increased expectations. More-
over, the nation-state, the monument of the first generation 'and its means to
dignity,58 is only a given for the second. Also, since first generations come
to power as young men, the second feel the added frustration of long exclusion
from the high counsels of the state. They may be better educated than their
predecessors and hence contemptuous of them; they will almost certainly be
more likely to be educated at home and will lack the cosmopolitan knowledge
and contacts so notable among early leaders. Not only will they be less likely
to accept the international order as a given, they are likely to find the state still
too undignified and too dependent, its domestic life too subject to impersonal
forces and foreign powers. Younger leaders ("generation," tho'ugh useful,un-
fortunately combines vagueness with seeming specificity) are likely to create
increasing pressures for an assertive foreign policy. Yet this aggression will be
the result of frustrations in part less material than those most often measured:
the frustration of the desire for dignity and for political society.59
Yet the fact is that such frustration and resentment are inherent in develop-
ment. Modern states, which prohibit interpersonal violence and in which the
organizational scale outruns the affections and the sense of dignity of the
individual, remain stable only so long as they can guarantee the gratification of
private desires. The need for sacrifice is most often justified by the threat of
enemy powers. Developing nations, facing a more difficult task with fewer
resources, are under great pressure (whether conscious or systemic) to find
outlets abroad for resentment which would otherwise find expression at home.
As the perils of conflict grow, this may be a harder task to perform, yet the
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frustrations of development will grow with those perils. Internal disorder, ethnic
secessionism, and guerrilla conflict are not only threats to new states; they have
made their appearance in the great powers. That too may be part of the future
toward which historical development leads mankind.oo
The prospects for international peace and stability are hardly enhanced by
the logic of development. Institutions in international society also decay; inter-
national law, difficult to enact and difficult to change, is losing much of its
already eroded standing. The cynicism of new states with regard to interna-
tional law often shocks Westerners, yet Western states have hardly hesitated
when they felt that necessity impelled them to a violation of law. Even if new
states had participated in the making of international law, it would be a ra~h
policymaker who appealed to pacta sunt servanda with any confidence. Change
undermines the promises of the past, and states, aware of the danger, hesitate
to commit themselves and hedge their pledges with escape clauses. States feel no
ability to pit human faith against the forces of change: the cushion of time no
longer surrounds states and the perils of trust have reached almost prohibitive
levels.61
New states, confronting the discontinuity between legal categories and
power, have surely been justified in regarding traditional and contemporary
appeals to legality as so many shams. Neocolonialism is a doctrine which reflects
the gap between legal sovereignty and political independence; it will not do, with
the experience of Latin America in mind, to dismiss the doctrine as a communist-
inspired fantasy as Crozier does. The doctrine is only a way of stating that some
states are immensely more powerful than others; Canada might be ranked
among the neocolonies. Yet the fact of that giant difference is the mark of the
obsolescence of international legality.
All states are aware of the interdependence of the world; all know that in
practice only a few (or only two) states participate in making the decisions that
govern mankind. The facts produce anxiety, resentment, and a desire to par-
ticipate.62 Yet formal participation solves nothing; it is treated as a gesture of
condescension and an indication that the real decisions are being made else-
where. Great inequalities of power make it impossible for the weak to trust the
strong.
Hence, the prevailing tendency for new states to regard alliances with indus-
trial states as inherently degrading. The weak are sensitive about their dignity,
and suspicion may become so extreme as to be folly, preventing any accurate
calculation of gains and losses. Worse, the suspicion of alliances tends to extend
to other developing states if these are somewhat higher on the ladder of
development (the relations of Africa with Asia are a case in point).63
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Neutralism is one effort to discover an alternative to alliance which does not
neglect interdependence. The political attitudes on which the policy is based are
starkly "realistic" ; nonalignment is the balance-of-power of the comparatively
powerless. Its major prescription is that new states have an interest in the most
intense form of great power competition short of war.64
The theory of national liberation wars is the same theory in more violent
form. It presumes that the increasing threat of war and the rise of affluence have
lessened the importance of values other than peace for the great powers. It sees
the world balance and the structure of opinion as restricting or preventing the
use of nuclear weapons in peripheral states. Even alt the next stage of the
argument it remains realistic; guerrilla insurrection cannot hope to defeat even
the conventional weapons of a great power. Yet by throwing the nonutilitarian
sentiments of patriotism and revolutionary zeal into the scales, a national
liberation war may make an area so costly to conquer as to seem not worth the
effort. Human will can prevail over unequal power.
The theory, obviously, requires continued conflict between the great powers,
the more intense the better-so long as nuclear war does not occur. Yet it also
requires that the great powers, and their citizens, operate by a standard of
utilitarian rationalism. Whatever the result, the Vietnam war demonstrates that
this is a risky supposition. The cost of war makes all states-the great powers
as well-anxious for their security; change and unpredictability only heighten
fear. This, in turn, makes the great states sensitive to changes in the relative
distribution of power; security and dignity are associated in more than one way.
Such sensitivity may become inordinate, especially if some groups become con-
vinced that "time is against us" and that is essential to "draw the line." The
old-style realism of theorists of national liberation wars is inaccurate in a new
reality.65
Both neutralism and national liberation wars tend to become a variety of
brinkmanship requiring policymakers of supremely great talent. Leaders of new
states are often chided for yielding to the normal tendency to overrate the
importance of their states to the world balance. Yet, except rhetorically, such
ethnocentrism is unlikely to be extreme in new states, which are most often
painfully aware of weakness. China assailed the Soviet Union for failure to take
advantage of what the Chinese felt were the Soviet Union's opportunities after
Sputnik; they did not believe themselves capable of acting and did not attempt
it. In fact, the habit of weakness is more dangerous. Breeding resentment, it also
generates irresponsibility. It may lead states to .exaggerate the givenness of the
international system and to pursue policies of local or regional assertion which
may, in particular cases, endanger the stability of the whole.66
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Such policies of regional self-assertion are only too likely, especially among
the more confident, but still frustrated, transitional or semimodernized states.
The temptation results from the indignities of d~velopment combined with the
near impossibility of imitating the means by which states in the past achieved
great power status. The task is now more difficult than for such late-arrivers as
Germany or Japan. States confront a weapons matrix in which qualitative dif-
ferences in weapons are crucial. Moreover, even if a state can keep the pace of
innovation, she must be able to afford the cost of obsolescence, which entails
repeated junking and replacing of entire weapons systems. The costs are beyond
the capability of any new nation.67
Conflicts remain likely, especially for states with an early record of diplQ-
matic success or foreign policy triumph. Such a history often reinforces the
inherent resentments and conflicts of foreign policy with a propensity to seek
solutions for recalcitrant domestic problems through action in international
politics.68 Politics often follows the course of least anticipated resistance.
For that reason, however, conflict with the great powers is unlikely no matter
how resented their status and pretension. Before the recent disastrous campaign
against Israel, Nasser found it useful to assert that Britain and France, not
Israel, had defeated Egypt in 1956; afterward, he pleaded American and British
intervention as the cause of disaster. Defeat, even by the secondary powers who
intervened in 1956, was only to be expected in a conflict between an industrial
and a developing state. That assumption, however, suggests that such conflicts
will be avoided even by the bellicose.
There are, however, developing states that can be taken to symbolize the
Western, imperial states (Ucreatures of neocolonialism"); there are also periph-
eral or weak Western powers-Israel, Portugal, South Africa. Local conflicts are
not only likely with such states, they tend to be total because the states in
question are symbolically equated with the source of indignity and frustration.
Some more genuinely local disputes are of serious proportion (Kashmir and
the Somali dispute are obvious examples), but many are comparatively petty,
both because the stakes are small and because the opponent is not identified with
the indignity of the past. Tribal irredentas may, as Zartman argues, come to seem
less significant as national integration advances.69 Yet, that prospect is darkened
by the history of similar disputes in eastern Europe. National integration may
create pressures to assimilate minority ethnic groups which only stimulate such
groups to resist or to seek assistance from kinsmen in neighboring states;
national integration may also create competitive efforts to assimilate- disputed
ethnic minorities. Most probably, governments may feel compelled to pursue
irredentist disputes by the fear that their prestige is too weak to survive
concession or compromise.70
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The short record of contemporary affairs only strengthens this prediction.
The OAU was able to halt the Algero-Moroccan conflict but only by accepting
the Algerian stipulation that a cease-fire be based on the principle of "non-
adjustment of existing frontiers," which made any resolution of the dispute
impossible. Other international agencies have had no more success in similar
disputes. And, as Zartman observes, if settlements are not made in times
of comparative prosperity and peace, they are likely to detonate in periods of
crisis.
Yet it may be less serious to allow local conflicts, within limits, than to
impose an iron peace. The resentments of developing states are real and pro-
hibition of foreign conflict-made ever more likely by the interdependence of
the world and the risks of conflict itself-may only lead to increased tendencies
toward internal division and civil strife.
However, it is not so easy to adopt a permissive attitude to local conflict. A
serious consequence of contemporary politics is that, despite extremely high
costs, the development of nuclear weapons is likely to seem worthwhile to many
states. Undeniably, nuclear status is the high road to greater consideration by
the great powers and greater international status generally, though nuclear
forces are likely to be too small and too backward to change a new state's
position of military inferiority.71
Moreover, nuclear-armed neighbors (China is the obvious case) may arouse
fears for one's own security. The great powers, menaced themselves with
annihilation, are perceived as less willing to honor their commitments than in
the past. The "new realism" of Indian and Pakistani commentators reflects this
attitude, as does the corollary proposition that each state must develop a de-
terrent of its own.72 Banning nuclear diffusion would achieve little, even if it
involved a guarantee to India by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.; if a post-Mao China
came to terms with the Soviet Union, would the Soviets honor their commit-
ments? Would the U.S. protect India at the risk of general war? Even if she did,
would this not force India to forfeit her nonaligned position? None of these
questions can be answered with a resounding affirmative, and not the least of
the costs of development is that the risks of error and the uncertainty of the
future combine to make just such an affirmation necessary.73
The alternatives involve equally dark portents. Perhaps the great powers
may contrive to find a solution that will reassure non-Western states sufficiently
to deter nuclear armament and t~ exclude the threat of 'local aggression. Yet such
a result is likely to increase feelings of dependence and resentment. In any case,
it would he likely to direct the expression of existing frustrations and resent-
ments in domestic violence and conflict. It is a comment on the gray landscape of
the age that this is probably the optimist's hope, for the alternative is an expand-
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ing nuclear race, the possibility of local nuclear conflicts, and the constant risk
that the great powers will be drawn in. War has become intolerable and indig-
nity, ubiquitous; men who cannot fight foreigners may become foreign to their
fellow citizens, and the streets become the new boundaries over which battles
are fought. That possibility, it need hardly be said, is the grimmest of the ways
in which the present of the new states may forecast the future of the old.
Modern times have realized in the empirical world the vision of ancient
prophets: the unity of human history. Yet the vision realized proves not to be a
blissful utopia but a predicament, complex, ambiguous, seemingly insoluble.
Many of the solutions offered to men have failed, and others will fail in turn.
Any solution must realize that there are no impersonal forces in the political
world, whatever they may seem. The forces of change and technology that seem
to sweep men onward and the shadowy tides of unreason that resist them are
both rooted in human desire and imagination. It is because the drama of history
is, in fact, the sWirling battle of forces in the soul of man that makes it so
resistant to control. Men yearn for the goods produced by the forces they fear;
pride speaks the inner language of self-hatred and doubt.
If there exists a solution it lies in the redevelopment-or the development~
of politics, though the political is at best a tentative synthesis needing renewal
in each generation. Perhaps more than any other, the quest for the political,
often inarticulate and fumbling, gives unity to such movements as the search for
means of participation and dignity· common to the ·unipartite movements of the
non-Western world and to the highly individualistic and antiorganizational
"New Left" in the West, to the partisans of guerrilla conflict and those of
nonviolent civil disobedience.74
Men need to give the visions implicit in such movements more articulate
form, and once stated, to seek means for the realization of the political in new
techniques and institutions. Success must be judged unlikely. It would require
initiative and action by the great powers, which alone have the capacity to
control the general international environment; the alternatives in the new states
depend on the alternatives made available by the old. Yet the great powers tend
to fix their attention on the terms of their present rivalry, partly because of the
appalling danger it poses to both, partly because they have sufficient comfort to
value the present, partly because old ideas and ideologies provide an illusory
security in new times. The new states, which perceive the necessities, tend
to an imagination chained by impotence; they too tend to accept the present
environment as a given.
Yet, however unlikely, the possibility that men will find a way to control the
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world of contemporary politics-even that they will find a way to attain the
political-cannot be excluded altogether. Crisis is a time of unlikelihood and
improbability, and as in all great crises we rely on the unlikely abilities and
devotion of citizens and statesmen. Men are never prisoners of events, but only
of their folly, and the imperative of de Tocqueville's new science rings true for
our time: "Our contemporaries are only too prone to doubt of human freedom
because each of them feels confined on every side by his own weakness but they
are still willing to acknowledge the strength and independence of men united in
society. Do not let this principle be lost sight of, for the great object in our time
is to raise the faculties of men, not to complete their prostration." 75
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~E RELATION between large, superordinate states and small, subordinate
states provides the most useful setting for the analysis of the relation between
foreign policy and social change.1 The argument for the use of this type of highly
simplified dyadic model with considerable power imbalance is largely a strategic
one. Social change is a complex process that is shaped by many forces. Normally
forces internal to the society will be more important than external forces in
determining the speed and direction of social change.. Further, the external forces
that are important seldom derive from a single society. They are more often a
complex amalgam of both identifiable foreign policies and the less formal social
and economic affinities of a large number of states standing in various degr~es
of social proximity to the subject society. The simple dyadic, super-subordinate
relationship model allows us to cut through much of this complexity in order to
arrive at least at a first approximation of some of the dimensions of variance in
the basic relation to be studied.
This is not to argue that relations between states of equal size and power are
irrelevant, nor that large and powerful states are insulated against external
forces. For example, Denmark provided important shipping and commercial
functions for Thailand in the latter part of the nineteenth and the twentieth
centuries. Although Denmark has undoubtedly been an important carrier of
external forces in Thailand, it would be difficult to argue that Danish foreign
policy was really significant in shaping the patterns of social change within
Thailand. Similarly, large states may be somewhat insulated against external
factors by their sheer size, but they are scarcely islands unto themselves. The
foreign policies of western Europe, which promoted imperialism and colonialism
since the sixteenth century and facilitated massive emigration especially during
the latter eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, certainly had a profound
impact upon the character of social change in the United States. This observa-
tion itself draws out more clearly one implication of our model and anticipates
some of the findings of this analysis. The impact of foreign policy on social
change in a subject country is most dramatic and visible in the case of a special
relationship between two states, such as the relationship characterized by super-
and subordinate status. Further, this observation calls attention to the character-
istics in the subject society that make it more or less vulnerable to external
forces. European emigration had an impact on social change in the United
States precisely because, and only as long as, immigration was permitted. Thus,
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it is some congruence of compatible external and internal forces that provide the
optimum condition for an external force such as foreign policy to have an impact
on internal social change.
Size is not the only determinant of super- or subordinate position. What we
are more concerned with is a relationship between societies of highly unequal
power. To be sure, sheer size often plays an important role. Disparities in size
contributed to the United States' superordinate position over Puerto Rico, the
Philippines, and Cuba (up to 1958). It did not require a change in size, however,
for Cuba to establish greater independence of the United States after 1958.
Further, it was a military defeat rather than simple disparity in size that placed
Japan in a subordinate position to the United States. Finally it was the combina-
tion of reduced size and Nationalist China's reliance upon United States pro~
tection for sheer survival that gave the United States considerable capacity to
influence the course of social change in Taiwan. Thus the super- and subordinate
relationships that we shall examine are themselves the products of a wide
variety of forces, including size disparities and the distinct quality of the
relationship.
Social change implies many things.2 We could mean changes in kinship
relations, in stratification patterns, in rural-urban population distribution, in the
industrial distribution of the labor force, in patterns of authority, in the size and
quality of organizations, or in the character and pervasiveness of norms. Any
one of these constitutes an area of social change and could provide the focus for
analysis. What we shall be concerned with, however, is a more general and more
basic pattern of change in social relations. This is the change from older
predominantly agrarian societies to newer predominantly urban and industrial
societies.
The observation of this major change is at the base of the emergence of
sociology as a distinct discipline and has remained a core interest in the "disci-
pline for the past century. From Saint Simon through Emile Durkheim, Max
Weber, Herbert Spencer, and to Talcott Parsons, sociologists have been con-
cerned with the changing pattern of social relations when men leave agriculture
and the rural areas and take up urban residence and industrial occupations, when
relatively small-scale societies are replaced with. larger ones, when tasks and the
relationships built around them become specialized and divided, and when
individuals and groups have larger and more diverse arenas in which to play out
their roles.
An important part of this basic social change revolves around the ownership
and use of land. In the ideal-typical sense, the old society is one in which land
was used for the production of goods that would be more or less immediately
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consumed. Relationships were generally diffuse and particularistic. Kinship
defined a set of horizontal claims and obligations covering a wide range of
behavior. Hierarchical relations were based largely on the control over land and
also gave men broad mutual obligations. Given this areal dimension of relations
and the technological barriers to communication, groups bound under single
and direct authority relations were relatively small and of low density.
The change we observe is one in which the products of the land begin to
move through a marketplace: agriculture is commercialized. As more and more
nonhuman sources of power are used, capital and labor become factors of
production more important than land: factory production emerges. Labor be-
comes specialized and divided, implying that its upward relations are of a more
specific 'and limited nature. Even the diffuse horizontal bonds of kinship give
way to the limited and specific bonds of organizational affiliation.3 The basis of
stratification shifts from kinship to organizational relations.4 As the areal dimen-
sion of organization becomes less important, as population densities increase
and the technology of communication and transportation improves, the bound-
aries of authority become less restricted and less particularistic. A more extended
and more impersonal public authority emerges.5 Overall, these changes lie at the
heart of what we have recently come to call "modernization," a term at once
useful and treacherous.
These changes occur gradually. Even where the most violent revolutions
have occurred, they constitute more of a watershed in a slower process than an
immediate and radical reordering of society. We can find watersheds in non-
revolutionary as well as in revolutionary societies. They can be sought and
found in many aspects of social relations,6 but from what has been proposed in
ideal-typical terms above, it is useful to seek them in the patterns of control
over land. This is, further, an area in which foreign policy can have and has had
a major impact on patterns of social change, especially in the cases we shall
examine.7
In Japan, Taiwan, and Puerto Rico, United States foreign policy was directly
involved in successful land reform programs that marked the watersheds in
longer and more gradual processes of social change. The processes were those
in which peasant masses became involved in direct and broadly based political
action, in which their interests were articulated and transmitted through new
organizations. The new organizations replaced the older limited and particu-
laristic relations with landowners and marked the movement of the peasantry
into positions of public authority. How United States foreign policy was so
involved and what the determinants of its success were will occupy most of our
attention in this paper.
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We shall use the contrasting experiences of the Philippines and Cuba to
throw into greater relief the role of United States foreign policy in the changes
mentioned above. The basic argument will be that the major determinants of
foreign policy effecting these basic social changes were the coincidence of power-
ful reform orientations in U.S. foreign policy and both general forces for change
and the creation or existence of effective organized agents of change in the host
society.
Some of the forces of modern social change in Japan can be found in the
Tokugawa period (1603-1867). The political and military stability of the period,
together with its restriction of intercourse among the Han (local centers of
power and initiative) stimulated the development of a national market with
Osaka as its center. This also implied a very considerable commercialization of
agriculture.8 The centralization of the knighthood in stipendary positions in
towns and their separation from land ownership precluded the kind of violent
resistance to agrarian change witnessed in western Europe. This left considerable
leeway for the emergence of powerful economic incentives to change on the
land itself, marked especially by the new peasant capitalists that grew up late in
the Tokugawa period and were an important force in the changes brought by
the Meiji restoration.9
The Meiji restoration (1868) removed some obstacles to modern social change
and in other ways hastened that process. The end of prohibitions against the
sale of land and the change of occupations removed barriers, already consider-
ably weakened in practice, to social'mobility. Universal education and conscrip-
tion similarly worked to weaken further the power of ascribed statuses and to
open new avenues of mobility to the population. Economic development also
played its role. The level of human productivity increased steadily in all sectors,
but especially in agriculture.to And agricultural growth helped to pay for growth
in the urban industrial sectors, adding geographic dimensions to the new occupa-
tional avenues of social mobility.
The period from the restoration onward also saw the development of
organizations technically competent to promote the basic social changes that
were underway. The Ministry' of Agriculture played an important role in the
early agricultural growth and at the same time acquired considerable under-
standing of the determinants of agricultural productivity. Especially in the early
Meiji period this role involved primarily attention to the technological and
biological aspects of productivity,ll but by the 1920's the ministry was gaining
greater awareness of the class determinants, the problem of tenancy and owner-
ship.12 Out of this process of bureaucratic development came a large organiza-
tion competent to plan and to execute, but not to decide upon, a decisive reform
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that would finally bring to an end the land and tenure conditions that supported
the diffuse and particularistic relations of the old order.
Not all the forces worked in the same direction, however. More powerful
forces worked to sustain the traditional relations, especially on the land, but
with repercussions for the entire society. Agricultural development brought
increased political power to the growing class of landlords. But while he was
gaining political power, the economic role of the landlord was undergoing
change. The Meiji landlord had been an integral part of the progressive structure
that brought agricultural development.13 By 1915 agriculture had lost its posi-
tion as a dynamic growth sector. Net flows of capital that had previously been
from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sector now were reversed.14 Land-
lords became absentee owners and the incidence of tenancy rose. After 1920 the
landlord class was a solidly entrenched conservative if not reactionary class. It
used its political power to buttress its position and thus to sustain, especially in
tenancy relations, the diffuse and particularistic relations characteristic of the
older order.15
In acting as a brake upon social change, however, the landlords also acted
as a brake upon economic development in agriculture. Against this braking force
was the more economically progressive force in the Ministry of Agriculture.
Though the weight was clearly and solidly on the side of the political power of
the landlords, the strain in the society did present alternatives for government
policy that could be easily exploited by an external and highly superordinate
power. The stage was set for the United States occupation forces to forc;e the
critical decision for reform upon Japanese society.
The immediate postwar Diet, composed of the more conservative wartime
elements, debated and delayed action on a land reform bill presented by the
Ministry of Agriculture. Only the fear of Occupation pressures for even greater
reform induced the Diet to act favorably on a bill in December of 1945. The
Occupation found this bill deficient and procured another, more sweeping in
its reform, early the following year.
The reform posture of the Occupation derived from a number of sources.
Old Japan hands in the U.S. State Department advised caution in the reform,
fearing that the radical disruption of the old syste~ of social relations would
open the way to chaos and a communist takeover. Others, such as R. A. Feary
and W. I. Ladejinsky, pressed for reform and also obtained positions on
MacArthur's staff.16 Part of the proreform argument in U.S. foreign policy was
to provide competitive forces to communist ideology,17 part was based upon the
assumed relation between landlordism and Japanese aggression.18 There was also
MacArthur's own previous experience in the Philippines, which had made him
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sympathetic to and knowledgeable of the problem of tenancy, and the more
technical consideration of the immediate need to increase food production and
the known connection between tenancy and low productivity. The convergence
of these many political, ideological, and technical considerations made the Occu-
pation's decision for reform a powerful and pervasive one.
However important this reform orientation in U.S. foreign policy, it would
have been ineffective without reform forces and the technical and organizational
competence previously developed in Japan itself. U.S. foreign policy was only
the midwife to an idea that was "as indigenous as the conditions which im-
pelled it./I 19
As important as the idea and the laws was the implemeritation of the reform.
This, too, was almost purely a Japanese accomplishment. Thousands of paid local
officials and a million voluntary hamlet auxiliaries were involved in the imple-
mentation of the law.20 Local agricultural committees were given great discre-
tionary powers and proceeded to use them, for the most part in rather full com-
pliance with the law. Peasants had to be instructed in their new rights and in-
duced to pursue them, no easy matter when those new rights violated norms
that had been reinforced by strong economic ties. The necessary instruction in
and protection of peasants' rights could only be accomplished by functionaries
thoroughly involved in and familiar with the pattern of social relations. No
occupation force would ever have such a capacity. Like the idea of reform, the
implementation "was as indigenous as the conditions which impelled it./I
The results were profound. In the removal of landlordism and the widespread
redistribution of land, the economic supports for the old pattern of social rela-
tionships were destroyed. Diffuse bonds of social and economic obligations of
large numbers of farmers to a small class of landlords were replaced by highly
specific and impersonal contractual relations. About two million farm families, a
third of all farm families, became owner-operators; about a million were re-
moved from the status of pure tenants.21
Ladejinsky speaks of this as a great rural renaissance. Land and labor pro-
ductivity, capital accumulation, and mechanization all increased. The once sub-
ordinate masses of the rural scene came to gain significant influence in both
local and national politics.
The old order has now been left behind. Although the overall process has
been gradual, the land reform of the Occupation marks a significant watershed
in the process. And the watershed was one in which reform orientations in U.S.
foreign policy coincided with orientations and agents of reform in Japan itself.
For our purposes the modern development of Taiwan commences with
Japanese acquisition of th~ island as a result of the Sino-Japanese war.22 Jap-
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anese colonial policy moved rapidly to make Taiwan a food surplus region for
Japan itself.23 Direct Japanese investments in agriculture and irrigation, experi-
mental work to develop appropriate rice varieties and fertilizer regimes, and or-
ganizational work in building farmers' associations through which to inject the
new science and technology paid great dividends. In the four decades prior to
World War II total rice production rose from about 700,000 metric tons to about
1,800,000 metric tons. The area under cultivation grew from about 400,000
hectares to over 700,000 hectares. And yields per hectare rose from just under
2 metric tons to almost 3 metric tons.24 This was done partly under direct
Japanese land ownership but more through the stimulation of Taiwanese farmers
themselves to increase their output. The overall process implied the massive
and rapid commercialization of agriculture not unlike the developments in Meiji
Japan.
Also similar to the Japanese development was the emergence of the relatively
small-scale village landlord, using economic forces to bind in diffuse and par-
ticularistic obligations a growing number of tenants and part-tenants. Unlike
the case of Japan, however, local political and organizational forces in opposition
to this pattern of relationships did not develop or, at any rate, did not show
the same power as they did in Japan. Taiwanese landlords and Japanese colonial
forces were in control of the society and they acted with little opposition to sus-
tain the old pattern of social relations.
The defeat of Japan and the return of Taiwan to Nationa~ist China in 1945
constituted the first step in breaking down this old system of relations. More
critical, however, was the fall of mainland China to the Communists and the
subsequent reform orientations in both the Nationalist government in Taiwan
and U.s. foreign policy with respect to Taiwan. Although previous U.S. attempts
to induce China's leaders to engage in widespread reforms were largely frus-
trated, the conditions were now propitious for their success.
At least three aspects of these conditions can be .isolated: ideological, polit-
ical, and organizational. The defeat of the Nationalists on the mainland inc~eased
the ideological commitment to reform both in U.S. foreign policy and in the
Nationalist government itself. Just as in the case of Japan a major part of the
u.s. argument was to provide a reform orientation competitive with the Com-
munists. In this argument even the Nationalist government became highly vul-
nerable to its own, not insignificant, proponents of change.
The new orientation was easier for the Nationalists to accept because the
Taiwanese landlords lacked political power under the new government. Suspect
because of their previous association with the Japanese, and never with highly
developed institutions to promote their interests such as the Japanese landlords
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had in the home Diet, the Taiwanese landlords were in no position to resist the
central political decision to effect sweeping changes in land organization.
Although local Taiwanese organizational supports for reform had never
seriously developed, as they had in the Ministry of Agriculture in Japan, a new
organizational force of considerable power and competence was created, largely
by the United States. This was the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction
(JCRR). Established by virtue of an act of the U.s. Congress, which provided
independent financial support to an organization for rural reconstruction that
would be led jointly by Chinese and Americans, the JCRR began its reform ac-
tivities on the mainland in 1948. At this time little if any attention was lavished
upon reform in Taiwan.
Although the JCRR was brought into being because of an act of the U.s.
Congress, the specific creation can also be credited to the special work of
Mr. James Y. T. Yen.25 In addition to this local Chinese inspiration, the JCRR
had the added advantage of being able to draw upon a large reservoir of qualified
and dedicated agriculturalists, who had been trained partly with American sup-
port over the past half-century. This professional competence was to be very
critical for reform activities in Taiwan. Another major advantage came with the
removal of the Nationalist government to Taiwan. Even the large corps of
qualified personnel available to the JCRR could be lost in the sprawling masses of
mainland China. In Taiwan, the physical proportions of the problem were re-
duced to about 2 percent of their former size. Further, the political nature of
this province provided a situation in which these professionals could have a
major impact.26
One of the JCRR' s first tasks on Taiwan was to press for the type of land
reform with which it had been experimenting on the mainland. The professionals
in the JCRR could see that an initial requirement for rural reconstruction and
agricultural development was the shift from tenancy to owner operation as the
dominant pattern of land control. Thus both the political and professional argu-
ments for land reform were compelling. The decision came rather easily.
Implementation was another matter, however. The organizational apparatus
that Japan utilized to implement its land reform program did not exist in as
developed a form in Taiwan, but there were important rudiments, especially in
the provincial Department of Agriculture. The national Department of Agricul-
ture had been disbanded when the government moved to Taiwan, but its func-
tions in policymaking and advice were largely taken by the JCRR. Together
with local agencies, the JCRR helped to organize the local committees for the
surveying, record-keeping, and the instructional and inspection procedures
necessary to implement the reform.
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In the land-reform program Taiwan and the JCRR had a number of advan-
tages in addition to those mentioned above. The experience of Japan was utilized
to make the reform more efficient and more equitable.27 The compensation that
had been paid to Japanese landlords was quickly reduced by the rapid inflation
of the period.28 In Taiwan a decision was made to pay 70 percent of the land
value in agricultural produce bonds as a hedge against inflation. The additional
30 percent was paid in industrial bonds, financed by the capitalization of con-
fIscated Japanese industries. Essentially, it cost the Chinese government almost
nothing not only to compensate the landlords but also to turn them into a class
of industrial investors. Finally, a good part of the land redistribution was ac-
complished by selling off about 170,000 acres of public agricultural land taken
from the Japanese.29
The overall land reform was carried out in three stages. The first began in
1949 with government regulations for the lease of private lands-a rent-reduc-
tion program. This prescribed rents not exceeding 37.5 percent of the total
annual yield of the major crop. Existing rents were normally about 50 percent,
with some as high as 70 percent. Additional abuses, such as demanding rents in
advance and extra payments, were prohibited, and tenants were to be given
written contracts that protected their tenure on the land. A hierarchy of com-
mittees was established to enforce the law and especially to obtain written con-
tracts for all tenants. Although there were certainly evasions of the law, as would
be expected, it did have considerable salutary effect in lowering actual rents. This
is seen especially in land prices, which fell about 40 percent in 1949 for most
grades of agricultural land.30
The second stage involved the sale of public agricultural lands and took place
largely from 1951 through 1953. The third stage established a ceiling of about
10 acres on land holdings, purchased individual holdings in excess of this, and
sold the land to tenants. The laws for this "Land to the Tiller" stage were enacted
in 1952 and were largely implemented during the next two years.
By 1956 the pattern of land ownership had changed radically from that of
1948. More than 200,000 farm families, about 25 percent of all farm families,
had joined the ranks of the owner-operators. This group had grown from 33 per-
cent to 57 percent of all farm families. Over 100,000 left the ranks of pure
tenants, whose overall proportions diminished from 36 percent to 16 percent of
all farm families. As in Japan, the economic supports for the old patterns of
social relations were largely destroyed.
The program of social change that the JCRR sponsored was not limited to
land reform, although this was the first and most dramatic aspect of the pro-
gram. Beyond the land reform, the JCRR helped to strengthen farmers' associa-
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tions and used these as communication channels through which to inject a new
technology into agriculture. Although these organizations had been originally
created by the Japanese, at the end of the war they were not properly consti-
tuted to further social change. They had developed into a set of functionally
specific organizations, largely controlled by local and absentee landlords for their
own immediate economic benefit. Under the JCRR'S leadership the farmers'
associations were made into effective channels for communication among the
peasants.
The economic results of this series of programs have constituted one of the
most impressive fifteen-year growth records Asia has seen, with agriculture
providing considerable dynamism in the entire process. The political changes
are less apparent but are of no less significance. The availability of the JCRR
technical and financial assistance to groups and individuals ready to assume
some of the cost themselves stimulated the growth of viable centers of initiative
throughout the country. At base was the breakdown of the old dependency rela-
tions of tenancy. On the surface was the proliferation of a variety of limited-
purpose, specific, action-oriented associations that could and did promote the
interests of the peasants.
Montgomery observes that although the political character of the one-party
state has not been lessened directly by these changes, the viability of local in-
stitutions has been greatly increased. So much so, that they "would seem even
better able to survive political change than the national government which has
resisted it for so many years." 31 Again, a reform orientation in U.S. foreign
policy coincided with the emergence of local forces and organizations competent
to effect changes in land ownership, which would lead to a basic change in the
patterns of social organization.
In the four centuries of its colonial rule, Spain created a relatively integrated
society in Puerto Rico. Although the island was used primarily as a military
base, controlling the entrance to the Caribbean and the Spanish colonies in
Central America, the land was settled and agriculture developed. The Indian
population was destroyed and Spanish colonial policy precluded the inundation
by Negro slaves that turned the small-holder colonies of other European powers
in the Caribbean into racially bifurcated pl~ntation economies. The slaves that
were imported and those that came and remained free as runaways were to a
large extent integrated into the colony i Puerto Rico became and remained
Spanish.32
The mechanism of Spanish settlement was the feudal encomienda system,
which, unlike the capitalist company mechanism, produced a set of diffuse and
particularistic mutually obligatory relations between the owner and the laborer.33
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Even the reforms of the early nineteenth century, loosening the restrictions on
trade and transforming the looser (as it developed in Puerto Rico) encomienda
system into the somewhat more economically rational hacienda system, did not
alter the basic pattern of social relations.
Crop changes were of considerable and complementary significance. With
Spanish protection of sugar, the large landholding patterns had assumed im-
portance before the mid-nineteenth century. In the later nineteenth century
sugar lost its importance in Puerto Rico and coffee became the leading export
crop. One result was an increase in the independence of the small farmers that
dominated the coffee industry.34 This shrinking of power of the Puerto Rican
gentry occurred just at the time of the American takeover and probably facili-
tated the ~ransformation of the Puerto Rican countryside into a full-fledged
foreign-dominated plantation economy, though it is doubtful if any powers in
Puerto Rico would have been sufficient to withstand the tremendous force of
the American capital-mobilizing capacity.
The United States acquired Puerto Rico as a result of the Spanish American
War. American troops landed on the island in 1898; American sugar investors
followed quickly. American companies bought and leased vast tracts of the best
sugar land from wealthy Puerto Rican families, cementing a tie of mutual interest
that lasted for four decades. The Foraker Act, Puerto Rico's organic act of 1900,
carried a prohibition against any company's or person's owning more than 500
acres of land.35 Whatever the motivations behind this prohibition, the restriction
was not enforced for the first four decades.
As the plantation system grew, it brought a fundamental change in social
relations for a large number of rural people. The stable, paternalistic hacienda
system with its diffuse relationships and mutual obligations (however un-
balanced these were) was replaced by the dynamic, profit-maximizing, econom-
ically rational sugar central, whose pattern of social relations was highly specific
and universalistic.36
For the first four decades of this century the Puerto Rican sugar industry
grew rich and powerful; the Puerto Rican population grew but tasted few if any
benefits of this economic transformation.37 The urban elite and the intellectuals
engaged in the freewheeling modern politics that was permitted and encouraged
by American tutelage. The issue of status was uppermost in these activities:
what was to be Puerto Rico's legal status under the Americans? This was an
issue that appealed to the political leaders. It dominated their thoughts and gave
them ample opportunity for theoretical and philosophical involution, but it also
seemed far removed from the question of the welfare of the large number of
people whose basic pattern of relations was determined by the sugar industry.
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Thus, unlike Japan and Taiwan, the pattern of social re~ations in the pre-1940
period was not that associated with small-holder family tenancy arrangements.38
It was associated with the plantation economy in sugar and with extensive family
small-holdings in other crops. Poor, landless, seasonally unemployed workers on
vast efficient plantations characterized the sugar industries. On the other hand,
there were almost 50,000 small, family-sized farms (under 20 acres; about
30,000 under 10 acres) in tobacco, coffee, and other crops.39 The most profound
social dislocation had taken place in sugar, giving rise to the pattern of organiza-
tion (including trade union movements) characteristic of a more modern economy.
The influence of the sugar companies was exercised not directly through
elected organs, as was the influence of the Japanese landlords, but indirectly
through the financing of political parties in Puerto Rico and through lobbying
activities in Washington. It was apparently largely sugar money that permitted
the parties to engage in the vote-buying practices that were characteristic of the
elective system before 1940.
Perhaps the most important pressure for social change in Puerto Rico after
the initial plantation development came with the New Dea1.40 President Roosevelt
established the Chardon Commission in 1934 to investigate Puerto Rican condi-
tions and to make recommendations for relief and reform. Carlos Chardon
recommended, among other things, the enforcement of the SOO-acre limit to
landholdings. The following year the Roosevelt administration encouraged
Governor Blanton Winship to obtain Puerto Rican legislation for this enforce-
ment. The legislation came in the form of two acts in 1935. Test cases were
developed, and the sugar companies contested them. It was not until 1940 that
the u.s. Supreme Court upheld Puerto Rico's right to enforce the limitation, but
even this did not end the effective delaying tactics of the sugar companies.41
More important than the actual reform this produced was its effect on local
political dynamics. In the late 1930's a new political force emerged. Luis Munoz~
Marin broke from established parties and created the new Popular Democratic
party, more commonly known as the Populares. Munoz also broke with previous
party traditions. He eschewed the status issue and took up the issue of wel-
fare; 42 he refused to buy votes and urged the electorate to use their vote for
their long-term welfare; and he took his cam('aign to the rural masses and gave
prominence to the land situation and the exploitation of the sugar companies.
Munoz won a narrow victory in 1940 and proceeded to press reforms vigorously.
In 1944 he won a landslide victory with two-thirds of the vote and has remained
undisputed political leader since that time.
Although Munoz brought the indigenous political power necessary for re-
form, his efforts probably would have been frustrated but for the concomitant
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administrative reforms engineered by Rexford G. Tugwell, governor of Puerto
Rico from late 1941 until 1946.43 The problem Munoz and Tugwell faced lay in
the dominance of the legislature over the executive branch of government and
the consequent technical and organizational incapacity of the administration to
provide real powers of initiative to any elected executive. Tugwell's reforms laid
the groundwork for a competent administration that would be the effective
servant of an elected government.
Thus, side by side a new indigenous political organization and a new adminis-
tration were developed, both actively dedicated to reform. Munoz drew his power
from a new set of articulated mass interests. Tugwell drew his support from
progressive elements in the American polity.44
The reform that ensued differed consider~bly from the land redistribution of
Japan and Taiwan. There was some early and highly dramatized settlement of
landless agricultural workers on small house lots, and there was also the creation
of a unique arrangement in proportional benefit farms. In these, the government
bought lands held illegally in excess of the SOO-acre limit and leased them in the
form of large farms to competent managers, who then shared the profits among
the workers in proportion to the amount they actually worked on the farm.
There were also a series of other reforms designed to increase the welfare of
the rural masses, but all of this was considerably different from the reforms
wrought in Japan and Taiwan. In effect, the reforms signaled the movement of
rural masses, already torn asunder from traditional patterns of relations, into
the modern political arena, where their interests would be promoted through
their activities as a new voting force.
Less than a decade after coming to power, Munoz' government· turned away
from agriculture as an area of reform and directed its efforts to the stimulation
of a modern industrial economy. Agriculture has remained a fairly dynamic
sector,45 but the real successes have been registered in manufacturing, commerce,
and construction. The new economic powers, both local Puerto Rican and from
the United States, are concentrated in the modern urban industrial and com-
mercial sectors.46
The significance of the Munoz-Tugwell reforms lay in their reinforcement
and extension in the political arena of changes in social relations begun four
decades earlier in the economic arena. The plantation system established the
economic base for more specific and particularistic patterns of relations, but it
did not fully eradicate the patron-peon pattern of relations. 'The political power
of the foreign and indigenous investors precluded the development of the mod-
ern organizations that were needed to make the new pattern of relations dom-
inant in the society. Without effective protection and articulation of their interests
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in specialized political organizations, the rural lower classes might be wage
laborers working for a huge impersonal organization, but their relations with
the functionaries of those organizations and with the owners of land would
continue to be highly diffuse and particularistic. Without independent bases of
power, they would still be subject to the more wide-ranging demands of the
local holders of power, to whom they would continue to look for an equally wide
range of assistance.
In this respect the reforms served much the same type of function served by
otherwise highly dissimilar reforms in Taiwan and Japan. They were political
reforms that made secure changes in social relations that were, however hesitat-
ingly, being induced by other economic changes. That they followed upon earlier
economic changes made them no less necessary to complete the process of social
change, for it cannot be argued that a grand evolutionary force would have com-
pleted the changes simply because they had been introduced by economic forces.
We have too many cases of arrested social change to allow us to have much faith
in the inevitability of the emergence of new patterns of relations as dominant in
a society simply because it is set in a world context of industrializing societies.
The development of Cuban and Philippine societies under Spanish, then
American, influence was not unlike the development in Puerto Rico. Spanish
mercantilist policy, the tradition of conquistador and missionary, and the use of
the encomienda system for land administration produced societies of considerable
similarity.47 The mutually obligatory, if highly uneven, patrimonial relations of
the preponderantly rural populations experienced the same development to more
specific and universalistic relations under the impact of commercialization in the
late nineteenth century. The process was merely intensified by the American im-
o . .
pact. The massive capital-mobilizing capacities of the United States, together
with its great demand for sugar, quickly produced more economically rational
plantation economies in the early twentieth century.
In many respects this process was more rapid and more complete in Cuba
than in the Philippines. By 1925 the Cuban economy had been fully transformed
and the period of rapid growth was over. The next four decades saw stagnation
in the internal economy, with increasing United States dominance spreading out
of agriculture to utilities, transportation, and urban commerce.48 The full de-
velopment of the modern sugar industry in the Philippines did not take place
until the second decade of the century, and even then sugar did not occupy the
position of overall dominance that it held in Cuba. The plantation economy
developed largely in the central islands, while Luzon remained dominated by rice
production, with landlord-tenancy relations not unlike those in Japan and
Taiwan.
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The result in Cuba was the development of powerful revolutionary forces,
which finally broke through in 1959. The Philippines has experienced consider-
able growth in urban commerce and industry, but the agricultural sector, together
with its social relations, has remained more economically retarded.49
It would be impossible to examine all the points at which American policy
either could have promoted reform and did not, or tried and was unsuccessful.
A brief look at some of the more dramatic points can, however, reveal some of
the important determinants of the ability of foreign policy to promote social
change.
The economic development of Cuba in the first quarter century was not
accompanied by a parallel political development. Political and administrative
structures were corrupt and incapable of actively stimulating social change.
There were, however, important internal stirrings of reform in the early 1930's
under Grau San Martin. The dictatorial repressions of the Machado government
from 1924 to 1933 plus the economic collapse of the depression brought wide-
scale pressures for reform and a government with considerable responsiveness to
that pressure. Without external assistance, this internal reform orientation was
destined to be frustrated by the lack of the administrative capacity to implement
new programs.50 External assistance bringing the kind of legislative and adminis-
trative change experienced by Puerto Rico at about the same time might have
allowed for the successful execution of reform.
The United States did not, however, assist the reform. Preference was given
to Batista's ability to secure order rather than to Grau's desires for reform. It is
one of the ironies of the period that just when the liberal domestic policies of
the New Deal were furthering basic social change in Puerto Rico, the equally
liberal foreign policy precluded comparable assistance to Cuba.
An important point to observe is that Cuba and Puerto Rico were in different
positions relative to the United States. Cuba was properly foreign, however
dependent economically. Puerto Rico was an extension, however special and
unique, of the domestic American system. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and
Ambassadors Sumner Welles and Jefferson Caffery were in different organiza-
tional positions in the United States in directing relations with Cuba than were
Harold Ickes and Rexford Tugwell in directing relations with Puerto Rico.
There is an important implication of this difference in the social bases of the
American impact in the two cases. By its independence Cuba was politically in-
sulated from the heterogeneous interests that provided the base for the New
Deal reforms in the United States. Cuba was thus left to the homogeneous and
highly specialized interests of large-scale foreign investment companies. These
interests proved powerful enough, together with U.S. diplomatic and military
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assistance, continually to support instruments of power with a relatively narrow
base in Cuba, and thus to preclude the articulation of the heterogeneous interests
that emerged with modern economic development.
One of the early American opportunities to readjust land arrangements in
the Philippines came in 1902-1903 with the purchase of the Friar lands. This
included 410,000 acres which had previously been held by the Church and had
provided part of the basis for popular Filipino hatred of the friars.51 Although
this was a comparatively small amount in the more than 7 million acres of culti-
vated land, it was important in that it was strategically located, especially in
areas of rice and tenancy. Effective redistribution of these lands might have
provided a model for further land reforms and an opportunity for rural masses
to gain an early foothold in the political structure.
The lands were not so distributed. This was partly due to lack of an organiza-
tion capable of effecting such distribution. There was nothing in the Philippines
comparable to the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture or the Taiwanese JeRR. It
was also partly due to the stage of development and the character of the ideas
that entered into the debate. Tenancy had not yet become a serious and wide-
spread problem. In other ways, too, the time demanded attention to growth and
development, not to welfare and distribution. The Secretary of Interior in the
Philippines from 1902 to 1913, Dean C. Worcester, constantly pressed for the
sale of friar lands to large companies capable of developing new industries such
as sugar.52
Although the lands were not effectively distributed to the cultivators, they
were also not, except from 1908-1914, legally available to companies and per-
sons wishing to acquire large holdings. The original organic act for the Philip-
pines contained limitations on landholdings (16 hectares to an individual and
1,024 hectares to a corporation),53 just as it did in Puerto Rico. The same U.S.
forces were active in both cases: liberal antiimperialists fearing the evils of
monopolistic capitalism and sugar beet interests fearing the evils of competition.
In the Philippines these American interests were assisted by articulate national-
ist, anticlerical leaders, whose counterparts were largely absent in Puerto Rico.
The result in the Philippines was something approaching institutionalized hypoc-
risy i the increasingly independent Philippine legislature continued to maintain
its posture against large landholdings, while wealthy Filipino and American
interests continued to amass large holdings. This precluded the utilization by
Filipino leaders of the visible target that Munoz had in the government's outright
decision not to implement land limitations in Puerto Rico.
By the time reform forces produced the New Deal in the United States, the
Philippines had become considerably insulated against the overflow of those
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domestic forces to the islands. The United States had stimulated the develop-
ment of political parties and a not inconsiderable administrative system. This
produced a push for independence that was largely absent in Puerto Rico. In
this early development, however, the parties proved most effective at promoting
the interests of the more articulate upper classes, and the administrative system
was largely captured and used more as an instrument of patronage than of
change. It was sufficient for the U.s. reform orientation of the 1930's that the
Filipinos were writing their own liberal democratic constitution and moving
rapidly toward full formal political independence. The issues of welfare im-
portant domestically in America found little support in the increasingly "foreign"
Philippines.
World War II in the Pacific, with both occupation and liberation, brought
great material and organizational damage to the Philippines. In the postwar
reconstruction period, the United States had another opportunity to promote
social change through land reform. Though this was more limited, it was not
unlike the opportunity available in Japan and Taiwan. Two forces appear to have
prevented success. One was the continuity of power of the Philippine landed
elite, who showed remarkable tenacity through the early American government,
during the Japanese occupation, and even through the postwar period that saw
collaboration arise as a political issue.54 Although this elite has not been overly
reluctant to pass rather liberal land reform legislation, it has also never been at a
loss to prevent the implementation of such legislation.
The second force is represented in a set of organizational characteristics, both
Filipino and U.S. The Philippines has not yet developed a technical and adminis-
trative structure in agricultural agencies capable of providing the guidance
needed for an effective policy and the capacity to carry out such a policy. These
agencies remain highly centralized in Manila and functionally fragmented into
specialized units with little effective coordination among them. Above the ad-
ministrative structure, executive powers are sufficiently fragmented to preclude
the initiation of reform.55
On the u.s. side, organizational involvement in reform has been concen-
trated in the hands of the aid-giving arms of the State· Department. It was in
part this involvement that obstructed the creation of a Taiwan-like Joint Com-
mission for Rural Reform in the Philippines. Aid officials in the Philippines
argued that a joint organization would be inappropriate given Phi~ippineinde­
pendence, and they succeeded in establishing an alternative all-Filipino organiza-
tion, the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Community Development
(PACO). The financial and status autonomy of the JCRR had been important in
developing a high technical capacity to promote agricultural reform in Taiwan.56
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Without this autonomy the Philippines PACD was actually more dependent
upon the local u.s. aid organization and local political pressures. Consequently,
it has not developed the necessary technical capacity to promote reform.57
In both cases, then, the failures resulted from the lack of appropriate, or
available, reform orientations in U.S. policy, and the lack of forces for reform
as well as the technical and organizational capacity to effect reform in the host
country.
From these five cases, we can make some tentative general observations of
the conditions under which foreign policy can have a decisive effect on social
change in a subordinate nation. These must be tentative generalizations because
the number of cases is small and the analysis has been necessarily cursory. The
utility of the general observations will be determined largely by the extent to
which the analysis has abstracted the more important aspects of the social
process from the mass of details of the actual historical situations. The utility
will be tested by the extent to which the propositions that can be drawn from
the cases are found to have a more general validity.
During the critical reform periods in Puerto Rico, Taiwan, and Japan, the
relationship with the United States was closer than foreign relations normally
allow. These were not relations between truly sovereign states, but between a
supaordinate state and a subordinate territory. The closeness of the relation
allowed for the direct intervention into major policy decisions of the society. The
insulation of independence in Cuba and the Philippines prevented the United
States from intervening sufficiently to promote change, even if it had so desired.
Another aspect of this relationship is the depth and breadth of the interven-
tion allowed. In the three successes, the United States was concerned with
effecting basic changes in the character of the societies. This made its intervention
diffuse and profound, with relatively few limits on the sectors of the society it
could pry into. The intervention in Cuba and the Philippines was highly specific
and limited: to maintain order in Cuba, and to contract for specific forms of aid
in the postwar Philippines.
We have also seen that an orientation to reform was needed in U.S. policy.
This implies both a general and undifferentiated support for reform, and a very
specific reform orientation in certain agents capable of having an impact on the
host society. The specific agents of change-e.g., Feary, Ladejinsky, Yen, Ickes,
and Tugwell-could draw upon the considerable power of the general value of
reform in America. But it was also important that they had a more specific ex-
pertise and more specific programs that were highly applicable to the situation
of the host societies. The liberal, but very general, reforms in foreign policy
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per se during the New Deal were not very effective promoters of change in
Cuba. The equally liberal but more specific reforms in domestic policy were,
however, highly useful for Puerto Rico.
In the postwar period the general orientation to an antifascist reconstruction
provided general support for the promoters of land reform in Japan and Taiwan.
But the resistance of the old Japan hands would also indicate that a more tech-
nically specialized orientation to particular reforms was more useful than the
general knowledge a foreign observer can acquire of a society. The foreign
observer probably tends to be more impressed with the equilibrium aspects of a
society. A more professionally specific, but geographically generalized, under-
standing of social processes can lead more easily to an understanding of the
strains inherent in any society and the consequent#possibilities of change.
There is also what may be a general limitation upon foreign policy per se in
promoting change in other societies. In its more specific and limited sense, foreign
policy is highly concentrated in the office of the u.s. executive. This concentra-
tion, plus the lack of direct relevance of most aspects of foreign policy for the
home electorate, makes it possible for quite limited and homogeneous interests
to dominate relevant aspects of policy. The events in Cuba and the Philippines
have been of little direct relevance to most Americans, but they have been of
great importance to the homogeneous and economically powerful sugar and
investment interests. It has thus been relatively easy for these interests to gain
considerable influence in the limited arena of the executive and, to a lesser extent,
the legislative offices. This highly concentrated decision-making loci can be
used to mobilize a wide range of very powerful forces in support of specific
interests.
This picture is certainly overdrawn, to be sure. Interest groups concerned
with foreign policy are seldom that homogeneous, and even the forces within
the executive offices concerned with foreign policy are rather wide-ranging in
their orientations. It remains true, however, that with respect to Cuba, and to a
lesser extent Puerto Rico, in the first half of this century the diplomatic history
reads much like a Marxist scenario for a bad movie.58 Diplomatic and military
forces promoted the interests of sugar, and later more extensive investments,
which especially after 1930 were anything but progressive.
We began by noting that foreign policy is never more than just one in a large
set of forces affecting the change of a society. We subsequently argued that the
reforms in Japan, Taiwan, and Puerto Rico could never have been effected with-
out strong local support. This has to be available in two arenas. The general
characteristics of the society must have already given rise to general forces for
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reform, and these must be capable of articulation in the polity. There are severe
limitations upon the ability of a foreign policy alone to make the decisi~n for
local reform.
It is just as important there be effective organizational mechanisms for im-
plementing the reform. This is required both by the extent of the problem and
by its subtlety. No occupation force could have provided the million committee
members that were involved in implementing the Japanese land reform. The
size of the program required a widescale mobilization that was made possible
only by using the Japanese themselves. In addition, effecting true reform re-
quires an extensive knowledge of the subtle cohesive and divisive forces in a
society. Such knowledge allows for an efficient judo-like operation in which the
weight of the society itself can be used to effect changes. Further, such knowl-
edge of a society is .generally gained only by a long and intensive involvement
in that society. We can see, especially in local politicians who may be very in-
articulate, that this knowledge can approach the intuitive in character and can
be very difficult to communicate. Thus, the more a foreign reform orientation
can rely on local agents to implement the reform, the more efficient and success-
ful it is likely to be.
This raises the double difficulty of either not having local allies available, or
of using the wrong groups as allies. Both conditions seem to plague the massive
efforts at reform in U.S. foreign aid programs outside of western Europe.
A final brief observation concerns the utility of having available some rela-
tively clear-cut targets or symbols for reforms around which mass support can
be mobilized. Such was the case, for example, with Munoz' use of the u.s.
failure to implement the SOO-acre limitation in Puerto Rico. The actual social
and economic value ot the land reform that ensued when this issu~ was raised
was probably far less than the symbolic value of the reform in mobilizing new
interests and bringing new groups to power.
In Taiwan and Japan the tenancy issue provided a clear target· for reform,
which was useful at two levels. At the policymaking level it mobilized support
both as a competitor to communist ideology and as a mechanism to preclude the
resurgence of Japanese aggression. At the level of implementation it was also
useful in mobilizing peasants to come forth with their demands in a pattern of
behavior that was deeply antagonistic to traditional interpersonal styles of
behavior. Throughout the underdeveloped world, community-development pro-
grams have often foundered on the inability to induce peasants to new forms of
behavior in electing village councils or cooperating for limited purposes. It is
certainly easier to induce a peasant to go against traditional norms of behavior
when the stake is land, which has a very clear and immediate interest to him.
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There is another type of target that is also considerably useful. Foreign
pressures for reform can provide targets to draw the fire of indigenous conserva-
tive groups away from indigenous reform leaders. This was very much the case
in Puerto Rico and Japan and operated to a lesser extent in Taiwan. There seem
to be two useful effects. One is that they draw away what could be fatal attacks
upon the precarious new reform leaders. After reform has been accomplished,
it can be relied upon to draw new mass support to its leaders. In the early stages
of reform the new leaders are often quite precarious, many are fearful of being
hurt by change, and no one has yet tasted its benefits. At this time, it is useful
for the society if conservative forces have an external target to attack. It not
only makes less precarious the immediate position of the reform leaders, but it
can also preclude the development of deep conflicts that persist beyond the
specific issue of reform. Conflicts that are limited to specific issues, with different
issues cross-cutting one another in group allegiances, form the basis for mod-
erate and pragmatic politics. They are, in fact, critical characteristics of systems
with a built-in ability to change. Thus, where foreign policy can provide external
targets of attack, this can help to produce or support self-corrective mechanisms
in a society, providing for a fairly steady pattern of subsequent social change.
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CHAPTER THREE
FOREIGN POLICY,
THE MILIT ARY, AND
DEVELOPMENT: MILITARY
ASSISTANCE AND
POLITICAL CHANGE
IN AFRICA
HENRY BIENEN

~LITICS AND ECONOMICS in the developing countries can be studied as
part of international affairs.1 There has, in fact, been a large literature on
colonia..lism and its inheritances. And those who focus on imperialism or neo-
colonialism have analyzed the impact of external forces on the societies of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. More recently, studies of modernization have argued
that there are important connections between national political systems and the
international system, and the idea of a transnational politics has emerged. Some
studies argue that nonindustrialized or traditional societies are changing under
the impact of modern, industrial systems i their concern is to show a world
transformation which manifests itself as a generalized Westernizing process.2
But there has been more interest in analyzing a worldwide process than in exam-
ining the specific impact the foreign policies of great powers are having on new
or developing states. The imbalance should be rectified because twentieth-
century foreign aid may be as significant for domestic political change in
recipient countries as nineteenth-century colonialism was. Insofar as this is cur-
rently admitted, it is maintained by analysts who see the CIA or the KGB sub-
verting domestic polities, or by those. who see the capture of elites via technical
assistance and have a cosmic view that the expansion of American, Spviet, or
Chinese "influence" somehow changes the patterns of politics in the receiving
country so that they emulate the patterns in the donor state.
We can account for the paucity of studies on the impact foreign policies have
on political and economic development in the third world. We have had a hard
enough time describing the aims and scope of foreign policies; it has been even
more difficult to analyze political development in given countries, not to say
regions.3 We have not been able to say with confidence what political develop-
ment is in the most simple sense of political happenings. We have been hard put
to determine priorities of various factors in the development of a polity.
But perhaps we are now able to define more clearly what political develop-
ment means, as we get better monographs on national politics and as concepts
are tested for a generality of application sufficient to permit comparative analysis
of their precision and relevance. Thus, we begin to understand better the condi-
tions for development. But, as Robert Packenham points out, it is important to
distinguish between knowledge of the conditions for development and knowl-
edge of the ways to bring development about, especially by the instruments of
foreign policy.4 The reluctance to assess the impact of foreign policies on de-
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velopment may be traced, in part, to a belief that very many variables are at
work and that policies can cut very many ways, producing intended and un-
intended effects and long-run and short-run consequences.5 Furthermore, there
may well be operating among American academics, as well as foreign policy-
makers and implementors, the belief that foreign aid, and even direct intervention
via occupation, has been and will be marginal to an indigenous development
process.6 Our own claims to nonintervention in domestic affairs of other states
along with the futility that has been felt over our inability to intervene effectively
to change domestic patterns of certain. states strengthens this belief in the
marginality of impact.
My own view is that the United States is the most heavily engaged, or im-
plicated, of all the great powers in the process of development, or nondevelop-
ment, in the tiers monde. This is because the United States has the largest
economic and military assistance programs, exports the most personnel, gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental, and is the great power with the most significant
trading relations for the Latin American states and for some of the African and
Asian states. Furthermore, it is intervening directly and massively in Vietnam.
Here I focus primarily on United States policy in one sphere: military
assistance. And I examine some connections between military assistance and
political development in tropical Africa. Of all the conventionally delimited
areas of the world, Africa has been the least studied in terms of the link between
national and international 7 systems and more specifically in terms of the con-
nection between foreign aid and political development. Some attention has been
given to foreign aid and economic development in Africa because it has been
inescapable for anyone who wanted to write about five-year plans or growth
rates to neglect the large foreign component in government or private domestic
investment.8 Similarly, it should be required for anyone who wants to explore
the military coups that took place in Africa in the 1960's and to assess the
prospects for political change that the military poses in Africa to examine pat-
terns and influences of military assistance. For not only have the nature and
scope of postwar military aid programs had significant consequences for the level
of armament and tension in Africa and for the balance of power regionally and
on the continent as a whole, but within African states military assistance
programs have affected the domestic political configuration.9
It is particularly hard to assess the impact of various military assistance
programs. Along with problems of evaluation in multifactor situations and the
lack of rigorous schemes available for assessing the role of military assistance,
we are in a realm where the basic data is especially hard to come by. Much of it
is classified. The United States and Britain publish more of their military assist-
70 HENRY BIENEN
ance facts than France, the Soviet Union, or China, and in the absence of hard
data on the scope of French military assistance, one could not hope to carry out
the kinds of correlations between military assistance and coups that Charles
Wolfe, Robert Putnam, and Charles Wheatley have done-the last two using
Latin American data.10 Furthermore, with a sample restricted to African coun-
tries who have had coups, we would be on thinner statistical ice than the
universe of countries with military coups puts us. (The African militaries are
providing us with more samples every few months, however.) Even if we had
good enough statistical analysis to give us correlations between military assist-
ance and certain political phenomena, like coups, and even if we could make
some statistically backed statements about t~e direction of relationships, e.g., a
coup occurs after military assistance rises, we would surely not be satisfied with
extensive statistical analysis. We need intensive studies of the impact of specific
military assistance programs on political development in single countries.11 Since
I have here neither utilized the data I have to make the kinds of correlations
Wheatley and Wolfe have made, and since I do not examine anyone country's
political development in terms of military assistance, I do not claim this as a
study of the impact of military assistance on political development in Africa.
Rather, I point to certain aspects of political development in Africa and describe
the evolving military assistance programs, with emphasis on American military
aid, in the hope of noting implications of aid programs and drawing some
connections.
We shall see that the United States military assistance programs are small in
absolute terms and relative to American military assistance in other regions. We
shall also see that the number of armed forces, but not police forces, the United
States is aiding is declining. But the fact that the programs are small in United
States terms does not mean they are unimportant f~r African political develop-
ment. And the fact that at present there are dominant voices in Congress and in
the Departments of State and Defense for limiting American military assistance
in Afri~a does not mean this will always be the case. We can be certain the
pressure for assistance from Africa will become more intense. For example, in
July 1967, both Congo (Kinshasa) and Nigeria asked for American assistance in
domestic crises. Thus, what is said now may be useful for policy formulation
later.
Furthermore, military assistance in Africa is very interesting in its own right.
The arguments for and against military assistance in Africa revolve around the
role of the military as modernizer in Africa rather than as bulwark against
foreign aggression or subversion from internal Communist parties. Issues of
international politics arise where there are African arms races-northern Africa,
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the Horn, or where great powers are involved in domestic strife, e.g. Nigeria and
the Congo. The confrontation of white minority regimes in southern Africa with
independent black states raises a host of important questions in the military
assistance realm. Still, it is the role of the military as a ruling group which already
confronts policymakers who must frame assistance programs. Military regimes
rule in six of fourteen western African states, and three of eight central African
states (see Table 1); the Sudan has had military rule; the military is a powerful
coalition partner in Uganda and the Somali Republic. The prospects for military
rule are good in these ~nd other countries, notably Ethiopia. The scope and nature
of assistance becomes both a matter between donor states and recipient ruling
military regimes and a question of the further evolution of military regimes.
The discussion of the impact of military assistance on developing countries
has been concerned largely with the incidence ,of coups and the scope of
assistance; 12 the literature on military intervention has been concerned with
exploring the correlations between intervention and political development and
the role of the military as modernizer.13 We suggest here exploring the relation-
ship directly between military assistance and political development.14 In this
context, assistance to ruling military elites is not our entire concern. The way
civilian rulers use the military is certainly another. This use can be for develop-
ment purposes or civic action. It can be for counterinsurgency purposes. And it
can be for maintaining or changing the domestic political balance through em-
ploying the military directly against one's opponents. For, as one author has
suggested, /IAlthough coups which result in change of government attract the
most attention, the most frequent coups in Africa are probably those initiated
by an incumbent government against threatening individuals or groups (real or
alleged), and those launched by a ruler or dominant faction against their
associates." 15 Obviously, in this regard, the police and paramilitary forces and
thus assistance programs run by the Agency for International Development will
interest us also.
African armies are for the most part small and lightly equipped.16 ·The
largest tropical African armed force was well under 40,000 (Ethiopia) until the
expansion of the Nigerian army; and on a scale for inhabitants per serviceman
and serviceman per square mile of territory, African armies rank low in world area
comparisons.17 The ratio of total men in the armed forces to the combined popu-
lations of the thirty-five countries listed in Table 2 is 1 :900; France is 1 :780 ;
China 1 :260; and the United States is 1 :65. Somali Republic has the highest ratio
of 1 :242 and Liberia the lowest of 1 :4,956. These thirty-five countries south of
the Sahara have armed forces totaling around 300,000 and low reserves forces of
about 126,000. There are around another 250,000 men in gendarmeries and
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national police. Thus, the security forces for Africa amount to approximately the
same number as those of South Korea.18
The African armies are· almost exclusively infantry battalions; some have
light artillery. With the exception of the north African countries and Ethiopia,
air forces are small. Few African countries have anything in the way of a navy.
Military manpower usually comprises less than 1 percent of the population. The
police forces and gendarmeries, which have been neglected in the study of
armed forces in Africa, are often larger than the armies proper and often do not
have significantly less fire-power.
In many French-speaking African states, the gendarmerie functions as a
national constabulary, although it is sometimes integrated into the armed forces.
There are both fixed and mobile units with responsibilities for public order and
internal security. Internal security is usually the de facto mission of the armed
forces as well since few African armies can as yet carry out foreign operations.
African armies have, however, served with United Nations forces in the Congo
and do man the borders of their countries. Thus, their function is not purely
internal. And in the future they will probably be involved in local or regional
conflicts. Since many police forces are on a par with or outnumber the armed
forces, and since their missions are overlapping, it is to be expected that the
police as well as the army would be involved in politics. And, in fact, ruling
military regimes have been coalitions of police, army, and civil servants in
Ghana and Nigeria. Until 1962, the gendarmerie of Senegal was under the
Ministry of the Interior but after M. Dia's coup against President Leopold
Sedar Senghor failed, the gendarmerie was put directly under the Minister of
the Armed Forces. The Surete and the Republican Guard of Senegal remained
under the Minister of the Interior; this was an example of balancing the police
forces themselves rather than concentrating them within one ministry.19
When the costs of defense forces as a share of GNP or of total govern-
mental budgets are calculated, the cost of police expenses are not included. But
given the comparability of internal security function for both police and armed
forces and given the nature of the gendarmerie and mobile police forces as
paramilitary units, this may not be the most useful way of calculating defense
costs. Because the population in Africa is so predominantly rural and because it
is typically scattered, internal security would be a problem whatever the political
problems. Since Africa is marked by a host of forms of violence (revolutions,
coups, rejection movements; organized group violence for both political ends
and robbery; and individual murder and assault as well as guerrilla fighting and
border wars), the costs of internal security come very high.20 (We leave aside for
a moment the question of whether the first political leaders of the newly inde-
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pendent states have themselves raised the cost of internal security and whether
the military has raised these costs.) In Uganda, for example, about 14 percent of
recurrent revenue is devoted to police and prisons.21 Much of the expenditure of
African armies can be counted as internal security expenses.
We see from Table 3 that Africa ranks low for defense expenditures as a
percentage of GNP as compared to other world areas. In fact, sub-Saharan
Africa would rank even lower because the north African countries pull up the
figure for defense spending as a share of GNP.22 However, the defense costs
defrayed through military assistance are not included. These are a very signifi-
cant share of defense expenditures-and for those countries having defense
treaties with France, not only equipment and training but perhaps also deferment
of recurrent costs have been taking place. African countries, moreover, are not
carrying out research and development programs.
We also see from the figures in Table 1 that a number of African countries
have defense expenditures that are comparatively high as a share of GNP for
developing countries. Kenya, Congo (Brazzaville), Senegal, and Upper Volta are
all above 6 percent. In the figures of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA) for 1964, Congo (then Leopoldville, now Kinshasa) was the
only country in all of Africa, excluding the V.A.R., that had more than 6 percent
of its GNP accounted for by defense expenditures.23 That defense expenditures
are rising in Africa is certainly true. In countries with major armed forces by
sub-Saharan African standards we can see the substantial increases. Calculating
the impact of defense costs on the economic growth of developing countries
has been a major concern both for ACDA and AID. But, generally, arguments
have cut both ways, as they have in discussions of political effects. When mili-
tary assistance becomes massive, there is a· fear that inflation will occur in the
recipient country and that domestic budgets will not be able to bear the strain
of absorbing the attendant costs of expanding the military. And there has been
a recognition within all branches of the aid-giving establishment that the politi-
cal and social contexts are sometimes such that military assistance will either not
be possible by itself or will perhaps be counterproductive unless it is accom-
panied by economic assistance. Thus, a large component of American aid since
World War II has been in the realm of defense support or supporting assistance;
17 percent of the total fiscal year 1966 request to Congress for AID programs
were in this category. Supporting assistance is used: " . .. to enable countries to
make a contribution to the common defense, or to internal security, greater than
their economies can support unaided; ... to maintain economic stability in
countries where the absence or drastic reduction of current support would
probably involve disastrous economic and political disintegration; ... to provide,
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along with other aid sources, an alternative to Sino-Soviet bloc aid where such
aid threatens a country's independence or otherwise conflicts with vital U.S.
interests." 24
Supporting assistance is supposed to go to those countries where "essential
growth prerequisites of stability and security must be established." It has
largely, but not exclusively, been used in "forward defense" countries that are
located on the Chinese or Soviet periphery. As a share of AID programs to
Africa, supporting assistance has been declining since 1961, with the exception
of 1964 when the Congo received a large dose of it. For individual sub-Saharan
countries, supporting assistance was large only in Guinea and the Congo. The
latter had major security problems, but for Guinea supporting assistance was a
way of getting economic aid into the country under a quasi-defense guise as it
has been for many non-African countries. We shall see that military assistance
too has been used as a way of getting extra economic aid to Africa.
Indeed, an argument has been made that military assistance can be a spur to
economic development. The provision of military equipment on a grant basis
avoids the use of foreign exchange. The assumption here is that military
expenditures would occur whether aid was given or not and that they would
thus come out of development budgets. Many recipients of military assistance are
countries where troops are recruited from those who live at subsistence level. If
forces were cut back, the economies could not easily absorb the manpower.
Furthermore, local demand is said to rise as an effect of assistance programs.
Above all, the military can directly increase economic growth via its own pro-
grams of social and economic development and through its own internal activities
which provide nation-builders, such as literacy programs. Thus, the argument
here is for the military as modernizer and for militarily sponsored civic-action
programs. On the negative side, along with inflationary pressures mentioned
previously, assistance programs are seen as merely whetting the appetites of the
military for hardware which is not economically productive and the military is
seen as a consumer of scarce resources and services and a utilizer of scarce trained
manpower.25
It is clear that military assistance has in certain places led to inflation, and
domestic unrest has been accentuated by economic dislocations. Military assist-
ance has had positive economic benefits, too. Nothing can be gained from such
generalizations and "on the one hand this" kinds of analyses. Similarly, highly
generalized discussion of the military as nation-builder or modernizer in de-
veloping countries is difficult to sustain because military forces differ in terms of
skills, social composition, fire-power, relations with civilian society and political
groups, and they differ with regard to their own organizational formats. Above
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all, the societies in which they operate constrain or allow their activities to
develop in various ways. Thus, if we want to be able to deal with these argu-
ments for the economic and the even more obscure political effects of assistance,
we must focus on the scope and nature of military assistance to Africa and the
role of the African military in political development.26
Tropical African countries receive military assistance from the great powers:
the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Britain, China, and from many
western European countries including West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Nor-
way, from eastern European countries who both sell arms and supply equipment,
from Canada and Israel, and from other developing countries, particularly the
United Arab Republic and India.27 Some African states have received their
assistance from one source, for example Liberia; others have begun to lessen
their dependency on a single source. Thus, some of the French-speaking coun-
tries who have preserved good relations with France have nonetheless requested
American assistance, Senegal for one. Other French-speaking countries have
received both American and Soviet assistance-Guinea and Mali being cases in
point. Ethiopia, too, has non-American sources now. Even where a country has
been linked to France by a bilateral defense agreement and regional defense
agreements, the United States has given some token assistance, e.g., Dahomey.28
The main advantage of widening sources is obvious: the lessening of de-
pendence on a single donor. However, there are real disadvantages, also. Too
much diversification leads to lack of standardization of equipment and training.
The militaries themselves object to this; moreover, they fear splits within their
ranks on the basis of cliques formed during overseas experience in v'arious
training programs. They do not want an officer corps that is perhaps already
split along regional, ethnic, generational, and career experience lines further
fragmented in terms of military assistance sources. And this is not necessarily a
matter of receptivity to different ideologies or political influences. Rather, it is
a fear that solidarity groups may form simply on the basis of shared experiences
in different settings.29 The civilian rulers may feel ambivalent about diversifica-
tion, too. Although it may be tempting to try and split the military by tying one
segment to one donor and playing it off against another, this is a dangerous
game. Disunity is a double-edged sword. Lack of cohesion among military elites
may promote coups. Syria and Korea are notable examples. In Ethiopia, splits in
the military allowed the emperor to survive the Imperial Bodyguard revolt of
1960 and Nkrumah was building his own professional counterforce to the arm,y
when he was overthrown.so Moreove~, diversification of assistance sources
brings its own pressures on the civilian rulers. Consider the following case: after
the Tanganyikan army mutinied in January 1964, first British and then Nigerian
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troops came to provide for public order. By the time the army was in the process
of reconstruction, Tanganyika was Tanzania; military assistance was being re-
ceived from West Germany, East Germany, the Soviet Union, China, Britain,
Israel, and Canada. Zanzibar's army was trained and equipped from communist
sources. And the United States gave police assistance. The Congo is another
example. After the uprisings there, the Armee Nationale Congolaise was re-
ceiving assistance from Belgium, the United States, Italy, and Israel. Dissidents,
meanwhile, were receiving arms and assistance from the U.A.R., the Soviet
Union, and China.
I do not intend to sketch the various assistance programs.31 We can mention
that in certain places the Soviet Union has been the major donor. Its current
North African programs are very large. It is attempting to transform the U.A.R.
and Algerian armies and is becoming increasingly involved with the Nigerian
military. In tropical Africa, it became involved with government-to-government
aid to the Congo for a brief time and then its aid was given in clandestine fashion
to dissident groups. Currently, its major program is in the Somali Republic where
its aid through 1966 was reported to be above $30 million.32 Close to one hundred
Somali officers are supposed to have been trained in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet
Union was also involved in aiding the Ghanaian army at one point and in building
a special Ghanaian military force outside regular army channels. Guinea, too,
received Soviet credits following its break with France. All told, by 1964 total
military assistance from communist states was put at over $60 million.33 Whether
all this money was expended is another matter, since Soviet aid is in the form of
credits which are not always drawn upon.
Soviet military aid to Africa has not been confined to those states that are
either carrying out "radical" domestic policies or even those that have lined up
with the U.S.S.R. on many foreign policy issues. Somalia could not be put in
either category. Rather, Soviet military assistance to Africa, as its foreign aid in
general, seems to be a flexible instrument for trying ~o further rather short-term
Soviet political aims.34 Although Soviet commentators have maintained that a
number of countries south of the Sahara-Dahomey, Nigeria, Upper Volta, and
others-in which military governments have come to power have received big
amounts of American weapons along with related ideological and political con-
cepts, they have not stated any explicit cause and effect between American
assistance and military rule.35 Nor have Soviet analysts of the African military
been categorically negative about their subjects. They have maintained that the
view that military coups are merely reactionary and militaristic is unsound;
similarly, the view that the army is the only all-national force capable of heading
a national liberation movement is also unsound. Rather, armies should be seen
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as playing the role of weapon of the state where insufficient class differentiation
and immaturity of social relations brings about a situation wherein one class
cannot direct the revolutionary process singlehandedly. Furthermore, the army
did not stand apart from the struggle for national liberation. Algeria's army is
cited here and its composition-poor peasants, workers, and petty bourgeoisie-
is stressed. The role of parties in former colonies is important in this respect in
Soviet eyes. National-front type parties united diverse forces and were not
prepared to solve post-independence problems. But the army cannot take the
place of a party as the guiding force for society as the army has no clear political
or ideological platform and no experience in leading the class struggle. More-
over, the army is not unified socially and ideologically, and it splits over the issue
of which paths to development should be followed. The army can turn into a
tool of reactionary forces, the more so because lithe army is a societal institution
in which democratic ideas c'an live rather placidly alongside reactionary views." 36
This analysis is worth citing at some length because it shows greater awareness
of the role of the army and the pitfalls of army rule-albeit pitfalls from Soviet
points of view-than many American writers concerned with the role of the
military in developing countries have shown.
We move on to United States assistance and will not treat British and French
aid in any detail-but not because the latter are unimportant programs. In fact,
both have been more important than U.S. military aid in Africa in terms of men
trained and impact on internal politics. British officers seconded to African
countries commanded armies even after independence and still do for certain
states (Malawi, Zambia). And where there are African commanders in chief,
Britons may command air forces or navies (Kenya). Some 300 uniformed British
still work with Kenya's S,OOO-man army.37 And British troops intervened in
Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika in 1964 to restore order and to shore up heads
of state in the three countries.3s
French troops, too, have intervened to restore a head of state in Gabon, and
they continue to be stationed on African soil, although in declining numbers.
France has defense and military assistance treaties with some states, and assist-
ance agreements only with others. Although French cadres do not take command
posts, they do fill staff and technical posts in African armies.39 Between 1960
and 1964, over two thousand African officers and noncommissioned officers were
trained by France. And there have been annual quotas for Africans in French
officer schools running into the hundreds.40
One reason for not dealing with French and British programs is that their
published figures for the nature and scope of their assistance are highly inade-
quate.41 More important is the fact that their programs seem relatively stable
78 HENRY BIENEN
and decided on, whereas American military assistance to Africa seems more an
open question (despite the congressional limits imposed on the program). The
reason for this is that Britain and France are retrenching in Africa, whereas
demands will be made for America to playa steadily growing role. However,
present American policy to usupplement" the ex-colonial powers' military and
economic aid to Africa and to keep the lead in military assistance may not be
maintained.
The distinctions between military assistance and economic aid can be drawn
by definition, but since the collateral effects of each impinge on military and
economic factors, the interrelatedness of the two is ever-present. We could
differentiate between military and economic aid on the basis of the form of the
aid: if the item is a howitzer there is little problem; if it is an earth-mover, the
use could be economic or military and we would have to consider actual use as
well. The basis of distinction could be the objectives of the donor: are we pri-
marily concerned with immediate military effects of assistance? We can also
distinguish military and economic assistance in terms of the administering agency
of the aid program:42 Supporting assistance has been considered economic aid in
part because it is administered by AID, but, when the aid program is defended
before Congress, the military aspects are stressed in order to get congressional
support. (Some congressmen have argued for a clear distinction between the
military and economic aspects of the foreign assistance program for a long time,
with all military assistance separated from the foreign aid bill and put on the
budget of the Department of Defense. This has alre~dy b~.en..~~ne for military
assistance to Laos and Thailand, and aid to Vietnam is in a special category, too.)
Arms sales can be considered assistance, too, if the credit provisions are for
soft loans. Certainly the political implications of sales have been seen by critics
and supporters of our arms sales programs.43 The share of American arms sales
to developing countries has been under 10 percent of total sales. Since 1963, the
credit transactions to Africa have been classified. Perhaps the hardest thing to
measure is. the flow of small arms via private manufacturers and clandestine
channels. Biafra has received its small arms in this way, as have a number of
African governments and rebel movements. United States sales programs have
received less oversight from Congress and less publicity than our military assis-
tance programs.44 For Africa, United States arms sales have been insignificant, at
least south of the Sahara, so we are not concerned with American arms sales at
this point.45
Military assistance itself can be divided into three categories: (a) military
assistance which provides military equipment, training, and related services;
(b) supporting assistance, which is at various times described in military terms
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rather than economic; (c) contingency funds used for the same purpose generally
as supporting assistance in those emergency situations which cannot be
anticipated.46
Until 1963, United States military assistance in tropical Africa was admin-
istered by the Department of the Army with the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations (DCSOPS) having primary responsibilities for these military assist-
ance programs (MAP) normally assigned now to unified commands. (Prior to
1963, the Ethiopian MAP was supervised by the Commander in Chief Euro-
pean Command.) At the end of 1963, the United States Strike Command
was assigned additional responsibilities as Commander in Chief (CINC) Middle
East, Southern Asia, and Africa South of the Sahara. In this capacity,
CINCMEAFSA has unified command responsibilities for planning and adminis-
tering military assistance programs as well as commanding all military assistance
advisory groups (MAAGS) and military missions.47 The unified command, in
this case CINCMEAFSA, reports to the office of the Director of Military Assist-
ance in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified command gets policy objectives
and order-of-magnitude dollar guidelines from the director. The director of
military assistance receives directives and overall guidelines from both the Joint
Chiefs and from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna-
tional Security Affairs (ISA). The Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, is
charged with the responsibility of directing and administering the military
assistance programs, subject to the direction and authority of the Secretary of
Defense. At the same time, the MAP personnel in the field are subject to the
authority of the Department of Defense hierarchy; they also work under the
authority of the ambassadors and work with members of the country team. The
Director of Military Assistance also sends program recommendations to the
State Department, AID, and the Bureau of the Budget.
One would expect difficulties in coordination with the various overlapping
organizational hierarchies within the civilian and military wings of the Defense
Department and between Defense and other agencies. One might also expect
that whatever the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which gives
the Secretary of State authority over foreign assistance, which he in turn has
delegated to the Administrator of AID, the Department of Defense which ex-
ercises primary responsibility in the field of military assistance would dominate
the formulation of assistance policy. In the small African programs, both the
civilian wing of Defense (ISA) concerned with assistance and State and AID
have more impact on the contours of assistance policy than they have where
there are big programs. In CINCMEAFSA at the end of 1964 there were thirty-
six military personnel and fourteen civilian personnel in military assistance work.
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Most of them were not concerned with Africa south of the Sahara.48 Military
personnel in the assistance program for Africa feel that AID and State have
considerable say in the administration of military assistance for Africa.49 The
AID personnel, in turn, feel that military assistance is particularly inappropriate
for Africa in the light of its stark development needs and its distance from the
Sino-Soviet periphery. The AID personnel concerned with Africa have more
antipathy for the military as a ruling group than have the military personnel.
Yet, many officers involved in assistance programs, both in the field and in
Washington, and military personnel seconded to ISA or to political-military
affairs desks within the State Department do not have exaggerated ideas about
the capacity of African militaries for either maintaining political order or
achieving political development.
It is probably true that AID'S voice has bee.n heard in interdepartmental
meetings on military assistance to Africa more than elsewhere. For one thing,
there are no large ongoing programs in tropical Africa. For another, Congress
has established a $25-million limit on provision of direct grant equipment to all
of Africa,50 although this can be avoided via interest-free loans. And sub-
Saharan Africa has been the area of least American involvement politically and
economically as well as militarily. Thus, in the context of a relative lack of
interest, AID has comparatively more influence on military assistance policy in
Africa than in other areas. (The emphasis on military civic action in Africa,
however, has been at least as much, and probably more of, an interest of ISA
than AID.) Finally, the police assistance programs are operated by the Office
of Public Safety, which is located within AID.
The official statement of AID on police assistance notes that the Public
Safety Program seeks: 1. To strengthen the capabilities of civil police and
paramilitary forces to enforce the law and maintain public order with a minimum
of physical force, and to counter Communist inspired or exploited subversion
and insurgency. 2. To encourage the development of responsible and humane
police administration and judicial procedure and to improve the effectiveness of
civil police and paramilitary forces, and to enable them to become more closely
integrated into the community." 51
In Africa where civil police and gendarmerie perform security and para-
military functions, and where policemen have been partners in military regimes,
AID'S public safety programs are important and enhance the role of AID
(although the Office of Public Safety has its own separate identity within AID).
The public safety funds come out of country budgets. Also, AID provides
training for civil police and for field forces. The requests of police for aid tend
to be "lighter" (that is, weaponry does not include artillery) ; it is less expensive.
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An American presence can be obtained, a concentration on internal subversion
is possible, and arms races are not furthered. This is not to say that there is no
danger for political development' in aiding police forces. Janowitz raises the
possibility that mobile police forces are instruments of potential political inter-
vention. While police forces are less costly, they can be even more disruptive to
the internal political balance because they are more likely to rely on local
coercive pressure and have less of a sense of national goals.52 "In fact, it might
be argued that, in the absence of the army as a counterforce, the police would
tend to expand their -political power in new nations with weak political institu-
tions, and their intervention might be highly unstable and fragmentary." 53
Since there are armies in Africa, with the few exceptions of Gambia, Botswana,
and Lesotho, there is also the possibility of army-police struggle. Posing hypo-
thetical questions will not be nearly as useful as examining specific police re-
cruitment patterns and analyzing actual police-civilian and police-military
relations. The kind of weaponry and training the police receive will affect these
relations.
The public safety programs of AID came to $2,541,000 for fiscal year 1966
and $3,550,000 for fiscal year 1967. This was one of the smallest categories of
the functional fields into w'hich AID breaks its assistance and it came out of a
total project commitment for Africa in 1966 of $141,488,000.54 During this same
fiscal year, 1966, AID provided development loans of close to $100 million and
supporting assistance of $26 million. Military assistance for fiscal year 1966 was
$24 million. The country breakdown on 1967 can be seen on Table 7.
The United States gives military assistance to Africa for a number of reasons,
all of which have been noted in congressional hearings. The official line, as
expressed by the men from the military and civilian wings of the Department of
Defense, from the State Department, and from AID, who appear before the
hearings of the Senate and House Appropriations and Foreign Relations com-'
mittees, is a true telling. With specific reference to Africa, Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara gave three reasons for military assistance, one of which was
deleted from the record of the hearings: (a) American interest in the independ-
ence of Africa. Military assistance helps counteract communist influence and
control; (b) Military assistance helps maintain friendly regimes that are capable
of maintaining stability, which is a precondition for orderly social and economic
development.55 Secretary McNamara's third and deleted reason, we may specu-
late, had to do with maintaining American base and overflight rights on African
soil.
When General Paul D. Adams, then CINCMEAFSA, appeared before a
congressional committee, he neglected to mention base rights and communica-
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tions facilities but he did cite the following as objectives of United States military
assistance to Africa south of the Sahara: first, to foster an anti-Communist,
free-world oriented community; second, to assist in the development of an
internal security capability and political stability essential to economic growth;
third, to contribute to the existence of viable and friendly governments; fourth,
to provide recognition of new countries and to assist them in assuming the
responsibilities of their independence and sovereignty; and, fifth, to prevent an
African arms race.56 General Adams also noted the importance of creating a
United States presence-to give "an alternative to the Chinese and Russians
who are competing to take over the countries in time."
A specific program, Ethiopian MAP, was described as "maintaining satisfac-
tory relations with the Ethiopian Government which continues to make impor-
tant communications facilities available to us. Concurrently our program
prevents Soviet encroachment into the military field in this strategically located
country. Our assistance provides an internal security capability for the Ethiopian
armed forces and provides the capability for these forces to contribute to U.N.
operations such as those in Korea and the Congo." 57
There have been other public allusions to bases in North Africa and to track-
ing stations, need for worldwide communications net maintenance, and over-
flight rights.58 Here, military assistance essentially is used to purchase needed
facilities. A communications base in Asmara, Ethiopia, an all-weather air base
in Libya (Wheelus), port facilities in Liberia (Roberts), overflight rights and
landing privileges in the Sudan, all are related to military assistance programs.
This is perhaps the most straightforward exchange. Political influence deriving
from military assistance and aid programs as development tools are much less
clearly achieved. And whether a country's internal security is furthered by
military aid is also a question to be explored empirically. Spokesmen for the aid
program do not even suggest that African militaries can directly add to Ameri-
can national security by providing forces that can substitute for American
forces. In fact, Congress insisted in 1963 that any aid not strictly needed for
purposes of internal security in Africa was prohibited unless the President
determined otherwise.
In the 1960's American military assistance has largely been geared to short-
term political objectives. Military aid has been provided in small quantities to a
number of countries in order to maintain political ties both with African ruling
civilian groups and with the potential or actual military ruling elites. The United
States· has been the primary source of assistance for Liberia and Ethiopia and
has been a major donor to the Congo. There have also been military assistance
programs in twelve other sub-Saharan states (including the Sudan).
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Although these programs are small by comparison with American military
assistance programs elsewhere (see Table 8), they grew in size after commence-
ment of assistance to Ethiopia in 1953.59 By 1967 the proposed military assistance
to Africa was $31.8 million (See Table 9). This was 3.1 percent of total United
States military aid.
The present level of military assistance at $31 million represents a concen-
tration of programs in fewer countries. The Clay Committee had argued, "We
believe that the problems created by military assistance programs in the African
countries would be greater than those they would resolve." 60 It argued for an
end to small, scattered programs. At the same time, AID was moving toward a
concentration of economic aid in fewer African countries.61 The congressional
limit of $25 million on equipment (twelve modern jets amount to about $25
million) militated for phasing out the small programs. Moreover, there was
another congressional limitation on the number of countries that could receive
American assistance of any kind-forty. Thus, small programs in Senegal,
Guinea, and Mali were speeded up and phased OUt.62 In tropical Africa, only
Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Congo now have MAP, along with Libya, Morocco,
and Tunisia in northern Africa. Only Libya could afford to purchase weapons.
America has already refused a number of requests for assistance and sales.
Assistance to Ghana was terminated in 1964, when relations with Ghana de-
teriorated. When the late Prime Minister Balewa of Nigeria asked for a jet
squadron in 1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk stressed its unsuitability, and
the cost of annual maintenance was pointed out as equaling the cost of educating
five million Nigerians.63 There has been a resistance to meeting such requests for
heavy weapons, and those responsible for military assistance in ISA and the
Joint Chiefs have maintained that aid to Africa in their realm has been for
training and for logistical support, communications equipment, small arms, and
the establishing of civic action battalions. A functional breakdown of assistance
is given for 1962 in Table 10.
Here training does not emerge as a primary component of military aid.
Through 1965, 2,721 Africans (including North Africans) were trained in the
United States and another 199 were trained at overseas areas. This does not
include, of course, training on the ground via mobile teams and MAP people in
formal and informal ways. The costs of training through 1965 were $13.9 million
of a total cost of over $1 billion for all American military training programs.64
This was less than 10 percent of American military assistance in dollar terms.
For the relatively large Congo program, which has been justified on the grounds
that training is the major need of the Congo's army, through 1966, $830,000 of
the $18.8 million the Congo received was for training.65 Of the $31.2 million
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proposed for assistance to tropical Africa in 1968, $.5 million will go for training.
Furthermore, the average MAP personnel strengths have been very small. In
1967, 17 military and no civilians were in Liberian MAP administrative and
mission training. The Congo had 29 military personnel, Guinea 16, Mali 4 (there
had been as many as 24 in 1965), Nigeria and Senegal 2 each. Only Ethiopia had
a large number of personnel with 187 military and 3 civilians.66 Ethiopia had
the largest number of men training in police programs at the International Police
Academy.
It is important to note the limited scope of training in the American military
assistance programs, even when we have taken account of the overall limited
scope of the military assistance program in Africa, because it was implicitly
through training programs that the objectives stated by Secretary McNamara
and General Adams for military assistance to Africa were to be achieved. Short-
term political influence via ties with the military can be had, perhaps, by pro-
vision of equipment. But inculcation of values is presumably achieved through
the training process.
Colonel Quintus C. Atkinson has stated: liThe United States perhaps recog-
nizing this danger of military coups as a part of the objective of 'Free World
Orientation' has engaged wherever possible in the training of selected African
military personnel in U.S. service schools and in the education and training of
other potential leaders in U.S. civilian college programs. These programs not
only supply much needed training and education but also offer the opportunity
to develop leaders in the democratic tradition. To many United States officials
these leadership programs offer more chance of long range success than the more
transitory popularity gained from furnishing hardware./I 67
There has been a debate within the military and civilian agencies concerned
with military assistance over the nature of training programs. Many individuals
doubt whether democratic values can be inculcated via training programs and
whether it is the place of the instructors at the various service schools to do so.
Furthermore, there is a belief on the part of civilian and military people alike
that coups are going to take place in Africa whatever the nature of American
training programs and, for that matter, whatever the nature of military assist-
ance programs. To counter these objections, the argument is made that programs
should be geared to exploiting leadership qualities, both .in the selection of
personnel to be trained and in the latter training.68 Nation-building qualities and
nonmilitary aspects should be stressed. General training in administration,
encouragement of precepts of public and social responsibility, and personal
ethics should be given.69 It has been explicitly stated that if the military are
going to play political roles, they should be trained to do SO.70
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But how do you train an individual or a group for political roles? The princi-
ples of administration can be set forth rather clearly, at least for administering
bureaucratic, rationalized organizations. Yet these principles, applied to institu-
tions of state in new nations, do not guarantee success. In Africa, if a civil
servant is going to be effective in putting across a local program, he may have
to be part com~unity-developmentofficer and part politician. There are no
models of bureaucratic behavior that can be transferred simply. Political roles
are even harder to define. To be able to teach someone how to be effective
politically requires a great deal of knowledge about the indigenous society. Is
such knowledge about African societies readily available? If so, it has not been
evident in the academic community.71 Do those who train the trainees have this
knowledge? Can you teach military assistance personnel who are going to MAP
programs in Africa about their countries in a month at the Military Assistance
Institute? 72 Is this kno.wledge going to be gained at Fort Bragg's Army Special
Warfare Center and School or Fort Gordon's Army Civil Affairs School or the
United States National Interdepartmental Seminar on Problems of Internal
Affairs?73 I think we can be very skeptical. When Africans come to the United
States would they be receptive to such teaching? Will courses in civics be any-
thing more than banal affairs and, where they are, how happy will be the
governments and militaries who send their people? This is not to suggest that
nothing can be taught concerning development to military personnel, both
American and foreign. It is to sugge~t that we are on strange ground ourselves in
this endeavor.
Furthermore, the view that we can teach principles of modernization to
foreign military personnel without getting into specific problems of local politics
is fatuous. Indeed, the views that the military is the elite best suited to carry out
modernization in new states and that "how to modernize" can be taught by
stressing good "nation-building" principles-the civic responsibility of the
citizen to the state, the role and importance of national symbols, and the identity
of views between the people and their government 74-are both rooted in an
apolitical image of development. The idea that United States military assistance
should stress training in nation-building so that military assistance will not just
have collateral benefits for economic and social development but direct benefits
through military nation-building activity gained its impetus from a view of the
military as modernizer in the new states.75 This conception in turn gave rise to
military assistance for civic action..
We are by now familiar with the argument that the military is a relatively
modernized institution in developing countries and that it is oriented toward
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industry and professionalism; it is available to outside contact, operates on ra-
tional norms with a receptivity to technological change, and is socialiied to a
wider national set of values. It is argued that an "informed soldiery drawn from
all elements of the population is not only well placed to transmit national values
to the populace" but that "properly employed the army can become an internal
motor for economic growth and socio-political transformation." 76 The rub here
is ;'properly employed." For by now we are also aware that the analyses which
considered that discipline and organization were the key qualities necessary for
institutions to act with political effect and that because the military could inter-
vene successfully against other groups they could be a dynamic force for mod-
ernization and bring order out of chaos have not everywhere been correct.77 It is
one thing to prevail against other political groups through possession of
weapons, organization, and discipline. It is another thing to create political order
or even to bring about stability. The proposition is well supported that it is
easier for the military in developing countries to accumulate power than to gov-
ern as a ruling group.78 We have learned that the coups that bring the military
to power often carry the seeds of factionalism within the military, if it is not
split already.79 Furthermore, if the military is to rule, it must be a political actor
and cannot stand above politics. Thus, a major claim made for the military-
that it represents the entire nation and is perceived to be above political strife-
ceases to be viable, once the military gains power (if it had any merit to begin
with).
There is another problem. Militaries in many countries are not disciplined
and well-organized; they are not melting pots or well-assimilated groups that
have been forged into a cohesive entity. In Africa, small militaries of a few
thousand men have been able to bring down civilian regimes. But these new
rulers make up neither in legitimacy nor coercive ability what they lack in
political talent. There is no evidence that African militaries have the political
talents requisite for rule in Africa. They are not reaching down to the grass roots.
There have been attempts to make African armies nation-builders by changing
patterns of recruitment and having the army carry out civic-action programs-
building roads, irrigation works, etc.,-and by changing names. Thus the
Tanganyika Rifles became the Tanzanian Peoples' Defense Force: youth-wingers
and party. people were enlisted and the army began economic projects. (The
French-speaking armies have carried out economic projects for a long time.) 80
But not all militaries want to carry out civic-action projects, not all do it effi-
ciently. The reliability of a politicized army, both for ruling militaries and for
civilian regimes, is doubtful. In Africa, of course, the reliability of the essentially
mercenary armies constructed by colonial rulers proved to be tenuous, too.
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When armies come to power in Africa, their leaders, be they ex-noncommis-
sioned officers from the colonial forces or new graduates from Sandhurst, St. Cyr,
and Fort Gordon, do not show particular skill in manipulating political groups
via persuasion, flexible policies, and bargaining abilities. Both the Nigerian and
Congolese military elites seem to be lacking in these skills, to name only two
glaring examples. Are "political" sentiments expressed, for example, when
Colonel Lamizana of Upper Volta, commenting on rumors that the former chief
of state, M. Yameogu, would remain in office after military intervention, de-
clared, "This is to know how poorly the military man I am, because my honor
as a soldier and my dignity prohibit me from such compromises"? 81
As different military factions begin to make alliances with various civilian
groups, a pattern that has become typical in Latin America and the Middle East
may occur: institutionalized intervention of the military does not promote polit-
ical development and bring about political stability i furthermore, the military
does not give up aspirations to rule and in fact cannot disengage from the
politics of rule.
When we begin to make concrete what we mean by political development
in Africa we should be talking about creating effective political instruments.82
Public order means domestic tranquillity. Political order means institution-
building. It is not a terminal state once reached, forever achieved. There are, as
yet, no nationwide political structures in Africa that can enforce the will of
ruling national elites, no matter whether these elites are of traditional lineage
groups, civilian bureaucracies, the military, or the ruling single-party-where it
still exists. Although many African states exhibit a rhetoric of mobilization-for-
development through disciplined parties or militaries, it is often these very states
where values are not allocated for society as a whole by central authorities.
However, highly localized determination of political life need not be synonymous
with disorder, anarchy, and chaos. In fact, in Africa it may be the only way to
avoid these conditions. For tropical Africa we can agree with Huntington's
general point for developing countries that the only organization which can be-
come a source of authority and which can become effectively institutionalized
is the political party.83 This does not commit one to the view that attempts at
centralized one-party systems will work. Political competition and nondirective-
ness are not necessarily inimical to development. They are required for it in
Africa. Indeed, political machines that are competitive and decentralized may
well be a useful model for Africa. If this is so, the military will hardly be the
group most appropriate for manning the machine.
If we should be highly skeptical about the military as the bearer of mod-
ernity and the creator of political development in Africa, then we must look
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carefully into the consequences of military assistance for the balance of political
power in African countries. This argument has particular weight because the
many reasons given for military assistance elsewhere are recognized as being
inappropriate in Africa. We do not look to African military forces as being
useful against external aggression from outside Africa and we are not interested
in strengthening the defense forces of the free world by adding African military
units; nor do we think that military assistance should be used to stabilize given
areas through balance-of-power politics. The places where this might apply, the
Horn of Africa and the Maghreb, worry us as they become involved in arms
races. Thus, the arguments for military assistance to Africa hinge on: (a) devel-
oping the military as modernizer; (b) creating strong military and paramilitary
forces to assure the independence of a country against internal subversion;
(c) enhancing American political influence through connections with the military
and by getting leverage with governments who request assistance. If, however,
the present phase of military rule and initial military interventions turns out to
be short-lived or highly unstable in Africa, then American political influence
might be lessened if relationships with new civilian elites are affected by past
military assistance programs. It is also possible that military assistance does not
add to internal security in Africa but rather lessens it. And it is at least con-
ceivable that the only way militaries in Africa will successfully contribute to
development is by restricting their own growth and the importation of hardware.
We have no hard conclusions to offer, but in order to take account of these
questions we must now try to assess certain effec.ts of military assistance in
Africa.
It is perhaps easier to see the absence of effects of assistance programs than
to specify negative or positive effects. For example, the evidence is as scanty in
Africa as elsewhere that Secretary McNamara is correct when he says, liThe
experience we have indicates that the exposure of the military officers to our
schools acquaints them with democratic philosophies and the democratic ways
of thinking which they in turn take back to their countries." 84 We do not have
good "before" and "after" guages of the attitudes of foreign personnel }'Vho
come to train in the United States. The impression of some of those who train
foreign police and military personnel is that the trainees are hardware oriented.
(The impression of observers, too, is that trainers are hardware oriented.) We
know the military elites are political actors on home ground, but we" have as" yet
little knowledge of how they are influenced by either training programs or a
general socialization process.85 It may be that interpersonal relations at United
States training programs neither supply a basis for communications about
United States policy and strategic intentions nor effectively communicate values
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about the role of the military. This does not mean that career and educational
experiences are not important. Janowitz suggests that they may be more im-
portant than the traditional categories of social background in explaining
political attitudes. But so far, we do not know the impact of our training pro-
gram on these attitudes.
What we do know is that American-trained officers have participated in
coups and that men trained for civic action in Latin America and having career
experiences with civic-action activities turn their attention to what may be called
coup politics. There is also evidence that personal relations are struck between
American military personnel and foreign officers. But we can be wary, as Henry
Bryoade was not when he said that "military leaders play an important and in
some cases controlling role in most of the states of the area and these leaders are
on the whole progressive, friendly to the West, and distrustful of the Soviets." 86
Bryoade was referring to the Middle East.
Insofar as militaries directly carry out nation-building tasks, they do so, in
American te.rms, through civic-action programs. "Civic action" has sometimes
been used synonymously with "counterinsurgency" because both involve mili-
taries with civilian populations. Civic action, however, stresses the nonviolent
use of the military. "Civic action is the use of indigenous and foreign military
and paramilitary forces on projects useful to local populations in fields such as
education, public works, agricultural, transportation and other projects which
contribute to economic and social improvement." 87 MAP-supported civic action
is designed to encourage and support the use of local forces in activities that
contribute to economic and social development, and to assist in the prevention
and elimination of insurgencies inimical to free-world interest by improving the
relations between army and population. Congress amended the Mutual Security
Act in 1959 to provide specific legislative endorsement for civic action, and
President Kennedy directed the Departments of State and Defense to undertake
expanded support of civic action in developing countries in 1961. The increased
number of African countries that were receiving American military assistance in
1963 was in part a reflection of interest in civic-action programs in Africa. Civic
action also served as a way of getting more economic aid into Africa.
There was support for civic-action programs in Africa by AID personnel
because they considered such programs as the least evil among the military
assistance alternatives. Within the State and Defense departments interest
quickened in the military as a force for development, and civic-action programs
were seen as direct contributions to economic development and as useful com-
ponents of counterinsurgency programs. The economic aspects of development
were stressed. liThe purpose of the non-military operations, such as civic action,
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is to help eliminate the economic cause of discontent that provides the breeding
ground for insurgency." 88 Although there was no interest within the Defense
Department in turning African armed forces into civic-action forces, civic action
was seen as an appropriate mission for army contingents. For one thing, there
was no danger that civic-action activities would unduly detract from what would
be primary military purposes elsewhere, namely, defense. The United States had
no interest in building large defense forces in Africa and feared an African arms
race. Furthermore, it was felt that civic action would not be contrary to the long-
term development of private enterprise and a sound civilian economy since there
was so little private enterprise in any case. Military officers, seeing that civic
action was "in" at high levels in the government, began to see a new army
mission in its sponsorship. And for Africa, it w~s clear that civic action repre-
sented a way to get military assistance established. In fact, the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1966 stipulated that military assistance to Africa must be for civic action
or internal defense.
The civic-action programs now started in Africa are considered to be in early
stages with a large potential for expansion. The civic-action programs in tropical
Africa usually take the form of assistance for engineering projects. Engineering
battalions are rehabilitating schools, constructing roads, and providing sani-
tation. The United States has provided the equipment, materials, and training for
these projects. Since individual items are not detailed, it is not known here pre-
cisely what equipment is called civic-action equipment. The claim is that only
light equipment is provided. This has meant, in Latin America at least, patrol
boats, training for airborne units, and transport and communication materia1.89
Some essentially new battalions are being supported by American civic-action
assistance. Military spokesmen have claimed for Liberia that civic-action projects
have enhanced the government's program of rural and tribal integration into
national life.90 We have as yet no studies corroborating this or denying it.
Skepticism has been evident over the positive results of civic action in Latin
America and limitations on civic-action programs have been stated elsewhere.91
And the warning has been sounded that as the military gets involved with
civilians and perhaps some of the least satisfied elements-the youth or the rural
populace in particularly underdeveloped areas-and as it gets more control over
resources, it might activate those resources against the regime.92 "However,
much depends on how this [civic action] is done, for deep involvement by an
army in such non-military matters can also lead to corruption and inefficiency.
Foreign advisors who stress the importance of the military's role in nation-
building may inadvertently be encouraging the army to judge its record-and its
hopes-against that of a lack-luster regime." 93
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However, there has been little calculation in the past of the impact of civic-
action programs on politics in countries receiving military assistance. This is
undoubtedly related to Packenham's finding that among aid administrat~rs the
sociological and psychological dimensions of political change are not perceived
or are not salient factors in their implicit models of political change and that the
American experience has produced an attitude of disdain toward the idea of a
possible technology of political development.94 Perhaps this lack of calculation
also reflected the small concern within the American government over the pros-
pects for military- rule in Africa. The "marginality of impact" view,95 plus the
notion of modernizing militaries operating on army corps of engineer principles,
has, in the context of the relative absence of American interests in Africa, led to
a posture where small military assistance programs were supported to gain short-
term political goals without a hard look at thE! consequences of these programs.
Even where there was uneasiness over the wisdom of miltiary assistance, if
African leaders wanted token programs, the United States gave them these
prior to 1965. If there were stronger political interests, larger programs were
undertaken.96
The desire for an American presence and for ties between donor and
recipients has led to a concern with the impact of American assistance in one
important political area: the propensity for coups. Moreover, congressmen are
always raising the possibility of a connection between assistance and coups.
In the past, Latin American military coups occupied congressional attention;
more recently, African military interventions have been prominent.
We have already said that we do not know precisely what values are transmitted
by military training programs. But, whatever the struggle of conscience, what-
ever the reluctance (or keenness), African officers have intervened in politics.
And they have intervened in former British colonies as well as former French
ones. There is no reason to suspect that American-trained officers have been any
less inclined to intervene than their colleagues trained at Sandhurst or St. Cyr.97
Although there have been American military assistance programs in Liberia,
Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria, Sudan, Ghana, the Congo, and Ethiopia, only in
Ethiopia and the Congo was assistance going on at the time of an attempted coup.
Since all African armies receive foreign military assistance from somewhere, we
can find a perfect correlation between coups and assistance at the grossest level
of analysis. Some of the smallest armies have revolted-e.g., Togo, Gabon-
and so have the largest (Ghana, Nigeria, and Ethiopia). The claim is probably
true that some African armies would intervene even if they were armed with
bows and arrows and that they would be strong enough to overthrow civilian
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regimes even with that kind of weaponry. This argument has been made in sup-
port of the null-effect hypothesis of military assistance. In the absence of data on
the French and British assistance policies, we cannot thoroughly investigate the
proposition that the conduct of armed forces in domestic struggles may be con-
ditioned by institutional and national ties with the outside. But even for small
armies receiving small amounts of assistance, it would be very useful to examine
the impact on military responsiveness to government control that institutional
dependence on foreign military assistance may represent.
Wheatley has done this for S4 countries over the period 1950-1964. (Liberia,
Guinea, and Ethiopia were the only sub-Saharan African states included.) He
sets up a simple 1/exchange of services" model where the military provides a
responsive !TIeans for the use of force in the pursuit of government goals while
the government reciprocates by providing human and material resources for the
military.98 He elaborates four hypotheses worth listing: "I) The smaller the
proportion of total material resources consumed by the military which derive
from domestic sources, the less responsive the military to the domestic regime;
2) The higher. the absolute levels of military resource consumption, the stronger
the association between the proportion of total resources derived from domestic
sources and the degree of military responsiveness to the domestic regime;
3) The greater the proportion of domestic material resources consumed by the
military and the smaller the proportion of total military consumption they pro-
vide, the less responsive the military to the domestic regime; 4) The greater the
number of external sources and the larger the proportion of total military re-
sources these provide, the less responsive the military to the domestic regime." 99
Unresponsiveness, in Wheatley's use, includes failure to resist-or assistance to
-insurgents or the calculated attempt to remove government incumbents or to
alter the structure of government. We would also want to know the likelihood
that the military will take independent positions on foreign and domestic issues.
This is harder to establish because infighting may be less well known. But it is
especially important in the context of military assistance because the donor may
have it in mind to encourage military dissidence in foreign or domestic policy.
Wheatley was concerned with relating the onset of coups to military assist-
ance compared to domestic resource levels.1OO We cannot find out with public
figures for enough countries in Africa whether military assistance was rising as a
share of defense expenditure before COUpS.IOl In east Afric~, mutinies took place
for higher pay and then defense costs went up as salaries were raised. Subse-
quently, military assistance increased in Tanzania and the numbers of donors
proliferated. But what the ratio of assistance to new costs was is not known to
me. Similarly, defense costs have gone up both in western African states which
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had coups, some of which were also pay strikes, notably Togo, and in states that
have not had co.ups. It may be that military assistance has no casuative correla-
tion and that factors completely internal to African politics are more
important.
But we should note here that many of the factors mentioned by students of
African coups can perhaps be gotten at by looking at military assistance. Changes
in size of the military, composition, technology, image of self, all are related to
military assistance because African militaries are dependent on aid for carrying
out structural changes and increasing the size of the armed forces. The argument
made by some proponents of military assistance that armies would get money
earmarked for capital development if assistance is not forthcoming can be true
only up to a point. Furthermore, internal politics in a given country as well as
regional struggles for influence can be related to military assistance because out-
side powers have an interest in the complexion of regimes and in African ex-
ternal relations. After the coup, the United States determined to furnish Ghana
aid to stabilize the nation's economy, to service debts, and to modernize the
Ghanaian security forces. lo2 Great powers also may intervene in crises of internal
security, the Congo and Nigeria being cases in point. Thus, military assistance
and coups may be related, but not merely in terms of the resource-mediation/
model-responsiveness that Wheatley positS.103
Our concern with development leads us to ask: what happens when the
military does take over? Do defense budgets rise and, if so, are they financed
out of greater foreign assistance or domestic resources? We are interested in the
reasons defense budgets rise, too. Zambia has the fastest-rising defense budget
in tropical Africa. But Zambia borders on the Congo and on Rhodesia. Yet, the
civilian government may be responding to internal political pressure as well as
felt security needs. A military regime in power may spend money on the army
in order to make payoffs to its major constituent. Or it may make such a botch
of rule that it begins to rely more and more on the coercive apparatus and thus
incur high costs for maintaining itself. lo4
It has been argued that African politics already manifest a major trans-
formation: the shift away from political power as a technique of rule to a reliance
on force. lo5 Rulers resort to force when power and legitimacy fail. If African
ruling militaries fail to legitimize themselves they will have to rely on instru-
ments of force rather than the manipulation of political power.106 Do we then
meet spiraling demands for assistance? The Congo already shows this pattern,
revealing how hard it is for the United States to extricate itself from military
assistance in a continuing crisis. There is evidence that the United States would
like to end its Congo military assistance programs or at least curtail them. Nor
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does the Congo appear to be a country listed for country development support
emphasis under new AID concentration policy. Yet, at a time when Congress is
particularly uneasy about American interventions and military assistance, air
transport and troop support are sent to the Congo (during July 1967) after
strong requests from the Congo government for help against a mercenary insur-
rection. Such a request can be refused. In this case it was felt that political ties
required the sending of assistance. Moreover, it was argued, and proved to be
true, that even such limited assistance could be crucial for the short-run military
situation. In this context, with a history of past military and political support,
it is hard to get out.
In other words, military assistance in Africa is not merely the provision of
material and services to another state but often means giving aid that can tip
domestic political balances precipitously. The Congo is simply the most dra-
matic example of this because its politics have been violent and military forces
have frequently been in struggles with other military and quasi-military groups.
The recipient state is willy-nilly in a client relationship in Africa to the donor,
who willy-nilly finds himself up to his ears in domestic politics without really
seeing how he can direct those politics.
If it turns out to be true, as argued here, that African militaries do not have
the political resources to run African polities nor are they modernizers, then
assistance which makes the military an ever "heavier" institution in society but
that is not able or designed to change the fundamental nature of the militaries
will not be conducive to an orderly process of political development.
So far American military assistance has reconstructed certain military forces
through massive aid and direct military intervention. Korea and Vietnam are
cases in point, although the latter may be more significant for the questions it
raises about the limits of American military assistance and intervention. In
Africa, it cannot be said that MAP has been used as "one of the most useful
available instruments for American foreign policy for meeting the challenges of
the systematic revolution in the underdeveloped areas." 107 Nor has MAP been
looked on as not only a military program but also a broadly gauged sociological
and organizational undertaking. lOS Aid has been used for direct rather than in-
direct influence.109 The biggest programs have been where the United States has
had bases, and assistance has been in the nature of quid pro quo. I have largely
ignored the foreign policy aspects of assistance here to concentrate on the possi-
ble consequences of these small programs. It is possible for big powers with many
huge programs to overlook the'impact of small programs on small states with
porous and fragile political structures and to concentrate on short-term political
influence rather than long-term political development.
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TABLE ONE
ARMED FORCES OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
(excluding gendarmeries and police)
Annual
Defense 0/0 Active
Inhabitants Budget of 0/0 Reserves
Armed per (million Total of (not
Nation 'Forces Serviceman dollars) Budget GNP police)
EASTERN AFRICA
Ethiopia 35,000 634 31.2 17.0 2.3 8,000
Sudan 18,500 789 40.0 17.7 4.4
Somali Republic 9,500 242 6.7 18.1 4.8
Tanzania 3,000 3,440 7.2 3.8 0.3 4,000
Kenya 4,775 1,906 10.2 6.9 9.8
Uganda 5,960 1,235 17.0 10.2 1.5
SOUTHERN AFRICA
South Africa 23,000 829 322.0 19.9 3.5 53,000
Rhodesia 4,345 963 16.9 6.6 1.9 38,300
Zambia 3,000 1,200 13.5 5.7 2.5 2,000
Malagasy
Republic 2,800 2,143 9.1 8.8 1.0
Malawi 850 4,350 1.5 3.3 1.1 ?
Botswana
Lesotho
CENTRAL AFRICA
Congo * 32,000 478 22.5 14.5 1.7
Cameroon 3,000 1,366 15.8 19.5 4.2
Burundi * 950 2,737 .97 ·6.9 .7
Congo
(Brazzaville) 1,300 615 3.8 8.9 10.9
Rwanda 1,500 2,007 1.3 9.7 .7
Chad 700 3,857 5.8 13.5 1.8
Central African
Republic * 500 2,400 2.3 7.9 .6 700
Gabon 300 2,000 2.5 7.6 5.1
WESTERN AFRICA
Nigeria * 11,500 4,956 54.0 9.9 .9
Ghana * 9,000 844 42.0 7.4 2.5
Guinea 3,000 685 5.9 8.1 3.1
Senegal 4,700 659 21.1 11.6 7.6
Ivory Coast 3,600 972 8.8 6.9 2.4
Liberia 3,580 698 3.1 6.7 1.8
Mali 3,500 1,280 8.8 21.2 3.2
Sierra Leone * 1,360 1,618 2.6 4.9 1.3
Upper Volta * 1,700 2,470 2.8 14.1 6.1 1,000
Niger 1,500 2,000 3.7 10.8 1.2
Dahomey * 1,400 1,429 4.1 12.0 2.0
Mauritania 1,100 909 4.1 17.9 5.1
Togo 600 2,500 2.8 13.5 4.1
Gambia *
* Ruled by military regimes as of June 1967.
Source: Charles Stevenson, "African Armed Forces," Military Review, XLVII (March,
1967), 18-24.
TABLE TWO
COMPARISON OF ARMED FORCES AND CIVIL POLICE GENDARMERIE
Nation Armed Forces Civil Police or Gendarmerie
Ethiopia
Sudan
Somali Republic
Tanzania
Kenya
Uganda
EASTERN AFRICA
35,000 28,000 plus 1,200 in frontier guard
18,500 10,000
9,500 5,000
3,000 1,350 (including a parachute company)
4,775 11,500 (including a light plane wing)
5,960 5,500 (including General Service Units and
air wing with light transport and heli-
copters)
2,800
850
4,345
3,000
South Africa
Rhodesia
Zambia
Malagasy Republic
Malawi
Botswana
Lesotho
SOUTHERN AFRICA
23,000 28,000 police, plus 15,000 reservists, 51,500
Kommandos (part-time rural militia)
6,400 active, 28,500 reservists
6,000 (including 6 platoons of Mobile Police
with light aircraft)
1,000 gendarmerie & 600 civil police
3,000
750
550 gendarmerie, 1,950 civil police
500 gendarmerie, 700 Republican Guard
and 330 civil police
600 gendarmerie, 900 civil police300
950
1,300
1,500
700
500
CENTRAL AFRICA
32,000 21,000 civil police,S gendarmerie battalions
3,000 3,000 gendarmerie, 5,900 civil police,
1,800 mobile police
1,000 gendarmerie, 850 civil police
Gabon
Burundi
Congo (Brazzaville)
Rwanda
Chad
Central African Republic
Congo
Cameroun
WESTERN AFRICA
Nigeria 11,500 24,000
Ghana 9,000 9,000
Guinea 5,000 1,000 civil police, 900 gendarmerie
Senegal 4,700 1,500 gendarmerie, 3,000 civil police
Ivory Coast 3,600 1,500 gendarmerie, 800 civil police
Liberia 3,580 700 police, 5,000 militia
Mali 3,500 1,000 gendarmerie, 600 civil police
Sierra Leone 1,360 2,050
Upper Volta 1,700 1,500 gendarmerie, 300 civil police
Niger 1,500 1,300 gendarmerie~400 civil police
Dahomey 1,400 1,200 gendarmerie, 1,000 civil police
Mauritania 1,100 800 civil police
Togo 600 1,000 gendarmerie, 300 civil police
Gambia None 150 paramilitary field force
Source: For armed forces I have used Stevenson, Military Review, XLVII, 18-24;
for police or gendarmerie I have used Wood, The Armed Forces of African States.
Wood and Stevenson have many comparable figures for armed forces, but they dis-
agree in various places, too. Although the publcation date for Stevenson is later than
for Wood, some of Wood's figures seem more up to date; others do not.
TABLE THREE
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND SELECTED ECONOMIC DATA
FOR LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,a BY REGION, 1964
Defense Public Public
Mid-Year 0/0 of Education Health
Region Population GNp b Expenditures C GNP Expenditures d Expenditures d
(in millions) (in billions of U.S. dollar equivalents)
Europe 109.0 $ 53.0 $ 2.5 4.7 $ 3.2 $ 1.3
Latin America 229.2 74.0 1.7 2.3 2.2 0.9
Far East 1,036.1 105.4 6.8- 9.8 6.5-9.3 3.9 0.9
Near East 82.1 19.2 1.4 7.2 0.9 0.3
South Asia 611.1 55.7 2.1 3.9 1.3 0.4
Africa 222.1 24.2 0.5 2.1 1.0 0.4
--- -- --
Total 2,289.6 $331.5 15.0-18.0 4.5-5.4 $12.5 $ 4.2
0/0 of
world total (71.2) (17.3) (12.1-13.0) (14.3) (11.1)
a For this table, less developed countries include Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia; all of the
Near East and Far East except Japan; all of Latin America; and all of Africa except the Republic of South Africa.
b For most free-world, less developed countries, GNP statistics are based on U.N. data for prior years. For less developed
countries where official national accounts data are not available or are considered to be inadequate, estimates were prepared
from available information.
C Data have been generally adjusted to concepts used by NATO.
d The quality and comprehensiveness of these data vary significantly from country to country. Data generally relate only to
central government expenditures. In many countries, provincial and local governments have a major role in education and health.
Source: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Wide Defense Expenditures and Selected Economic
Data, Calendar Year 1964, Research Report 66-1 (Washington, D.C., Jan. 1966), Table III, p. 17.
TABLE FOUR
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
FOR SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1960, 1962, AND 1964
(in millions of u.s. dollar equivalents)
Country GNP
1960
Defense
Expends. GNP
1962
Defense
Expends. GNP
1964
Defense
Expends.
Ethiopia $ 812 $15 $ 900 $19 $ 982 $22
Ghana 1,324 14 1,518 33 1,675 39
Nigeria 3,300 16 3,715 24 4,120 48
Note: Gross national product and defense expendi~ures are in current market prices
generally converted at official exchange rates. Defense expenditures have been adjusted
generally to the concepts and definitions used by NATO.
Source: World Wide Defense Expenditures, 19.
TABLE FIVE
AID EXPENDITURES-APPROPRIATION CATEGORY BY REGION
AND COUNTRY-FISCAL YEAR 1966
(thousands of dollars)
Techincal
Coopera-
tion/ Contributions
Develop- CoIrtiI\';' to Interna-
Development ment SuppO'rting gency tionalOrgani-
Country Total Loans Grants Assistance Funds zations
AFRICA 212,140 90,160 76,730 42,954 1,271 1,024
Algeria 834 678 156
Burundi 292 292
Cameroon 3,453 2,005 1,135 313
Central African
Republic 1,468 1,468
Chad 1,164 1,164
Congo
(Brazzaville) 38 38
Congo
(Kinshasha) 22,285 1,423 20,004 858
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TABLE FIVE (Continued)
Technical
Coopera-
tion/ Contributions
Develop- Contin- to Interna-
Development ment Supporting gency tionalOrgani-
Country Total Loans Grants Assistance Funds zations
Dahomey 460 460
Ethiopia 7,830 741 5,803 1,276 10
Gabon 557 557
Gambia 102 102
Ghana 29,545 28,642 903
Guinea 7,214 141 2,876 4,215 -18
Ivory Coast 2,340 1,694 646
Kenya 3,777 448 3,329
Liberia 21,241 14,565 6,676
Libya 454 -4 458
Malagasy 602 602
Malawi 1,695 1,695
Mali 1,782 42 951 654 135
Mauritania 185 185
Morocco 20,240 6,280 854 12,972 134
Niger 1,117 339 778
Nigeria 20,530 4,579 15,951
Rhodesia and
Nyasaland 1 1
Rwanda 410 410
Senegal 165 148 17
Sierra Leone 1,549 1,539 10
Somali
Republic 5,654 1,294 4,360
S. Rhodesia 7 7
Sudan 3,493 67 3,426
Tanzania 3,920 2,062 1,858
Togo 1,088 1,088
Tunisia 27,047 24,496 2,551
Uganda 3,443 1,654 1,789
Upper Votla 367 367
Zambia 808 808
East Africa
Regional 3,268 1,116 2,152
Africa
Regional 11,509 6,998 3,346 1,000 165
Regional
USAIDIAfrica 205 205
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TABLE SIX
FRENCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE: 1964
(in millions of dollars, excluding gifts of equipment)
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Dahomey
Gabon
Ivory Coast
Malagasy Republic
Mauritania
Niger
Senegal
Upper Volta
1.84
1.40
1.36
.88
2.00 b
11.66
1.30
1.00
1.40
a A French gift of military vehicles was worth $2 million.
b There was a 340-man mission in 1963.
C No monetary breakdown available from the source.
Source: M. J. V. Bell, Military Assistance to Africa ("Adelphi Papers," No. 15, Dec.
1964, ISS). Addenda and Errata Pt. I, March 24, 1965, pp. 1-4. Bell put French military
assistance to Africa at $46.6 million in 1963 and $48.4 in 1964.
TABLE SEVEN
AID'S PUBLIC SAFETY ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA
(in thousands of dollars obligated)
Total through
1966 1967 Fiscal Year 1967
Central African Republic 77 4* 214 *
Chad 141 39 * 312 *
Congo (Kinshasa) 526 2,437 4,207
Dahomey 34
Ethiopia 408 199 2,378
Kenya 77 46 553
Liberia 211 323 2,526
Malagasy 42 34 * 408 *
Niger 40 18 * 560 *
Rwanda 208 101 661
Somalia 647 320 3,804
Tanzania 64 * 182 *
Tunisia 30 9 150 *
Upper Volta 36
Total 2,541 3,550 15,955
* As of March 31, 1967.
Sources: Figures for 1966 from the Statistics and Reports Division, Office of Program
Coordination, AID, as published in AID, Report for July I, 1965-June 30, 1966 (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1967), 31. Figures for 1967 and total figures from Office of Development
and Planning, Bureau for Africa, AID.
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TABLE EIGHT
MILITARY GRANT AID PROGRAMS-CHARGEABLE TO
APPROPRIATIONS DELIVERIES BY FISCAL YEARS
(millions of dollars)
Africa
1950- 1950-
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1965
8.2 11.5 17.8 26.1 28.0 17.4 138.0
.2 .2
.1 5.0 2.3 7.4
.1 * .1
7.0 6.0 10.9 10.9 10.3 8.3 80.9
* * * *
* *
Cameroon
Congo (Leo.)
Dahomey
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guinea
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Libya
Mali
Morocco
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sudan
Tunisia
Upper Volta
Total
4.8 4.0 4.7 8.8
.1
1.1
4.8 4.0 4.8 9.9
5.2
.3
5.5
.9
.3
.3
.3
.1
2.1
2.7
.1
.4
1.3
.7
1.5
.1
*
.1
*
2.3
.1
1.2
.4
.1
6.1
*
*
1.6
*
5.7
*
.7
1.5
.2
6.0
.3
.5
*
3.5
.5
2.2
.5
2.3
.2
.1
*
.9
*
3.1
8.1
1.6
18.4
.1
.5
2.3
.1
15.1
1.
* Less than 50,000.
Source: Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts (Washington, D.C., May,
1966), 14. McArdle gives higher figures for u.S. military equipment and training assist-
ance to African states, 1950-1964, putting Ethiopian assistance, for example, at $11.3
million for 1963 and Liberian at $2.0 for the same year. Her sources are cited as U.S.
Department of State, Report to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program forFY
1961, p. 22, and International Development Agency, Proposed Mutual Defense and
Assistance Program for FY 1964, p. 177. McArdle's figure may be higher because all
training costs are included. See Catherine McArdle, The Role of Military Assistance in
the Problem of Arms Control ("Center for International Studies," MIT, Aug. 1964), 69,
Table a.
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TABLE NINE
FISCAL YEAR 1967 PROPOSED MILITARY AID
Europe
Near East and South Asia
Africa
Far East
Latin America
Regional costs
Worldwide costs
Total
Amount
36,129
240,125
31,816
387,340
71,999
68,991
190,600 .
1,027,000 *
Percent
3.5
23.4
3.1
37.7
7.0
6.7
18.6
100.0
* This is total obligational authority and includes both $917 million in new obliga-
tional authority requested for fiscal year 1967 and $110 million in estimated recoup-
ments and reappropriations from prior year programs.
Source: Military Assistance Facts, 2.
TABLE TEN
FUNCTIONAL BREAKDOWN OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TO AFRICA, FISCAL YEAR 1962
(in millions of dollars)
Supply operations and nutritional surveys 2.3
Training 2.8
Total fixed charges 5.1
Spare parts 2.4
Attrition 1.0
Other consumables .4
Total force maintenance 3.8
Aircraft .9
Ships .6
Tanks, vehicles, and weapons 5.4
Missiles
Electronic and communications equipment 1.3
Special programs 11.2
Other 2.0
Total force improvement 21.5
Total 30.4
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee
on Foreign Operations Appropriations, Hearings for FY 1963, p. 543, cited in Mc-
Ardle,68.
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TABLE ELEVEN
NUMBER OF AFRICAN PARTICIPANTS IN PUBLIC SAFETY
PROGRAMS IN THE U.S.A.
1965 1966
Africa 79 101
Chad 2
Congo (Kinshasa) 6
Ethiopia 29, 25
Kenya 3
Lilieria 10 5
Sierra Leone 1
Somalia 17 23
Tanzania 13 17
Tunisia 4 17
Uganda 4
Upper Volta 2
Note: There were no Africans in public safety programs being trained by the U.S.
in third countries.
Source: AID, Operations Report, FY 1966, p. 108.
TABLE lWELVE
THE NUMBER OF U.S. GOVERNMENT TECHNICIANS IN PUBLIC SAFETY
PROGRAMS IN AFRICA AS OF JUNE 30, 1966
Central African Republic *
Chad
Congo
Ethiopia
Kenya
Morocco
Rwanda
Somalia
* (Listed as East African Republic in AID document.)
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1
1
6
7
7
1
2
2
TABLE THIRTEEN
u.s. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FUNDS FOR CIVIC-ACTION PROGRAMS
IN AFRICA-FISCAL YEARS 1962 THROUGH 1966 *
(in thousands of dollars)
Congo (Leo.)
Ethiopia
Guinea
Liberia
Libya
Mali
Senegal
Sudan
Tunisia
Upper Volta
Total
1962 1963
463
183
646
1964 1965 1966
**
167 6 5
783 152
66 88 9
6
5 230 162
66 276 306
**
2
8 8
312 1,391 642
* Fiscal year 1962 was the first year that civic-action assistance was so identified in
MAP.
** Less than $500.
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings,
Foreign Asisstance Act of 1966, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p. 1040.
NOTES
1 This present work grows directly out of a concern with American policy that was fore-
shadowed in Henry Bienen, ed., The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Change
(New York, 1968). The Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, under the
chairmanship of Professor Morris Janowitz, has generously provided financial assistance
for the continuous research. Furthermore, discussions with colleagues at formal and informal
gatherings of the Inter-University Seminar have been invaluable. As a member of the semi-
nar, I happily acknowledge the debt owed to the Russell Sage Foundation in support of our
work. Equally valuable to me has been the support of the Center of International Studies at
Princeton. This work could not have been possible without the help I received from many
individuals in the Department of State, Agency for International Development, and Depart-
ment of Defense, particularly in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna-
tional Security Affairs, and the Office of the Special Assistant for Military Affairs in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. My acknowledgment of thanks to the various organizations and agen-
cies cited in no way is meant to distribute the responsibility for the results here produced.
2 For a review of some of these works, and a critical analysis of what he calls eurhythmic
change (further change toward the characteristics of the society from which the original
change derived), see C. S. Whitaker, Jr., /IA Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change," World
Politics, XIX (Jan. 1967), 190-217.
3 See my "What Does Political Development Mean in Africa," World Politics, XIX (Oct.
1967), 128-41.
4 Robert A. Packenham, "Political Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid
Program,/I World Politics, XVIII (Jan. 1966), 230.
5 Among the few studies that have tried to come to grips with the impact of foreign aid
on development in recipient countries are Amos Jordan, Foreign Aid and the Defense of
Southeast Asia (New York, 1962); Charles Wolf, Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in South-
east Asia (Princeton, 1960). These are more cost-effectiveness studies of various combinations
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of United States deployments than analyses of impacts. Wolf's United States Policy and the
Third World (Boston, 1966) does the latter.
6 Packenham's study of Agency for International Development middle-level personnel
established that one important segment of the government at least views foreign economic
aid as having marginal effects on internal development (World Politics, XVIII, 228).
7 There have been studies of Africa as a subsystem in the international system, e.g., I. Wil-
liam Zartmann, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," unpub-
lished paper, and I. William Zartmann, International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1966).
8 See Andrew M. Kamarck, The Economics of African Development (New York, 1967).
9 Catherine McArdle, in The Role of Military Assistance in the Problem of Arms Control
("Center for International Studies," MIT, Aug. 1964), has addressed herself more to the con-
sequences of military assistance for the balance of power between states because she believed
the nature of the difficulties precluded the possibility of assessing impacts of military assist-
ance programs (pp. 8-10). Another study with an arms control focus is Lincoln P. Bloomfield
and Amelia C. Leiss, "Arms Control and the Developing Countries," World Politics, XVIII
(Oct. 1965), 1-19.
10 Charles Wolf, liThe Political Effects of Military Programs: Some Indications From Latin
America," Orbis, VIII (1965), 871-93; Charles Wheatley, "Some Inter-National Dimensions of
the Role of National Military Forces in Internal Political Conflict," paper prepared for the
1965 meetings of the American Sociological Association, Session on the Sociology of War and
Peace; Robert Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics,"
World Politics, XX (Oct. 1967), 83-110.
11 We are only now getting studies of the genesis of particular coups in depth. See, for
example, Bienen, ed., The Military Intervenes.
12 Among those who argue that American military assistance does not create coups are
Wolf in both of the studies alluded to and Captain David Zook, Jr., "United States Military
Assistance to Latin America," Air University Review, XIV (Sept.-Oct. 1963), 82-85. Among
those who argue that there are positive correlations between coups and American military aid
are Herbert Mathews, "When Generals Take Over in Latin America," New York Times Mag-
azine, Sept. 9, 1962, and many congressmen as well as academics. See, for example, .U.S.
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, International Development and Security,
87th Cong., 1st sess., Pt. II, May 1961, pp. 610-12, 681, 669.
13 On military intervention and political development, see Martin Needler, "Political De-
velopment and Military Intervention in Latin America," American Political Scienc.e Review,
IX (Sept. 1966), 616-22; Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York,
1965); Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of N ew Nations (Chicago,
1964) i Henry Bienen, "Public Order and the Military in Africa; Mutinies in Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanganyika," in The Military Intervenes. Many books have been concerned with the
role of the military as modernizer, including those just cited. Also see the follo~ing bibliogra-
phies: Peter B. Riddleberger, "Military Roles in Developing Countries: An Inventory of Past
Research and Analysis" (Special Operations Research Office, March 1965); and Moshe Lissak,
"Selected Literature on Revolutions and Coups d'Etat in the Developing Nations," in The
New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization, ed. Morris Janowitz (New York, 1965).
14 To some extent Wolf has dealt with this subject and others have written of fundamental
changes in the balance of power which military assistance brings about. There has been less
analysis of the effect of military assistance on ruling elites. A recent study which takes this
up is Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power: Counter-
insurgency and Civic Action in Latin America (Columbus, 1966). Also see Annex D, Report
of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program (the
Draper Report), Washington, D.C., 1959, Vol. II, by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of
the University of Pennsylvania. I have not seen a report by W. P. Davison, "Political Side
Effects of Military Assistance Programs" (RAND Corporation, 1960).
15 Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical
Africa," paper prepared for delivery at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, New York, Sept. 6-10, 1966, p. 13.
16 For material on African armies, the source I have found most useful is the publications
of the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) in London, particularly, David Wood, The Armed
Forces of African States ("Adelphi Paper," No. 27, April 1966); M. J. V. Bell, Army and Na-
tion in Sub-Saharan Africa ("Adelphi Papers," No. 21, Aug. 1965); M. J. V. Bell, Military
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Assistance to the African States ("Adelphi Papers," No. 15, Dec. 1964); also M. J. V. Bell,
"The Military in the New States of Africa," paper given to the working session, "The Profes-
sional Military and Militarism," Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Sept. 1966; James S.
Coleman and Belmont Bryce, Jr., "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," in The
Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, 1962), 359-
405; William Foltz, "Military Influences," in African Diplomacy, ed. Vernon McKay (New
York, 1966), 69-90; George Weeks, "The Armies of Africa" in A Handbook of African Affairs,
ed. Helen Kitchen (New York, 1964), 188-236.
17 For armies of other areas, see ISS, The Military Balance, 1965-66 (Nov. 1965).
18 Charles Stevenson, "African Armed Forces," Military Review, XLVII (March 1967),
18-24.
19 For a good description of a police force in Africa see Foreign Areas Studies Division of
the Special Operations Research Office, United States Army Handbook for Senegal (Washing-
ton, D.C.: American University, Aug. 1963),443-54.
20 Colin Leys has given us a most useful typology of violence in Africa in his "Violence in
Africa," Transition, IV (1965), 17-20. War subsystems refer to the feuding of tribes and clans
as a way of life.
21 Ibid., 19.
22 Algeria, with an armed force of 48,000 men, was spending 3.2 percent of GNP in 1964.
For the same year Morocco, with an army of close to 45,000, was spending 4.8 percent;
Tunisia, with an army of 16,000, was spending 3.1 percent, and Libya, with an army of
6,000, was spending 3.6 percent. See United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
World Wide Defense Expenditures and Selected Economic Data, Calendar Year 1964, Research
Report 66-1 (Washington, D.C., Jan. 1966), 11-12.
23 Stevenson's figures for defense budget as a share of GNP were published in 1967. The
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's were published in 1966 using 1964 calendar year.
There are many discrepancies between them which perhaps may be accounted for by rapid
shifts in government spending. The governments' figures upon which they are based are vari-
able also. For some countries the same data are used.
24 AID, Principles of Foreign Economic Assistance (Washington, D.C., 1965), 20.
25 These arguments are summarized, among other places in Harold Hovey, United States
Military Assistance (New York, 1965), 219-24.
26 See Janowitz, The Military in Political Development, for a comparative study on the
military in new nations.
27 Stevenson, "African Armed Forces," Stevenson, 22, notes that 23 nations give military
assistance to African countries.
28 For French defense agreements see West Africa (London) Aug. 24, 1963, reprinted in
Kitchen, Handbook of African Affairs, 233-35. For the texts of certain published agreements
see Collective Defense Treaties (Washington, D.C., 1967), 165-66. Also see Wood, Armed
Forces of African States, for a brief resume of aid for individual African states.
29 See Philip B. Springer, "Disunity and Disorder, Factional Politics in the Argentine Mili-
tary," in The Military Intervenes, 145-68.
30 See Colonel A. A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup (New York, 1966).
31 This can be found in Bell, Military Assistance to the African States; Wood, Armed
Forces of African States; McArdle, Role of Military Assistance in Arms Control; and in the
ISS publication by John Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, Arms to Developing Countries ("Adelphi
Papers," No. 28, Oct. 1966).
32 Marshal Schulman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York, 1967), 180.
33 McArdle, Role of Military Assistance in Arms Control, 78.
34 For a discussion of Soviet military aid programs and their motives, see The Soviet Mili-
tary Aid Program as a Reflection of Soviet Objectives ("Georgetown Research Project," Atlan-
tic Research Corporation, June 1965).
35 V. Sibirsky, "Washington's New Frontiers in Africa," International Affairs (Moscow), II
(Feb. 1967), 73-77.
36 A. Iskendrov, "The Army, Politics, and the People," Izvestia, Jan. 17, 1967, p. 2.
37 The Economist, May 27, 1967, p. 900.
38 See Bienen, "Public Order," in The Military Intervenes, 35-70.
39 Lt. Col. Bernard L. Pujo, "South of the Sahara: Defense Problems in French Speaking
Africa," Military Review, Feb. 1966, p. 33.
40 Ibid., 34.
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41 Press and periodical reports can be assembled. Sutton and Kemp have done this and
they provide material on origin of aircraft, tanks, etc. House of Commons, Papers, Civil Ap-
propriations Accounts and Civil Estimates reported military aid to Africa where there were
small programs: Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Mali. Nigeria was not reported after 1960; Ghana
and Kenya were not reported. Data on Tanganyika and Uganda were incomplete; Sierra
Leone was not reported.
42 John H. Ohly, "A Study of Certain Aspects of Foreign Aid," Annex G of the Draper
Report, 282-83.
43 Henry Kuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs and
the man in charge of arms sales, has argued that from the military point of view we stand to
lose all the major international relationships paid for with grant aid money unless we can
establish professional military relationships through the sales media. U.S. Senate, Committee
on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Hearings, United States Armament and
Disarmament Problems, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 197, p. 147.
44 A staff study prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Arms Sales
and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1967), argues that at a time of increasing congres-
sional oversight of military grant assistance, emphasis has shifted from these programs to a
concentration on military sales. In fiscal year 1961 sales were 43.4 percent of grant aid; in
1966 sales stood at 235.1 of aid (p. 2).
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FOUR ASPECTS of foreign economic policy are of importance for the develop-
ment of underdeveloped countries: foreign aid, foreign trade, stabilization, and
encouragement (or discouragement) of private investment.
Foreign aid has been much more in the public eye in recent years than any of
the other three types of policy, and controversy concerning it has been much
keener. It might also be said that thinking about it has been much more con-
fused. For this state of affairs social scientists are partly to blame. There is little
truly sophisticated literature on the theory of foreign aid, and it could hardly
be claimed that in practice foreign aid programs have been shaped by such
theories as there are. Foreign aid policy developed first on an ad hoc basis, and
social scientists have tried to provide a logically consistent rationale afterward.
It is not even clear as to why the donor countries believe foreign aid should
be provided. Moral obligation to help the poor, the threat to national security
entailed in the widening gap between rich and poor nations, the desire to win
allies, and the possibilities of expanding world trade have all been cited as rea-
sons for helping the underdeveloped countries with their development programs.
In his inaugural address, President Kennedy stressed the moral obligation to
help less prosperous peoples: "To those peoples in the huts and villages of half
the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts
to help them to help themselves, for whatever period is required-not because
the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because
it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save
the few who are rich."
Most statements of the objectives of foreign economic policy are general
and vague. There is no lack of such statements: speeches by Presidents, secre-
taries of state, and foreign policy administrators; the documents arising out of
work of the Draper Committee; 1 the various submissions to the Special Com-
mittee of the United States Senate to Study the Foreign Aid Program; 2 the later
submissions to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; 3 and statements by
independent research organizations and scholars.4 Nearly all these statements
have a common stamp. For the purposes of an earlier study,5 I summarized the
essence of these statements as follows:
1. The major aim of American foreign economic policy is to accelerate
economic growth in underdeveloped countries, on the grounds that poverty-
stricken nations are a threat to the security, peace, and freedom of the American
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people. In addition, however, it is desired to demonstrate to the underdeveloped
countries and to the world that high rates of growth can be achieved within a
noncommunist economic framework and with a democratic political system. The
political objective, in other words, is to achieve the economic goals in a fashion
that will contribute to the growth of representative, responsible, and independent
governments, which are not hostile to the West, and which can be expected
either to remain neutral or to support the United States in a major war. It may
also be-although this is a question for analysis-that stagnation elsewhere in
the world may become a drag on the economic development of the United States
itself.
2. A secondary objective is to assist in the economic stabilization of other
countries on the grounds that economic instability hampers development and is
also a threat to security, peace, and freedom. Instability elsewhere may also
aggravate the problem of maintaining steady growth in the American economy,
although this too is a question for analysis.
In stating the political objective of U.S. aid, I have avoided any blunt state-
ment that United States foreign economic policy is designed to combat com-
munism. The United States has given aid to both Yugoslavia and Poland. It
would presumably be contrary to American principles to combat communism in
countries where it is clear that the majority of the people support a communist
government and where the government is representative of the people, responsi-
ble to its wishes, and independent of foreign domination. It may be questioned
whether such a nation is conceivable, but that is another matter.
I have also avoided stating the U.S. economic objective to be one of "closing
the gap between the levels of per capita incomes in the United States and other
countries." It is extremely unlikely that this aim could be accomplished in less
than a century, if ever. Since the United States starts from a level of per capita
income so much higher than that of underdeveloped countries, growth rates
would have to be several times as high in underdeveloped countries as in the
United States, if the absolute difference between American incomes and their
incomes were to be reduced. The technical difficulties involved in generating
such a process are enormous, and for the advanced countries to promise the im-
possible would in the end prove contrary to the interests of the advanced coun-
tries. Moreover, just as in anyone country the presence of a few rich people
would not be a very serious matter if no one were poor, the fact that some na-
tions are richer than others would not be very serious if there were no poor
nations. The economic goal is to eliminate poverty everywhere rather than to
close the gap between American and foreign incomes.
I have also rejected the idea that the aim of foreign economic policy is to buy
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friends. Friendship cannot be bought; the motto most clearly established by
foreign aid experience would seem to be "the feeding hand shall be bitten."
France continues to provide more bilateral assistance, relative to gross
national product, than any other country. The bulk of French aid goes to French
colonies and territories, the rest goes almost entirely to ex-colonies. In France,
therefore, the question is not only "Why aid?" but also "Why aid concentrated
in these few countries?" The most thorough review of French foreign aid policy
to date is the Jeanneney Report.6 The report attaches little importance to any
economic gains from aid. The basis for the relatively generous French aid pro-
gram is simply the necessity of cooperation with underdeveloped countries for
the purpose of "human solidarity." There is also a responsibility for the spread-
ing of French civilization and keeping alive the French tongue as an interna-
tional language. Finally, France must join other Western powers in preventing
the emergence of a bloc of developing countries hostile to the West. The report
recommended broadening the geographic scope of French aid but felt that French-
speaking Africa should continue to enjoy priority. France's revolutionary tradi-
tion gives her special advantages in dealing with developing countries, the re-
port argues.
The United Kingdom also provides most of its assistance to colonies or ex-
colonies. A White Paper of September 1963 pointed out that half the increase
in British aid between 1957-1958 and 1961-1962 went to colonial territories.
Most of the rest of the increase went to independent Commonwealth countries;
both aid to other countries and contributions to multilateral programs remained
small. The White Paper had little to say about why aid is given; the British
people feel a responsibility for development of the remaining colonies and a
continuing responsibility toward independent Commonwealth countries. Having
helped these countries to political independence, "it is a natural and fitting con-
tinuation of the earlier relationship that we should now assist them in their
efforts to achieve balanced and self-sustaining economies" (p. 16).
The German approach to foreign aid policy seems even more simple. As
Goran Ohlin puts it, "No strategic or security considerations are given much
weight, and no historic ties of any importance have guided the direction of aid.
. . . Repeatedly, the present Minister for Economic Co-operation, Herr Scheel,
has described it as 'welfare policy on an international scale.'" 7 Japan stresses
the diplomatic aspects of aid. The prime minister stated to the Diet in October
1963, "It is quite natural that Japan should extend assistance to other countries
as she herself has attained such remarkable economic growth, and Japan must
also make a greater effort to establish friendly relations of solidarity with Asian
countries, bearing in mind the necessity for stability and peace in all of Asia." 8
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In the smaller countries, like Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Italy, and Canada, the
expectations of diplomatic gains from aid are somewhat diluted; the major
motives seem to be a feeling that all advanced countries share the responsibility
of helping the poor ones and a general desire to be in on the act.
In the complex process of interacting economic, social, and political forces which
brings economic development, what contribution can capital assistance make?
It is quite clear that capital assistance cannot begin to do the job alone. At the
same time, the availability or absence of foreign aid of the right kinds and in
the right amounts might make the difference between success or failure of a
country's own efforts to launch a process of sustained economic growth.
The most obvious thing that foreign aid can do is to fill the gap between
capital requirements for a IItake-off" into sustained growth and domestic
capacity for savings and investment.9 There is no use in providing a country with
more capital than it can effectively use. On the other hand, an ideal international
economic policy would see to it that all countries were able to invest annually an
amount equal to their absorptive capacities. They would then be able to maximize
income over a long-run planning period, given the supplies of factors of produc-
tion other than capital, and the institutional, political, and economic framework.
Capital assistance would be lion tap" in such quantities that lack of capital would
never cause a bottleneck in the economic development of any country.
We can imagine that the planning authorities estimate the net contribution
to national income, direct and indirect, from now to infinity, resulting from the
addition of successive blocks of investment to the total investment program
planned for the next five years. tO The additional blocks of investment for which
estimates of contribution to income are made should be big enough to take care
of the relevant economic, political, and social discontinuities in the development
process of the country concerned. In calculating the contribution to the national
income of a particular extra block of investment, allowance must be made, of
course, for maintaining the capital stock at its new, higher level thereafter. We
shall call the addition to income of each successive block of investment the
"marginal contribution" of investment to distinguish it from the "marginal
productivity" of capital in its ordinary meaning and also from "marginal effi-
ciency." The marginal contribution includes all the changes that would accom-
pany a substantial addition to the developmental investment program.
We can then define "absorptive capacity" as the amount of investment that
can be undertaken, within a five-year program, without reducing the marginal
contribution of the last block of capital below x. In other words, it is the amount
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that can be undertaken without raIsIng the incremental capital-output ratio
(ICOR) of the last block of investment, or marginal ICOR, above 1.-. In this
x
context we are concerned with investment over a five-to-ten-year planning
period and the resulting increase in income over a very long period-twenty
years or more.
The question, then, is how high do we put x? One could make a strong
case for making x equal to zero. Absorptive capacity would then be the total
amount of capital that could be invested during the planning period and still add
something to future income. Putting it the other way round, it is the amount that
can be invested without raising the marginal ICOR to infinity. In most countries,
the real obstacles to acceleration of growth are lack of entrepreneurship, ineffi-
ciency of public and private administration, shortag~ of technicians and skilled
workers, lack of commitment of government and people to economic develop-
ment, resistance to social change, and the like. As the investment budget is in-
creased, a point is reached where the inadequate supplies of these other factors of
production will reduce the marginal contribution of additional investment
sharply to zero. Given the discontinuities in the supply of new capital (one can-
not build half a railroad or half a power plant), it is doubtful whether the amount
of investment that would raise the marginal ICOR to infinity would be very
different from the amount that would raise it to, say, 30:1.
If foreign capital assistance is provided in the form of hard loans carrying a
rate of interest of y percent, it seems clear that x should not be set lower than y.
That is, investment financed by foreign aid should not be carried beyond the
point where the addition to national income offsets the increase in cost of servic-
ing the debt.
An operational manual of the u.s. Agency for International Development
suggests that in determining the cost-benefit ratio of projects proposed for AID
support, an interest rate of 3.5 percent should be applied to the foreign com-
ponent of the cost; for the domestic component local interest rates should be
used, or, if no accurate local rate can be isolated, a "shadow price" of 6 percent
should be applied. 11 John H. Adler, commenting on this suggestion, maintains
that its economic rationale is doubtful. The use of a different rate of return on
foreign and on domestic capital, he argues, presupposes that: "(a) a project suit-
able for partial financing by foreign aid with a rate of return at or above the
cut-off rate cannot be developed because (b) the supply of co-operant factors
cannot be increased in the short run, but (c) the undertaking of the project itself
will somehow stimulate the supply of deficient co-operant factors, and (d) that
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 119
this cannot be brought forth by any other method, such as import or technical
assistance." 12 Dr. Adler agrees, of course, that certain projects can increase the
flow of domestic resources and thus raise rates of return above initial levels. In
such cases it may be justified to accept the lower rate of return in the first place.
But it is justified only if the internal rate of return over the entire life of the
project is above the"cut-off rate." "In that event," he insists, "the project itself
is 'good' and what is bad, or inadequate, is the cost-benefit analysis which does
not permit systematic and rational determination of the rate of return allowing for
the lapse of time." 13 Adler accordingly favors a single"acceptable rate of return
applied to total capital," but he does not tell us precisely how the "acceptable rate
of return" is to be established.
What about the gestation period? Is it a matter of indifference how long it
takes before increases in income start to accrue? If the capital is costless to the
receiving country, it is a ..IJlatter of indifference-not in assigning priorities to
projects, when a discount factor should be applied to future income, but in de-
ciding on the total amount of investment to be undertaken. If the capital involves
a future debt service, of course, the addition to income must be compared with
this debt service. The rate of capital accumulation should be pushed to the point
where the increase in income net of debt service is zero. But no interest rate pre-
vailing within the underdeveloped countries themselves seems pertinent so long
as the capital comes from abroad and represents savings performed outside the
economy. The marginal contribution of additional investment within the economy
is certainly relevant, but there is no internal "cost of capital" with which this
rate might be meaningfully compared.
It may be, of course, that different time-paths of income yield different total
income, from now to infinity, with the same total investment over the next five
years but differing allocations between saving and consumption in subsequent
five-year plans. This fact raises the problem of the country's "welfare function"
regarding income now and income later. Ultimately, such decisions must he made
by the government; no purely economic analysis can provide an answer as to
what time-path is optimal.14 The selection of a discount factor, of course, is essen-
tially a determination of the optimal time-path of income.
If a substantial proportion of capital assistance is to take the form of loans,
perhaps the best definition of x would be the rate of interest at which the aid-
giving government can borrow. This interest rate provides a rough measure of
the value to the people in donor countries of this marginal use of savings.
Clearly, this interest rate is a highly institutionalized phenomenon and depends
a good deal on the monetary and fiscal policies currently pursued by the gov-
ernments of donor countries. Nevertheless, this measure is probably as good as
120 BENJAMIN HIGGINS
any available. Let us therefore define absorptive capacity as the amount of in-
vestment that can be undertaken, over a five-year planning period beginning
from the present, without reducing the addition to perpetual national income
below 3 percent. Or, putting it once more the other way round, absorptive
capacity is the amount of investment that can be undertaken in five years without
the m~rginal ICOR rising above 30 :1.
It has been suggested to me that the concept of absorptive capacity involves
a time limit on the period during which aid must be continued. This idea has
some validity but must be applied with care. When should a country stop bor-
rowing? Canada was a net borrowing nation for nearly a century after confedera-
tion. It became a net lending nation during World War II and is now expanding
rapidly as a net borrowing country once more. Could it possibly be argued that
Canada's recourse to international capital markets to finance recurrent phases of
development indicates that the capital inflow between 1880 and 1910 was too
high?
It could perhaps be said that, if the amount of foreign aid is so great that at
the end of a twenty-year planning period further capial inflows are necessary
merely to maintain per capita income, absorptive capacity has been exceeded in
the interim. It is "easy enough to spot countries where this situation has pre-
vailed: Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Libya. Foreign aid is itself part of per capita in-
come, and, if it can be counted upon to increase steadily, there may be, no limit
to absorptive capacity in this distorted sense.
However, our definition really takes care of this problem. It involves a com-
parison of the addition to the stock of capital with the addition to national income
in perpetuity which it produces. Military aid with no offsetting increase in do-
mestic savings, or support to current consumption, involves no addition to the
stock of capital and no permanent addition to national income. The ICOR in-
volved is infinite, and it cannot be justified at all on economic policy grounds.
In short, such assistance falls outside the scope of foreign economic policy.
There is some level of domestic investment which represents a umaximum
effort." "Effort" is partly a matter of saving and investing more and partly a
matter of working harder or better, but both can be expressed in terms of
investment inputs.
It is possible for the level of investment to be too low in" the important sense
that it requires no fundamental policy decisions, no changes in attitudes or be-
havior patterns, no acquisitions of skills or improvements in technique, ana no
improvement in business or public administration. All these things, once in
motion, tend to have a cumulative effect on future growth. On the other hand,
it is possible for a country to try to invest too much. Some degree of austerity
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may so destroy incentives that growth is retarded rather than accelerated. Ob-
viously, no counfry should try to invest more from its own resources than it
can absorb.
As a rule, the maximum domestic effort will be below absorptive capacity for
several reasons:
1. It is usually necessary to feed and clothe a growing population either
through production of consumers' goods at home or production of exports to
finance imports of food and textiles.
2. The sacrifice entailed may go beyond what is indicated by the domestic
welfare function, destroying incentives and reducing output, capital accumula-
tion, and welfare below potential levels.
3. The structure of inherited capital (and future comparative advantage)
may be such that certain increases in production of consumers' goods are neces-
sary in the near future, if excess capacity is to be avoided. In other words, some
existing capital, of a kind that should be reproduced, or some types of new
capital recommended by future comparative advantage may be specific to the
production of exports or consumers' goods.
An ideal international policy, then, would be one which guaranteed that
foreign capital would always fill any gap between absorptive capacity and the
maximum domestic effort, provided domestic investment is actually equal to the
latter. Subtracting the amount of foreign private investment that is acceptable
and forthcoming from the gap, we obtain the amount of foreign capital assistance
to be provided to each country.
The increase in total aid involved in applying this criterion would probably
not be very great. It would, however, mean considerable geographic redistribu-
tion of foreign aid. As things are now, some countries are clearly' getting more
than enough to fill the gap between absorptive capacity and maximum domestic
effort. If this criterion were universally understood and recognized as being
wholly without political strings, its application could greatly improve the atmo-
sphere in which foreign aid programs are administered.
It is unlikely that absorptive capacity will exceed maximum domestic effort
by very much in most countries. A big gap will occur only where the supply of
skills of all sorts is unusually high relative to the current level of income, as in
India.
If a country needs capital assistance, by definition its maximum domestic
effort is below the minimum effort required for a take-off into sustained growth.
If the country is worthy of capital assistance, on the other hand, it must have
an absorptive capacity that is at least equal to this minimum effort. The really
difficult cases are those in which both absorptive capacity and the maximum
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domestic effort are below the minimum effort required. In these cases, foreign
economic assistance must be concentrated on technical assistance, designed to
raise both the maximum domestic effort and absorptive capacity by training
workers, managers, public administrators, and technicians, and providing ex-
pertise directly in the short run.
w. Arthur Lewis suggests in effect providing foreign aid as a reward for
increasing the domestic effort. He would make aid equal to the growth in the
ratio of savings (5) to gross domestic product (GDP) over three years: Aid =
51/GDP1 - 54/GDP4• If total public and private capital formation from domestic
sources is 24 percent of GDP last year whereas three years earlier it was 22 per-
cent, aid for next year would be 2 percent of GDP. The necessary computations
would be made annually on agreed definitions by an international team of
national income statisticians. Lewis regards his proposal as "just about the
simplest self-policing aid formula that one could devise." 15
Simple it may be, but it is hard to fathom the rationale except in terms of the
Protestant ethic-to him who hath shall be given, virtue is its own reward, waste
not want not, make what you can and save what you can. Rigorous application
of the formula would mean that a country that has just struck oil, like Libya,
with more capital than can be effectively used already, would stand high on the
list for aid in per capita terms because she could hardly help but have a rapid
increase in the ratio of developmental investment to GDP. But a country in
trouble, like India during the second plan, finding itself unable to sustain its rate
of domestic investment because of bad harvests, collapse of world markets, or
other disaster, would suffer a cut in its foreign aid as well. A more flexible
method of deciding whether, under existing conditions, a country is making a
maximum domestic effort or not, with aid provided in amounts equal to the
difference between that maximum and absorptive capacity, seems better de-
signed to achieve the objectives of international economic policy.
John Fei and Douglas Paauw raise a somewhat different question: 16 assum-
ing that the objective of international economic policy is to bring all countries to
a situation of self-sustained growth, where the per capita marginal savings ratio
(PMSR) is high enough in itself to permit target growth rates to be achieved
indefinitely, how many years of gap-filling aid will be needed before this type
of "bliss" is achieved? The question was answered for thirty-one countries for
which data were available for the key variables: initial savings ratio, PMSR,
capital-output ratio, rate of population growth, and target rates of growth. The
results were rather startling. Among the thirty-one countries, Yugoslavia alone
had already reached "bliss." In seven other countries, a policy such as recom-
mended above of filling the gap between domestic effort and requirements for
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reaching targets (assuming the targets accurately reflect absorptive capacity)
would produce self-sustained growth, where no further aid would be needed, in
due course. Mexico, for example, is only four years away from "bliss" and the
Philippines only six; but with the present parameters Colombia will need sixteen
years to achieve self-sustained growth, Greece will need seventeen years, and
Taiwan thirty-two years. The other twenty-three countries, with the values
ascribed to the key variables, will never reach "bliss" at all; aid requirements
will continue to increase forever. This group of countries includes Argentina,
Brazil, Chile" India, Indonesia, and Burma, among others. No African country
in the sample can attain "bliss."
The eight "successful" countries divide again into two subgroups. Some are
already on a "glide path"; foreIgn aid can fall monotonically to the termination
date. Others belong to the "hump scale" group, 'where aid must increase for some
time before starting its slide down the "glide path."
In the "successful" cases, aid should be provided to fill the gap. In the
others, international economic policy must be directed toward reducing the gap
-in our terms, toward raising both the maximum domestic effort and absorptive
capacity. Here technical assistance can play an important role.
The United States and other donor countries, the World Bank, and the Inter-
national Development Association are all providing small amounts of capital
assistance for education projects. It is clear, however, that the role of foreign
capital in the field of education is limited, for the simple reason that the scarce
resources needed to expand education programs are normally supplied through
domestic rather than foreign channels. Ultimately, the question is the same: to
what extent can the supply of trained teachers, classroom space, textbooks, and
laboratory equipment be built up through the expenditure of foreign exchange
provided by external assistance?
First, it is apparent that schoolteachers cannot be provided from abroad 'to
any significant extent. Certainly, technical assistance programs can provide
limited numbers of foreign teachers in special fields where the need is particu-
larly pressing, and where the supply in other countries is relatively abundant. It
must be recognized, however, that all countries face a shortage of teaching
personnel over the next ten years. The relat~ve cost" of providing large numbers
of teachers from abroad makes such an approach impossible. Similarly, the
extent to which teachers can be provided to students from underdeveloped
countries by sending students abroad is severely limited. Schools in many
advanced countries are crowded to capacity, and the number of foreign students
that can be accepted, even at the university level, is severely restricted. The
limitations on provisions of textbooks and laboratory equipment from countries
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with a different language, culture, and technology are obvious. As for the class-
room space, most countries have adequate supplies of building materials appro-
priate for construction of schools, and it is doubtful that it would be appropriate
overall development policy to allocate any significant proportion of foreign aid
budgets to the- purchase abroad of building materials or equipment for the
construction of schools.
It is clear enough from some of the statements regarding external financing
of education that those interested in expanding educational programs, and
particularly ministers of education, really have in mind increased allocations in
domestic currency to acquire human and physical resources domestically avail-
able, while the foreign exchange is utilized for other projects within the overall
economic and social development program. Certainly, insofar as expansion of
the education program requires the attraction of human and physical resources
from other fields of activity, thus reducing the output of other goods and
services and adding to inflationary pressure, increased foreign exchange may be
used to import raw materials and equipment for other projects, or even to import
final consumers goods, thus offsetting inflationary pressure. In this way any
harmful effects of expanding the educational program may be offset. However,
it should be noted that in this event there is absolutely no significance in first
attaching the foreign assistance to educational programs. The ultimate result is
exactly the same if the external assistance is provided against the economic and
social development program as a whole, and in that event there is less likelihood
of misallocation of the actual foreign exchange provided. Ministries of education
seldom have particular expertise in overall economic and social development
programming, and accordingly it is preferable that foreign exchange which will
not in fact be utilized for educational purposes should not be allocated to
Ministries of Education.
In the short space of fifteen years, attitudes toward the contribution of technical
cooperation to economic development have gone full circle.17 When President
Truman announced his Point Four program in 1949, much was expected from
simple transfer of know-how from technologically advanced to technologically
retarded countries. The attitude was well expressed at the time by an American
undersecretary of state: "It is important to us and to the rest of the world that
people in these areas realize that, through perseverance, hard work, and a little
assistance, they can develop the means of taking care of their material needs and
at the same time can preserve and strengthen their individual freedoms." 18
Technical assistance in agriculture was expected to be particularly productive,
bringing back "one hundred fold" the modest outlays required.19
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As time went by and the bilateral and multilateral technical assistance pro-
grams failed to produce spectacular results in developing countries, while
understanding of the development process accumulated and the large-scale
capital assistance under the Marshall Plan brought impressive increases in
productivity in Europe, emphasis shifted for a while to industrialization and to
massive transfers of capital. But with new disappointments and still deeper
understanding of the complexities of economic development, it was recognized
that the capacity of developing countries to absorb capital effectively was sharply
limited by shortages of skills both in technical and scientific activities, and in
everyday application of manpower in the productive process. Thus, although the
importance of capital assistance-as a supplement to domestic investment, a
source of foreign exchange, and a vehicle for transfer of technology-is not
being overlooked, emphasis is once again shifting to technical assistance. One
symptom of this new interest in technical assistance is the series of evaluation
missions carried out under the auspices of the United Nations and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Absorptive capacity is limited by the supply of technical, managerial, scien-
tific, entrepreneurial, and labor skills; by the willingness to accept the risks of
investment in durable productive capacity; by the supply of natural resources;
by the stability of the government, its commitment to development goals, the
honesty and efficiency of the civil service, the quality and scope of the educa-
tional system, the appropriateness of development plans and stabilization poli-
cies, and the like. The maximum domestic effort is affected by these factors and
also by the commitment of the population to the goals of development, their
savings and consumption habits, attitudes toward work and leisure, and con-
fidence in their government. It is clear, therefore, that well-conceived technical
assistance programs can raise both absorptive capacity and maximum domestic
effort. Indeed, within the context of an ideal international foreign aid program,
it could be said that the function of technical assistance is to do just that.
More effective programming and evaluation of technical assistance can be
obtained by concentrating on the quantitative rather than on the qualitative
aspects of the international flow of human resources. A clearer picture of tech-
nical assistance as an aspect of economic and social development may be ob-
tained by drawing analogies between trade in skills and trade in commodities. In
the first place, just as no country, whatever its stage of development, is expected
to be exclusively an exporter or an importer of goods, or even of capital, so no
country should be expected to be exclusively an exporter or an importer of
human resources. All countries can be expected to be both exporters and im-
porters. However, the pattern of international trade, the terms of trade, the
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balance of trade, and the overall balance of payments are all important aspects
of a country's economic situation.
The composition of international trade in skills should reflect comparative
economic advantage. Even developing countries with overall shortages of skilled
manpower have surpluses of certain types of skill, sometimes at a very high
level, as indicated by the presence of the educated unemployed. Until the
developing countries with such surpluses reach the level of development that
permits them to absorb all their own trained people, it makes good sense to
export surplus skills to countries with shortages of the same categories of trained
personnel, whether through organized technical assistance programs or in some
other fashion. To some degree, the existence of surplus skills reflects past inade-
quacies in the educational system, in the sense that it has failed to adapt to the
occupational needs of the country at each stage of development. However, there
may be a case for continuing to produce skills for export. Greece, for example,
might continue to turn out archeologists, ancient historians, and scholars of
Greek literature and language in excess of its own immediate needs.
Of particular importance to developing countries are the terms of trade-
whether in commodities or in skills. It is by no means clear that the terms of
trade in skills of developing countries have been universally favorable in the
sense that the average cost, in man-years of training, of people coming into the
country is higher than that of people going out. Unfortunately, among the
emigrants from developing countries are some of their most highly educated
people-and these not always in the categories with surpluses at home. Conse-
quently, the terms of trade in skills are not as favorable for developing countries
as they might be.
It is sometimes said that the optimal balance-of-payments situation for a
developing country is an import surplus offset by a net capital inflow. An
analogy can be obtained for human resources if we think of trained adults as
capital goods and the educational system as the basic stock of capital. We could
then say that the optimal balance-of-payments situation for a developing country
is an import surplus of human resources (in terms of value rather than volume)
offset by a net capital inflow in the form of educational facilities. The latter can
be accomplished either by foreign-financed fellowships to train students abroad
or by the development of the domestic educational and training facilities through
foreign aid.
When cast in terms such as these, it is clear that technical assistance is one
part-an important one-of a ,much broader spectrum. It is apparent, for
example, that technical assistance policy cannot be properly formulated inde-
pendently from the international exchange of human resources through the
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private sector. Information regarding import and export of skills by private
institutions should be continuously available to the authorities, to assist them in
formulating technical assistance policy. It is also clear that the international flow
of human resources should be adjusted to the flow from the domestic educa-
tional system. Given the stock of human skills and the flow from the educational
system, technical assistance in all its forms should aim at filling the gap between
available skills and skills needed to execute the development program.
Some developing countries, concerned with maintaining their independence of
the "economic imperialists," have raised the cry of "trade, not aid." Sometimes
it appears that what these spokesmen have in mind is "aid through trade"-that
is, guaranteeing quantities for their major exports. If "trade" means merely
removing any remaining barriers to the importation of major exports of develop-
ing countries, there is little reason to believe that it can contribute significantly
to accelerated growth of underdeveloped countries. Indeed, one of the reasons
that these countries remain poor is that foreign trade has proved to be an engine
of growth of very low horsepower. There are few developing countries that have
not enjoyed substantial growth of foreign trade in the past.
Let us look at Southeast Asia, the region that remains the most stagnant and
troublesome of all major groupings of countries. Whether we take the whole
century since 1900 or only the period since World War II, Southeast Asia is the
region that seems to frustrate most obdurately efforts to raise per capita income.
Yet all countries in Southeast Asia have had at one time or another one or more
strong exports to serve as leading sectors for vigorous growth of the entire
economy. In Indonesia, most recalcitrant of all Southeast Asian countries, there
has been a whole succession of strong exports, from spices in the sixteenth
century to rubber and petroleum in the twentieth. Between 1880 and 1920
Indonesian exports grew 1300 percent. Similarly, Malaya enjoyed a 440 percent
growth of exports in the three decades between 1906 and 1925. In the 54-year
span between 1906 and 1960 Malayan exports grew by 1400 percent. The
exports of tea from Ceylon grew 1100 percent between 1849 and 1875-1879. In
Taiwan total exports grew 500 percent in 25 years (1915-1917-1940-1942).
These periods are selected so as not to begin with a year when exports were so
low that large percentage growth means little; the initial year in each case is
some time after the major new exports were well established. Throughout the
whole of the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the percentage
growth of exports was considerably higher than the percentage growth of total
output. There was, in fact, little structural change; the new export sector was
superimposed on a stagnant 'traditional agricultural sector, where little happened
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except population pressure and a shift from slash-and-burn to irrigated agri-
culture. Except for Malaya, the proportion of the labor force engaged in
traditional agriculture scarcely fell. The story is much the same in other
underdeveloped regions.
The postwar picture is much the same, perhaps worse. There is no significant
correlation between postwar growth rates in Southeast Asia and either the ratio
of exports to national income or the rate of growth of exports. Moreover, exports
which once were strong are strong no longer. According to Economic Commis-
sion for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) projections (which are certainly optimistic,
since they ignore supply and marketing problems), even if we assumed that total
income would grow as fast as exports, only petroleum exports are likely to grow
enough between now and 1980 to yield a 3 percent average annual increase in
per capita income. If we accept instead a 2 percent growth target, then sugar
may be added to the list.
In short, it is clear that instead of expecting expanded trade to solve the
development problem, we should realize that development is needed to solve the
trade problem. The countries with the largest proportion of their labor force in
agriculture are precisely those with the biggest comparative disadvantage in
agriculture and with a more marked comparative disadvantage in agriculture
than in other sectors. In the United States, on the contrary, comparative
advantage is most marked precisely in the agricultural sector.
With the mounting food crisis and industrialization of developing countries,
sharp shifts in the structure of international trade can be expected, unless our
policy prevents them. What seems most important in the field of foreign trade
policy is that as the poor countries prove their ability to undersell us in industrial
products-as they certainly will-we do not impose barriers on the importation
of their industrial products. The myth that low wages reflect low productivity
has long since been exploded. Industrial technology has proved highly mobile
among countries. If anything, the level of technology in the new industries of
developing countries is higher than in advanced countries, and real wages will
remain lower for a long time to come. Our proper role may well prove to be that
of becoming the "bread-rice-soybean basket of the world./I
Even if expansion of traditional exports cannot be expected to make a funda-
mental contribution to accelerated growth of developing countries, it remains
true that the stability of export earnings complicates the problem of formulating,
financing, and implementing development programs. It took the United States a
long time to recognize this fact. As late as 1958, while President Eisenhower
was urging more liberal foreign aid, his brother Milton was insisting in an
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official report that United States participation in international commodity sta-
bilization schemes be limited to technical assistance to study groups. His advice
was apparently heeded, and it was not until the Kennedy administration and the
Act of Bogota that the United States was officially committed to participation in
schemes "to deal with the problem of instability of exchange earnings of coun-
tries heavily dependent upon the exportation of primary products." 20 Since that
time the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has devoted
considerable attention to this problem, but so far nothing in the way of a general
scheme for international stabilization has emerged.
Among the various proposals, my own favorite remains the one suggested
in 1958 by the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT) Panel of
Experts.21 The International Fund, in consultation with experts from the major
exporting and importing countries, would study long-run trends in prices of the
major exports of developing countries. The Fund and the governments involved
would agree on an appropriate trend price for some years to come and revise
this price as needed in the light of new developments. An alternative-theoreti-
cally less attractive but possibly more workable-would be simply to take the
average price during several years in the recent past as evidence of the long-run
trend. If the market for any commodity included in the agreements suffers a
temporary setback, the governments of the exporting countries would buy for
stocks and make such payments as they wished, in domestic currency, to their
own producers. To provide the foreign exchange needed to permit development
programs to be carried out despite the decline in foreign exchange earnings, the
International Monetary Fund would permit drawings on its reserves up to some
stipulated percentage of the value of stockpiles at the predetermined "normal"
price. The loans would be repaid and stockpiles reduced when prices in world
markets rose again. If producing countries did not "play the game" properly, or
if it appeared that the break in the market was permanent and consequently
stockpiles overhanging the market continued to grow, the "trend" or "normal"
price would of course be revised downward.
As a minimum contribution to international stabilization, the advanced
countries should presumably endeavor to make sure that their efforts to stabilize
their own economies do not have the effect of destabilizing the economies of the
developing countries. Worst offender on this score has been the administration
of u.s. Public Law 480. Complaints that the disposal of U.S. agricultural sur-
pluses has disrupted the export markets of other countries have come from
Argentina, Spain, India, Pakistan, Japan, and even Canada. The accumulation of
counterpart funds from PL 480 sales, as recipient countries discover that local
currency generated by their own borrowing from their own central banks is no
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more inflationary than spending counterpart funds and is subject to no control
but their own, is becoming an embarrassment to the u.s. government. At the
same time, it is clear that surplus commodity disposal has a useful role to play
in the whole nexus of policies designed to accelerate growth of developing
countries. As the food crisis mounts, this role is likely to become increasingly
vital. It would seem clear that surplus commodity disposal should be continued
but within an international framework and as an integral part of an overall
international policy for stabilization and development.
Policy regarding private foreign investment has been left to the end for several
reasons.
First, the international flow of u.s. capital is *a tiny trickle and seems likely
to remain so, no matter what is done about it. To get some sense of scale, we
might revise upward the figures suggested some years ago by Alex Cairncross
and say that, if U.S. foreign investment were to play the role today that U.K.
investment played in the nineteenth century, relative to the total scale of the
world economy, u.s. foreign investments today would amount to some $1,000
billions, and the u.s. would receive a net income from foreign investments of
about $50 billion per year. Instead, total u.s. foreign private investment is not
much more than $50 billion, and net foreign investment runs at $1 billion to
$2 billion per year, even less than foreign aid.
Second, such foreign investment as there is tends to go to advanced rather
than developing countries. Canada and Europe have proved much more attractive
to U.S. investors than the underdeveloped countries, and among the latter the
relatively advanced countries of Latin America have been more attractive than
the poorer countries whose dependence on outside capital for development may
be greater.
Third, the policies of the developing countries themselves toward foreign
investment are likely to prove much more significant for investment decisions
than anything the advanced countries can do. The measures used by advanced
countries to date have consisted mainly in guarantees against expropriation,
devaluation, and the like, plus tax incentives (or disincentives). These measures
have proved somewhat impotent where the general climate for foreign invest-
ment has been unfavorable. It is still true today that "nothing is so shy as one
million dollars," and the countries most in need of foreign capital (and of the
entrepreneurial, managerial, and scientific expertise that comes with it) are
precisely those that are most reluctant to make the kind of passes needed to
seduce millions.
Finally, there is a continuing controversy among Western economists as to
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whether or not foreign private investment makes a net contribution to develop-
ment of underdeveloped countries. Some, like Martin Bronfenbrenner, maintain
that not only should developing countries be uninterested in attracting new
foreign investment but also that they should confiscate the foreign enterprises
already there. The gain in funds that could be locally reinvested, instead of
being transferred abroad as profits and repatriation, would likely substantially
exceed any new inflow of capital from abroad-especially in countries where
property income is high and landowners are prone to consume rather than
invest.22 Others, like Wendell Gordon, go less far, but argue that the point is
soon reached in borrowing countries where the cost of servicing the old debt
exceeds any possible net inflow of new capital and that foreign enterprise delays
the formation of domestic cadres of entrepreneurs, managers, scientists, and
technicians.23 On the other side of the controversy, there are economists who
point out that the debt service is met out of the higher gross national product
that the foreign investment itself helps to produce and which could ~ot be
attained without it. The proponents of foreign investment also insist that foreign
capital brings with it foreign skills, especially of the entrepreneurial and man-
agerial variety, not otherwise available. The cadre of foreign expertise that
accompanies foreign investment raises absorptive capacity and thus has a chain
effect.
Probably one ought not to generalize about the potential contribution of
foreign investment to development of developing countries but should consider
each case on its merits. Being impressed by the enormous difficulty of generating
an adequate supply of entrepreneurial and managericd skills in countries where
they are now almost totally absent, I am inclined to favor foreign investment in
such countries. The need for effective economic leadership seems to be especially
pressing in mixed economies. At the same time, it must be recognized that most
developing countries have had substantial foreign investment in the past and
that foreign enterprise has fallen far short of solving the development problem
in many of these countries.
From the foregoing review of major aspects of foreign economic policy in relation
to economic development, one major conclusion stands out: if the policy of
advanced countries is to be truly one of assisting poor countries with their
economic development, foreign aid must be the major instrument. Liberalization
of foreign trade (especially ready acceptance of new industrial products) and
international stabilization measures can help. Foreign private investment still has
a role, at least in some countries. But the major need of poor countries is rapid
structural change, and in many of them the requirements are such that they
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cannot do the job alone, if population growth is to be outrun by a big enough
margin and for long enough to put them on the road to self-sustained growth.
In this context, aid must mean grants or very soft loans, not fifteen-year loans at
6 percent. Technical assistance has a major contribution to make in raising both
absorptive capacity and the maximum domestic effort, but it must henceforth be
programmed as part of a general human resource policy and continuously inte-
grated with overall development planning and programming. The scale of
assistance needed is such as to make it unwelcome in many countries if it is on
a bilateral basis. Some overhauling of the machinery for international aid is
clearly and urgently required.
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CHAPTER FIVE
LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT
AND INTERNATION
BEHAVIOR
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kIS DISCUSSION concerns the relationship between levels of socioeconomic
development achieved by nations of the world and their behavior within the
international political system.1 The study includes 84 nations (all independent
polities in 1948), which are scrutinized for the period following World War II.
The variables employed derive generally from the period 1948-1962. The dis-
cussion is based on a consideration of 27 variables in all, giving the study a
global scope although a limited historical perspective.
A major portion of the analysis centers on three categories of internation
behavior: hostile transactions, amicable transactions, and degree of involvement
in the international arena (or transactional level). Events such as wars, economic
sanctions, mobilizations, accusations, treaties, alliances, state visits, and others
may serve as typical examples of hostile and amicable behaviors occurring be-
tween nations in the international system. Their frequency of occurrence, and
also the extent to which they are directed toward a wide variety of other nations,
gives an indication of the level of international involvement of a nation within
the system. These broad transactional categories are then related to a variety
of ecological and structural variables of political systems. In particular, level
of socioeconomic development is related to type and level of internation
transactions.
With this broad and general focus, a great many nuances of international
and national behavior are lost, including styles and varieties of foreign policies,
actions and reactions in the international arena, specific idiosyncracies of nations,
and their unique physical, social, and historical backgrounds. A macroscopic
look at the entire universe of nations, as here conceived, sacrifices the richness of
social and political reality preserved in case studies. Yet, a macroscopic view also
has its merits. The entire universe may be surveyed, making comparisons possi-
ble that are not available to case studies, which often argue the uniqueness of
events. Also, generalizations are difficult to uphold on the basis of a single case
or a few cases. Such a macroscopic approach provides a panoramic view of the
world, revealing global patterns and relationships between levels of development
and hostile and amicable transactions in the international sphere.
The questions we are seeking to answer empirically vary in complexity. At
the simplest level, we ask whether the nations at various levels of attained
development also vary in the amount of external hostility expressed toward
others, in level of diplomatic and other interactions, and in level of amicability.
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We also attempt to distinguish empirically a limited number of types of transac-
tional postures characterizing the nations of the world, an approach which per-
haps comes the closest to the notion of a generalized foreign policy pattern.
These postures are also related to developmental level. Furthermore, we analyze
a set of variables which might serve to predict internation behavior to see
whether they have the same predictive power for nations at different levels of
development. Finally, we also analyze dimensions of hostile behavior to deter-
mine whether they are by and large the same for nations at different develop-
mental levels.
A final introductory word is in order. The larger portion of the discussion
and analysis is descriptive and statistics are used in the descriptive rather than
in the inferential sense. The prevalent question asked is what patterns persist at
mid-twentieth century, rather than why they persist. In the last section of the
study, however, we attempt to interpret at least a portion of our global empirical
findings in terms of explanatory variables. Some theoretical insights are sug-
gested inductively from the descriptive data, and a few hypotheses are formulated
and compared with our empirical findings.
The data used in this analysis fall into two basic categories: The first consists of
both internation and intranation behaviors; the second comprises a variety of
ecological characteristics including socioeconomic, demographic, political, and
military indicators.
The behavioral data deal with different transactions among nations. These
include hostile and friendly transactions as well as a measure of the level of
internation interaction. Transactional behavioral data must be collected from
various sources, and the first step in establishing a data collection of this type is
a delimitation of the acts which will be included for study. This in turn depends
upon prior definition of the variables selected for inquiry.
Behaviors signifying aggressive or hostile relations between nations are of
various types and differ in the level of threat or severity implied. Thus, one may
distinguish war, or armed conflict, as the most intense instance of internation
hostility, whereas at the other end of an internation hostility continuum, one
might place a mild diplomatic maneuver, such as a request for clarification or a
verbal protest. In between these two extremes, a number of different actions may
be distinguished. Rummel and Tanter, for example, selected twelve types "of
such behaviors for study: antiforeign demonstrations; the expulsion or recall of
diplomatic officials of lesser than ambassador's rank; threats; presence of
military action; war; troop movements; mobilizations; accusations; negative
sanctions; protests; the severance of diplomatic relations; and the expulsion or
recall of ambassadors.2
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Having defined the actions, the task is to peruse news sources and other
chronicles of events and to record the occurrence of internation behaviors falling
within the specified categories. In this way, the Rummel and Tanter studies devel-
oped a data bank covering 75 nations for the period 1955-1960. Data for the
collection were drawn from five sources.3
Chambers completed a collection of internation hostility behaviors which
expanded the Rummel and Tanter bank in a number of ways, although un-
fortunately not in terms of data sources.4 The categories of events were the same
as in the Rummel-Tanter collection, with the addition of two new events (quasi-
military acts and requests for assistance of third parties against target countries)
and a narrowing of the category "threats" into three subtypes of different
intensity (nonspecific threat, semispecific threat, and specific threat). Chambers
also retrieved and stored the data in terms of dyadic relations, naming the
initiator and target country for each event, and qualified some events further in
terms of such factors as the amount of violence, number of persons involved,
amount of property damage, etc.
In his data collection, C'hambers also sought to amass information on inter-
nation relations of a nonhostile character. For this purpose, he defined thirteen
categories of amicable intern·ation events: offers; talks, negotiations, conferences;
expressions of support; social and cultural agreements; economic agreements;
political agreements; scientific agreements; military agreements; official visits;
diplomatic recognition; state visits; alliance in the presence of military action or
war; agreements for adjudication or mediation by a third party; and conferences
between member countries of an international organization.
Data on these amicable interactions were collected, categorized, qualified,
and stored in the same fashion as the hostile interactions. The Chambers com-
plete data bank of both hostile and amicable internation-interactions covers 84
nations for a six-year period, 1955-1961.
The level of political unrest characterizing a society may also be determined
in terms of behaviors such as riots, strikes, demonstrations, coups, civil wars,
etc. Following the definition of political instability as aggressive behavior di-
rected by politically relevant individuals or groups within the polity against the
officeholders, by the officeholders against such individuals and gr~ups or, finally,
among the officeholders themselves, the Feierabends distinguished 28 categories
of political instability events: dissolution of legislatures; resignation of politi-
cally significant persons; dismissal of politically significant persons; fall of
cabinets; significant changes of laws; plebiscites; appointment of politically
significant persons; organization of new governments; reshuffle of governments;
severe trouble within a nongovernmental organization; organization of opposi-
tion party; governmental action against specific groups; strikes; demonstrations;
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boycotts; arrests; suicides of significant political persons; martial law; execu-
tions; assassinations; terrorism, sabotage; guerrilla warfare; civil war; coups;
revolts; and exile.5
Occurrences of these events were recorded from two data sources,6 and each
event was qualified in terms of a number of subcategories including duration;
violence; number of people involved, injured, killed, and arrested; whether
significant people were involved, etc. The data collection includes 84 countries
for the fifteen-year period, 1948-1962.7
A scaling or profiling of nations on the behavioral variables of internation
hostility and amity and internal political instability was also needed. For this
purpose we used a scaling method based on frequency and intensity-weighting
of events.8 The first step was t~ scale the behavioral events in terms of their
intensity value. This scaling was based on a cC?nstruct-validity analysis of the
meaning of amity and aggression (both external and internal). For internal
political unrest, for example, events were placed on a 7-point scale in terms of
the amount of violence and severity of disturbance connoted by each. Thus, civil
war fell at point 6 and elections at point 0 on the scale. In between these two
extremes, events were ranged at the various scale positions. Consensual valida-
tion was obtained for this .scaling by the technique used for assigning values in
the judgmental method of attitude scaling.9 In similar fashion, intensity scale
values were determined for acts of external aggression and amity.
Finally, countries were profiled on the behavioral dimensions by weighting
the frequency of events in terms of their intensity values. Countries were first
grouped according to the most extreme event (unstable, hostile, or amicable)
occurring within the country during the time period under study. Then the
frequency of events weighted for intensity was summed to yield the country's
position within its scale group. Countries were profiled on a 7-point scale for
internal political unrest and on a S-point scale for internation amity. Two dif-
ferent scales were developed for internation hostility. A 7-point scale was used
in which the highest scale value, 7, was reserved for military action, declaration
of war, and total blockade. IO A 4-point scale was also developed and applied to
the Rummel-Tanter collection of data.II Point 4 on this scale included war,
military action, and severance of diplomatic relations. Thus, the main differences
between these two measuring instruments and the resultant country profiles on
external aggression are that the 4-point scaling combines diplomatic and military
hostility at the highest scale position and also that the profiles are based on two
different data collections.
The profiles of the 84 nations on external aggression, external amity, and
internal political instability are given in Tables I, 2, and 3.
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Another method of assigning numerical values to countries for behavioral
events is to use country scores on dimensions ascertained through factor analysis.
Rummel and Tanter both factor-analyzed their data collection on external con-
flict and Rummel named the emergent dimensions war, diplomacy, and belliger-
ency.12 The war dimension consists of high loadings on the following variables:
number killed in international conflict, wars, accusations, threats, military actions,
protests, and mobilizations. The diplomatic dimension comprises nonviolent acts
of hostility: expulsions and recalls of ambassadors, expulsions and recalls of
lesser officials, and troop movements. The third dimension, belligerency, includes
severence of diplomatic relations, negative sanctions, and antiforeign demon-
strations. Country factor scores on each of these dimensions provide a measure
of the extent to which each country is engaged in the set of behaviors designated
by the factor.
The dimension of permissiveness-coerciveness of a political regime entails
various notions of democratic institutions, civil liberties, and freedom of political
opposition. To determine empirically the level of coerciveness or permissiveness
of a government is not as straightforward a task as the collection of data on
political unrest and internation hostility.13 However, we have measured nations
on this dimension by means of an ordinal rating of countries on a 6-point scale
from most permissive to most coercive. Ratings were based on a detailed set of
considerations which revolved around three basic questions: (a) To what degree
are civil rights present and protected? (b) To what extent is political opposition
tolerated and effective? (c) How democratic is the polity? 14
Ratings were given to 84 countries for the fifteen-year period 1948-1962,
assigning one scale value to each country for the entire time period. The ratings
were made after consulting a minimum of five case studies per country.15 The
resultant scaling of countries places permissive Western democracies at point 1
and coercive totalitarian regimes at point 6 on the continuum. In between these
two extremes, countries fall about equally into the four remaining scale positions.
Finally, the level of transactions occurring between and among nations was
assessed in two ways: as political or diplomatic and as other nondiplomatic inter-
action. In both types of transactions, level is defined in terms of the number of
countries with which a nation has a high frequency of interaction. Interaction
with only one other country, even if highly frequent in occurrence and highly
charged with either amity or hostility, does not yield a high transaction score.
Another way of describing the transaction measure is to say that it represents
each country's number of participations in different dyadic interactions.
Political-diplomatic transaction level is thus scored on the basis of participa-
tion in hostile and amicable acts between nations. The greater the number of
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countries with which a nation has amicable or hostile relations, above a certain
base level, the higher its diplomatic transaction score. Nondiplomatic transac-
tions could be measured in various ways. Deutsch has used the volume of mail
exchanged between countries,16 and the volume o.f foreign trade is another
possible indicator. To these we have added the number of passenger flights
between nations.17 The number of countries with which a nation is connected
by passenger flights, and the weekly frequency of these flights, are used as
indicators to yield the nation's nondiplomatic transaction score.
Our ecological indicators are also of two types: combined indexes based on
a variety of selected indicators and single indicators drawn from available
sources.
Two of the combined indexes are based on a single set of ecological indica-
tors, which are treated in different fashion to correspond to different theoretical
concepts.18
The systemic frustration index was devised to represent the theoretical
notion of systemic frustration, which in turn was interpreted as the ratio of
social wants to social satisfactions within a society. Data were gathered on eight
ecological indicators for the period 1948-1955. Two of these indicators were
regarded as a means of spreading want formation within a society: literacy level
and level of urbanization.19 The remaining six indicators were taken in combina-
tion as a measure of level of social satisfaction: GNP per capita; caloric intake
per person per day; number of newspapers and radios per 1,000 population;
percent of population having telephones, and number of persons per physician.
The combined coded score on these six indicators was divided by coded literacy
or coded urbanization levels, whichever was higher. This ratio corresponded to
the theoretical ratio:
social satisfactions
social wants = systemic frustration.
The modernity index was computed as the average score on the same eight
indicators, converted to standard score form. This yielded a picture of each
nation's level of attained development based on a variety of measures. In order
to distinguish level of attained modernity, or levels of development within the
sample, the distribution of countries on the modernity continuum was divided
into three groups. The High Modern group consists of the 24 countries with the
highest average scores; the Low Modern group comprises the 23 countries at the
opposite end of the distribution with the lowest average scores, and the Mid-
Modern range contains 37 countries falling between these two groups. The
modernity groupings are given in Table 4.20
The rate of socioeconomic change index was based on nine ecological indi-
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cators gathered for the twenty-eight-year period, 1935-1962. The indicators are:
national income per capita, standard of living, infant mortality, primary educa-
tion, secondary education, literacy, radios and newspapers per 1,000 persons, and
level of urbanization. Yearly percentage rate of change was calculated by the
formula: maximum value - minimum value/minimum value/years, and coded
change scores were combined to yield the overall index.21
The various single indicators used in this analysis are drawn primarily from
the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators and McClelland, The
Achieving Society.22 They may be organized into the following groups:
1. Demographic:
2. Wealth:
3. Interaction:
4. Military:
5. Motivational:
Total population.
Area in square kilometers.
GNP per capita in U.S. dollars 1957.
GNP in millions U.S. dollars.
Trade as percentage of GNP.
Foreign Mail per capita.
Military personnel as percentage of total population.
Defense expenditure as percentage of GNP.
Need achievement score, 1925 and 1950.
This last measure perhaps needs some explanation. It is based on a coding of
samples of stories in children's elementary school readers for the type of motiva-
tional themes expressed. Those countries in which a sample of stories indicates
strong emphasis on striving, goal-and-task-orientation, success, and the like,
receive a high need-achievement score. McClelland has scored 25 countries for
need-achievement level in 1925 and 40 countries for need-achievement level in
1950. Through such scores, McClelland hopes to distinguish societies striving
toward achievement, that is, modernity and development, from countries in
which the population has lower aspirations.
We have, then, 27 variables with which to approach the question, does level of
development affect the patterning of internation behavior? Twelve of these
variables provide different measures of internation transaction. Among these are
two transactional profiles of level of external aggression and one of level of
external amity. These are based on total transactions for each country, yielding
a total weighted country score as explained above. In addition, two measures of
net aggression level are constructed by subtracting country rank position on the
amity profile from rank position on· the aggression profile. This net aggression
level is calculated for total acts directed against the country (Net Aggression,
Target), in which case it assesses the net international environment to which the
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country is subject. It is also calculated for total acts engaged in (Net Aggression,
Initiator), indicating whether, on balance, the country is more hostile or more
amicable, if all its actions are taken into account, regardless of target.
Furthermore, the study includes the three factor dimensions of Rummel: war
(which includes some acts of diplomacy, such as accusations, threats, and pro-
tests), diplomacy, and belligerency (which is identified as an "arousal" or ani-
mosity dimension). There are also four measures of internation transaction level
included in the analysis. Diplomatic transaction level measures the number of
other countries toward which amicable or hostile behavior is exhibited. Non-
diplomatic transaction level is determined in three ways: (a) the number of other
countries with which direct passenger flight connections are maintained; (b) the
total number of weekly flights to other countries; and (c) the volume of foreign
mail received. The remaining fifteen variables may be regarded as potential
predictors of these various forms of internation transaction. All the variables are
listed in Table 5.
The 27 variables were intercorrelated for the sample of 84 nations (or for
the maximum number of countries available on each variable). Also, the sample
was divided along two dimensions. Level of development split the group into the
three modernity groupings described above. In addition, five "major powers" of
the world were identified, the U.S., the U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, France, and
mainland China. Analyses were performed both including and excluding these
major powers on the grounds that their pattern of internation transactions might
differ from that of the lesser powers. Four of these major powers derived from
the High Modern group of countries, the fifth from the Low Modern group.
Thus, each correlation is given seven ways: (a) all 84 nations; (b), 84 nations
without the major powers (84/WMP); (c) the High Modern -group; (d) High
Modern without the major powers (HiMod/WMP); (e) the Mid~Modern range
(Mid-Mod) which has no major powers; (f) the Low Modern group i and
(g) the Low Modern without major powers, Le., without mainland China
(LoMod/WMP).
These correlations are presented in Table 5. The table reveals the inter-
correlations for the first ten measures of internation interaction only. Correla-
tions above .4 are bracketed for ease of discussion. This is not to claim statistical
significance, which will vary with the number of countries involved, but because
a correlation of this size or larger was taken rather arbitrarily as indicative of
a tendency worthy of discussion.23 The number of countries entering into each
correlation is given in parentheses beneath the coefficient.
A final point should be made before discussing the patterning revealed in
Table 5. In breaking the overall sample into subgroups, the possibility of statisti-
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cal artifacts is increased. Again, it is not our purpose to see how many statisti-
cally significant correlations may be obtained by this subdivision. Rather, our
purpose is to see what seem to be the trends within the various levels of
development.
Let us look first at the intercorrelations among the various measures of
internation transactions, especially those which may serve as reliability checks
for each other. The two scalings of external aggression, for example, should be
highly correlated, although we must bear in mind that they cover a slightly
different time period (1955-1960 and 1955-1961), interpret the intensity level
of events differently, and, finally, are based on different data collections. Never-
theless, in column 2 of the first block of correlations in Table 5, we find that the
correlation between the two scales is .52 for the sample of 72 nations scored on
both and that it is above .40 for all subgroups except the LoMod/WMP, where
it is .39.
Again, we would expect level of external aggression to correlate with net
aggression initiated and find that it does so with a degree of association of .51
for the entire sample of 84 nations, if we use the 7-point external aggression
scale. Reading down column 5 of the first block of correlations, we find that for
all subgroupings, the relationship between these two is .42 or higher. Similarly,
level of external aggression and country scores on Rummel's war dimension
should be intercorrelated. We find this to be the case, again using the 7-point
external aggression scale, with an r of .58 for the 71 countries scored on both
measures. And in column 6 of the first block of correlations, the degree of
association between these two measures is above .51 for all subgroups. This is
reassuring, since, as has been mentioned, these two measures are based on
different data collections.
It must also be pointed out that the 4-point scale of external aggression does
not intercorrelate very highly with either net aggression initiated or with any of
the three Rummel dimensions. In fact, it does not correlate well with any of the
remaining eight measures of internation interaction, as may be seen by looking
across the top row of the second block of correlations. The three highest correla-
tions are .31 with Rummel's diplomatic dimension, .31 with level of diplomatic
interaction, and .30 with the war dimension (Rummel). Although these correla-
tions are lower than expected, they do at least provide a coherent picture in
which the 4-point scaling of external aggression can be seen to include both
military (war) and diplomatic acts. It is curious that this scale does not correlate
more highly with Rummel's three dimensions, since it is based on the same
data bank.
These are the reliability checks for internation transactions which are built
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into the correlation matrix, and they cover only the measures of external aggres-
sion. For the remainder of the internation transactional measures, we will look
for patterning across the entire sample and within subsamples.
One relationship that emerges and complies with expectation is that external
aggression expressed is highly related to amount of aggression received. We see
this in two sets of correlations. In column 4 of the first block of correlations, we
find that the relationship for the sample of 84 nations between Net Aggression,
Target and total aggression expressed, on a 7-point scale, is .41 and that for all
subgroups except the Low Modern it ranges from .43 to .52. For the Low
Modern groups, the correlations are .27 and .28, suggesting that these countries
are more apt to express aggression without being retaliated against or provoked.
We see even stronger relationships between our measure of net aggression
initiated and net aggression experienced (target). In column 5 of the fourth block
of correlations, we fiI)9 that for the entire sample of 84 nations the degree of
association between these two is .65 and that it remains consistently high (the
lowest r is .59) for all subgroupings. Again, however, the 4-point external ag-
gression scale does not yield the same result. For the entire sample of 72 nations,
the correlation to Net Aggression, Target, is only .10. In column 4 of the second
block of correlations, we find no cortelation higher than .15 for these two
variables and for the Low Modern group of nations, we find a low inverse
relationship.
If we continue to seek patterns of aggression, we may look for intercorrela-
tions among Rummel's three dimensions of aggressive behavior at different
developmental levels. Although we would not expect to find correlations between
the dimensions for the entire sample of nations, for countries in the Mid-Modern
range war and belligerency are intercorrelated (.56) and in the Low Modern
groups diplomatic aggression and belligerency are correlated (.51 and .50 for
Low Modern and Low Modern without the major power, respectively). Thus,
belligerency, which implies animosity of feeling, apparently accompanies other
forms of aggression in nonmodern countries. In the High Modern group, how-
ever, if anything, belligerency is negatively related to the other two types of
aggressive behavior.
If we turn to amicable behavior and diplomatic and nondiplomatic trans-
action level, we find that patterning also appears in the data. For the entire
sample of nations, external amity behavior correlates only to Net Aggression,
Initiator, and here we find an inverse relationship of - .48 for all 84 countries
and -.51 for all 84 without the major powers. This is a relationship certainly to
be expected and may be regarded as a reliability check on the amity scoring.
Within subgroupings, however, some interesting and unexpected patterns
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emerge which will be pursued further in other data treatments reported later in
this paper. For High Modern and Low Modern countries, a strong positive rela-
tionship seems to obtain between external aggression and external amity be-
havior. This relationship does not occur in the Mid-Modern range of countries.
If we look first at the 7-point aggression scale, we see that the relationship
between aggre~sion and amity is .57 for the High Modern group of countries.
This coefficient drops to .38 when we exclude the major powers. For the Low
Modern group of nations, the relationship is .36, whether or not we include
mainland China. By contrast, within the Mid-Modern group of countries, there
is no relationship (r = -.02). This patterning emerges even more strikingly if we
use the 4-point aggression scale. Here the correlation is .55 for the High Modern
group of countries and .41 without the major powers. The relationship is .48 for
the Low Modern group, with or without mainland China. But for nations in the
Mid-Modern range, the correlation is -.07.
In further corroboration of this patterning, if we examine columns 6, 7, and 8
of the third block of correlations, we find that for High Modern countries, in-
cluding the major powers, there is a correlation of .48 between external amity
and factor scores on Rummel's war dimension and .36 with his diplomatic aggres-
sion dimensions. (There is no correlation to the belligerency dimension: -.04).
Excluding the major powers, these correlations are lowered; the association be-
tween amity and war is lost (.09), but that between amity and diplomatic aggres-
sion remains to some degree (.22). If we look at the Low Modern group of na-
tions, the pattern is even more pronounced. There is a correlation of .33 between
amity and war and one of .39 between amity and diplomatic aggression for the
entire Low Modern group. When we omit mainland China, the relationship is
even higher: .35 for war; .40 for diplomatic aggression. (The relationship be-
tween amity and belligerency is again low: .12.) For countries at the Mid-Modern
position, however, there is no correlation between external amity and the three
Rummel external conflict dimensions (war: .05; diplomacy: .08; belligerency:
.06). This confirmation of the pattern between amity scores based on the
Chambers data bank and aggression scores based on the Rummel-Tanter data
bank gives some confidence in the finding.
What does it imply? Apparently both High Modern and Low Modern coun-
tries engage simultaneously in aggressive and amicable behaviors. The countries
in the Mid-Modern range do not show this variety of pattern. We might suppose
that the High Modern and Low Modern countries engage in a higher level of
diplomatic, and perhaps also nondiplomatic, transaction. They are thus involved
in more relations with more countries of the world, with their hostile interactions
offset by amicable ones. Countries in the Mid-Modern range seem to be beset by
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more associations of a single type, which could be a reflection of their lower
transaction level.
To evaluate this use of transaction level as a mediating explanatory variable,
we may look at the correlations between diplomatic and nondiplomatic trans-
actions and the various internation behaviors. The greatest number of high
correlations occur between diplomatic, and also nondiplomatic, transaction levels
and level of external amity. In columns 9 and 10 of the third block of correlations,
we find that for the entire sample, there is a degree of association of .45 between
amity and diplomatic transaction, and an association of .48 to nondiplomatic
transaction measured in terms of passenger flights. These correlations remain
fairly consistently high (ranging from .27 to .82) throughout all subgroupings.
The implication is that at all developmental levels, interaction with a large
number of countries is based on amity, not hostility.
To return to the high-aggression-high-amity pattern, however, we find that
there is some degree of association for the entire sample of countries between
level of external aggression and level of diplomatic and nondiplomatic trans-
actions, although it is not so high as for amity. With the 7-point aggression
scale, there is a correlation of .37 to diplomatic transaction and one of .23 to
flights. The latter is considerably lowered, however, if we omit the major
powers. With the 4-point external aggression scale, there is a correlation of .31
to diplomatic transaction, which is lowered to .29 by omitting the major powers.
The correlations to flights are negligible. Similarly, there are correlations of .37
and .29, respectively, between Rummel's war dimension and diplomatic and
nondiplomatic traIlsactions for the entire sample of 71 countries. And the asso-
ciation between Rummel's diplomatic-aggression dimension and diplomatic-
transaction level is .53, whereas it is .23 to flights. (The belligerency dimension
does not correlate with transaction level.)
Thus, there is also some tendency for hostile relations to form the basis of a
large number of interactions. If we look at the developmental levels, we find
that it is the High Modern and Low Modern countries which fit this pattern,
not the countries in the Mid-Modern range. With the 7-point aggression scale,
there is a correlation of .60 between aggression and diplomatic transaction and
an association of .57 to nondiplomatic transaction in the High Modern group
of countries. These coefficients are somewhat lowered if we omit the major
powers. For the Low Modern group, there is a correlation of .50 between aggres-
sion and diplomatic transaction, which is even higher if we omit mainland China.
(The correlations to flights are .35 and .38.) In the Mid-Modern range, these
correlations are near zero. A similar picture emerges if we use the 4-point ag-
gression scale or Rummel's war or diplomatic-conflict dimensions. Furthermore,
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there is an inverse correlation for Mid-Modern countries between Net Aggres-
sion, Initiator, and level of transaction.
The patterning which appears, then, is that there are two groups of countries
at either end of the modernity continuum which appear to experience a large
number of both amicable and hostile interrelationships. Countries at the middle
of the modernity continuum either tend to express hostility toward a small num-
ber of others or, if their diplomatic transaction level is high, to engage in amicable
interchange. We will find, in further substantiation of this pattern, that countries
in the Mid-Modern group have the highest net hostility score; their hostile
interchanges are the least apt to be offset by amicable ones.
Before discussing these patterns further, we might give some consideration
to possible predictor variables of international aggression and amity. For the
entire sample of nations, the picture is not entirely promising. Among the better
predictors of external aggression level are extent of foreign trade as a percentage
of GNP and foreign mail received (inverse relationships), level of internal polit-
ical instability, defense expenditures, and need ac'hievement. Among the better
predictors of external amity are defense expenditures (.23) and level of GNP
(.34). Both of these coefficients drop considerably, however, if the major powers
are omitted. Transaction level is better explained by the variables included in the
analysis. In the first place, diplomatic and nondiplomatic transactions are cor-
related at all levels of development, and the coefficient is .56 for the entire
sample of 84 countries. Also, both types of transactions are related to level of
GNP and GNP per capita. Diplomatic transaction is also related to population
and area, while passenger flights are a function of modernity. Thus transaction
level seems to be a matter of wealth and size and, in the case of passenger flights,
level of modernity.
If we examine the three developmental groupings separately, however, we
find many more possible predictor variables. In modern countries, for instance,
high levels of external aggression and external amity seem to be inversely related
to foreign mail, foreign trade as a percentage of GNP, and to the level of need
achievement in 1925, but they are positively related to military personnel and
defense expenditures, population and area, and level of internal political insta-
bility. Many of these relationships still obtain even if we omit the major powers.
It is interesting to note that population and area are not consistently related to
internation aggression or amity. At some levels of development and with some
measures of internation behavior the relationships are positive; in other cases
they are negative. Only between level of diplomatic interaction and population
size do we find consistent positive relationships at all levels of development.
(These correlations range in value from .40 to .93.) Another variable that needs
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explanation is foreign trade as a percentage of GNP. It appears to be one of the
better predictors of internation behavior, showing a strong inverse relationship
to all of our variables: aggression, amity, and transaction level. This indicator is
really not a measure of volume of foreign trade, however, but rather of degree of
economic dependence. The u.s. and Russia rank as the lowest two countries on
this variable, Barbados and Libya as the highest.
Finally, an unexpected pattern in the data is the lack of any strong relation-
ship between external aggression and either military personnel or defense expend-
itures. For the entire sample of nations, the war dimension correlates the best
with these two measures of preparedness, .30 to military personnel and .32 to
defense expenditure. When we examine the developmental groupings, we find the
explanation for these low relationships. In the High Modern group of countries,
the relationships are very high, especially if we include the major powers. The
correlations are also positive for the Low Modern group of nations and, although
not as high as for the modern group, show some reasonable degree of relation-
ship. For the countries in the Mid-Modern group, however, we are more apt to
find an inverse relationship between extent of external aggression and degree of
preparedness. On the variable of Net Aggression, Initiator, where one might
certainly expec:t military preparedness, we find instead a correlation of -.24 to
military personnel and one of -.14 to defense expenditures. Only with Rummel's
war dimension do we find a single substantial positive correlation within this
modernity group, which is r = .36 to defense expenditures. Perhaps we must
assume that the Mid-Modern countries engaging in hostilities are the ones least
prepared to do so.
In brief summary of the correlation matrix, it seems that for countries at
either end of the developmental continuum, external aggression is one aspect of a
high transactional behavior pattern which also includes a large number of
amicable interactions. For Mid-Modern countries, external aggression implies a
low level of transaction and few amicable exchanges. This might be characterized
as a relatively isolated "feuding" pattern, seemingly unrelated to preparedness
for military adventure. Furthermore, external aggression cannot very well be
"explained" in terms of any single related variable which will be equally appli-
cable to transactional behavior across developmental levels, with the possible
exception of internal political unrest. Within the High Modern group of coun-
tries, however, and especially for the major powers, all of the commonsense
variables apply: wealth, size, population, and military preparedness. Some non-
commonsense variables are also in evidence, such as level of political instability
and level of need achievement in 1925 (inverse). Also, level of mail flow shows a
high inverse relationship. Ext~rnal amity also shows a relationship to the same
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predictor variables for the High Modern group, which is not surprising since
amity and hostility are part of the same transactional pattern for countries at this
level of development.
Within the Low Modern group of countries, although the transactional pat-
tern resembles that of the High Modern group, there are not many possible
predictor variables. Size shows some relationship to external aggression. Need-
achievement level in 1950 shows a high positive relation (.84) based on a very
few cases (N = 4), and systemic frustration shows a high negative relationship
(-.73), also based on few cases (N = 9). Foreign trade as a percentage of GNP
shows a strong negative relationship.
For the Mid-Modern group, almost all of the correlations to possible pre-
dictors are negligible. Only with some measures 6f external aggression do we find
positive correlations to both level of internal political unrest and level of need
achievement in 1925 (the latter based on a very few cases). There are also some
sizable negative correlations between external aggression and both population
size and level of GNP.
A second set of findings provides information not available in the correlation
matrix. This concerns the difference in average level of transactions, direction,
and intensity among countries at different developmental levels. The findings are
given in Table 6 for the three developmental levels including the major powers
and in Table 7 with the major powers excluded.
If we scan the tables for highest average score on each transactional behavior,
we note that the High Modern group of countries is. lowest in' scaled external-
aggression level, even when the major powers are included in ·the analysis. The
differences are striking with major powers excluded. Evidently, there is a suffi-
cient number of peaceful modern countries to counterbalance the high aggression
level of the leading powers. The High Modern also lead in amity transaction score
but by very little. Countries in the Mid-Modern group are most frequently the
targets, as well as the initiators, of net aggression. On Rummel's dimensions, if
we leave the major powers in the sample, the High Modern lead on the war and
diplomatic aggression dimensions; the Low Modern are the highest in belliger-
ency. The pattern changes if we omit the major powers. Now the Low Modern
excel in war, but by very little, and the Mid-Modern group leads in diplomatic
conflict. Belligerency is still the domain of the Low Modern group. When it
comes to transactional level, the High Modern group clearly leads in both
diplomatic and nondiplomatic trallsactions, especially if the major powers are
included. Excluding the major powers, diplomatic transaction level is about the
same at the three levels of development, but internation passenger flights are
still the province of nations at the highest level of development.
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Also included in Tables 6 and 7 are average scores on internal political in-
stability for the two time periods, 1955-1961 and 1948-1962. The High Modern
group of countries are clearly the least afflicted with internal conflict in com-
parison with countries at both of the lower developmental levels, a finding which
we have discussed elsewhere.24 The difference between the Mid-Modern and
the Low Modern groups is small on level of internal unrest, although the Mid-
Modern are somewhat more beset with this form of conflict.
We may deduce from these tables that there are quite a few modern countries
which are both ext~rnally peaceful and internally stable in contrast to the less
developed groups of nations, which are more consistently beset with both types
of conflict.
Certain transactional patterns have been discovered within the correlational
matrix. These may be further elaborated, and the particular countries that fit each
type may be identified. Table 8 gives a breakdown of countries by developmental
level in terms of three major transactional variables: hostility, amity, and inter-
action level. Interaction level is a combined index based on both diplomatic and
nondiplomatic (flights) interaction. The three transactional variables are divided
at the median into High and Low levels.
We see that for the High Modern group of nations, two patterns account for
79 percent of countries. Within this 79 percent, countries either show a high-
hostility, high-amity, high-interaction pattern or, at the opposite extreme, indi-
cate a low-hostility, low-amity, low-interaction pattern. Only one country
shows an excess of hostility over amity (in terms of an above-or-below the
median split), and that is the Netherlands. Two countries show more amity
than hostility, with higher interaction-Czechoslovakia and Canada. And two
countries indicate low levels of hostility and amity with higher interaction-
Belgium and Denmark. It should be pointed out that the combined index of
diplomatic and nondiplomatic (passenger flights) transaction levels teI1-ds to
alter the pattern of the modern countries from what it would be if we did not
use passenger flights. Some modern countries, which are not very involved in
diplomatic transactions, are nevertheless very high on transactions such as air-
line traffic. In this sense they are certainly very much a part of the world, al-
though able to stand apart from the major conflicts and diplomatic involvements.
Thus, if one substitutes passenger flights as the measure of transaction level,
instead of the combined interaction index, there will be eight countries in the
next-to-Iast cell (high interaction, low amity, low hostility).
Looking at both the Low Modern and the Mid-Modern groups of countries,
we also find some tendency for nations to group themselves at either of the two
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extreme activity or withdrawal patterns. At the Mid-Modern level, 53 percent
of countries fall into thes~ two postures; in the Low Modern group, the level
drops to 45 percent of countries. One other strong pattern, which has already
been mentioned in discussing the correlation matrix, is revealed for the Mid-
Modern group of countries. This is a higher level of hostile than amicable trans-
actions, combined with a low level of interaction. This pattern emerges whether
we use diplomatic or nondiplomatic transaction levels or the combined trans-
action index. These countries are not in high interaction with many other nations
and, when they do interact, they are more apt to have a hostile than an amicable
relationship. This "feuding" pattern accounts for almost one-quarter (22 percent)
of the nations at this developmental level, whereas it is completely absent among
High Modern" nations and characterizes only two countries in the Low Modern
group, China (Taiwan) and Haiti.
The Low Modern group of nations shows the greatest diversity of patterns;
18 percent are high on both hostility and amity but low in transaction level. This
is explained, however, by the nondiplomatic transaction measure. These countries
do not have direct passenger flight connections with many other nations. If one
uses the diplomatic transaction measure only, all of these four nations move to
the first cell, and we find ten Low Modern nations showing the high-hostility,
high-amity, high-involvement pattern. We thus find that among countries lowest
in economic development there is a large proportion of high participants in inter-
national affairs.
A transactional posture that is peculiar to nations at the low end of the
developmental continuum is a higher level of amicable than hostile transactions
with a low interaction level. Again, however, this picture is a function of the
combined transaction index, not of diplomatic transactional level alone. If we
substitute purely diplomatic transactions as our measure of interaction, three
countries move to the left into the high-amity, low-hostility, high-interaction cell,
indicating a supportive transactional posture. This pattern is not confined to this
developmental level; it also characterizes two High Modern and three Mid-
Modern nations.
We may thus distinguish four transactional postures in internation relations:
the High Participant posture, the Withdrawal posture, the Feuding posture, and,
to some degree, the Supportive posture. Do these postures depend upon develop-
mental level? This is difficult to answer from the data and might be argued either
way. Participants and Withdrawers are found at all levels of development, to an
extent that we did not anticipate, at least not for the High Participant posture.
Evidently, a low level of economic development does not prevent a nation from
being a High Participant in international affairs in the sense of Wielding con-
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siderable hostile and amicable weight. The one pattern which does seem to be
tied to development?llevel is what we have dubbed the Feuding posture. Why
should this be the case? Returning to the correlation matrix, it does appear that
aggression is a function of GNP and population, which are measures of interna-
tionall'lpower," in both High Modern and Low Modern countries. In the Mid-
Modern group, however, the correlations to GNP and to population are both nega-
tive, using the 7-point aggression scale (-.26 and -.23, respectively). It appears
to be the smaller countries that are engaging in the feuding. Also, whereas for
High Modern countries external amity is also related to GNP and population
(r = .55 and .49, respectively), this is not the case for the Low Modern group
(r = .06 and .05). With Mid-Modern countries, however, there is a positive re-
lationship, albeit a small one (r = .21 and .22) between external amity and the
two measures of I'Ipower." We might hazard the interpretation that I'Ipower" may
lead to both hostile and amicable relations among High Modern nations, whereas
it leads to more amicable behavior at the Mid-Modern level and to more hostile
behavior at the Low Modern level. On the other hand, the correlations are small
on which to make such generalizations and the theoretical argument that is ad-
vanced below is not based on these considerations of wealth and size.
Since these data on internation transactions are descriptive of the world at a
particular point in time, it is necessary to clarify the world situation betwpen
1955 and 1961. Many conflicts of today were not then in existence. The Korean
war had terminated and large-scale U.S. involvement in Vietnam had not begun.
Thus, the U.S. was not involved in war. The U.S.S.R. was severely at odds with
Hungary; the U.K., France, and Israel were attacking Egypt and Syria.
These patterns are given in Figures 1 and 2 which depict, in sociographic
form, the hostile and amicable relations of the world during the ti~e period.
Only dyadic transactions based on a frequency in excess of fifteen interactions
are included in the tables, for purposes of clarity of exposition. Total transactions
occurring between dyads during the seven years are summed to yield average
value, which will indicate either net hostility or net amity. A high net score on
either affective dimension is distinguished from a low net score by a double
versus a single line; also, frequency of interactions (above the base level, fifteen)
are divided into high and low levels and distinguished by continuous and dotted
lines.
In Figures 1 and 2 we find reflected the Cold War pattern of the world as
well as those nations which attempt to bridge both camps and those which have
their own private involvements relatively undisturbed by the major currents.
While a great many patterns of interest can be gleaned from both international
sociograms, the dominant pattern which emerges is the bipolarity of structure
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produced by the weight of the United States and the Soviet Union. In this respect
our data substantiate, on a quantitative level, the usual perception of inter-
national relations.
Beyond this structure, we also find in Figure 2 the hostilities between dyads
which are reflected in the correlation matrix and the tables of transactional
levels. Hostiljty between the Netherlands and Indonesia, Thailand and Cam-
bodia, Tunisia and France, Spain and Morocco, Guatemala and Cuba, Afghan-
istan and Pakistan, Yugoslavia and Albania, Austria and Italy, China (mainland)
and China (Taiwan), Portugal and India supplements the more far-reaching
hostile transactional involvements of Egypt and especially of the two major
powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
If the number of hostile dyads distressing the world seems to present a bleak
portrait, however, we must stress that in sheer frequency, amicable dyadic inter-
actions exceed hostile ones, 3 to 1. We have 295 internation dyadic interactions
based on a frequency of fifteen or more transactions during the seven-year
period. Of these, 219 yield a net amity score and 76 a net hostility score. Al-
though the data are obviously not complete and do not provide an index to the
total number of internation transactions occurring between dyads during the
seven-year period, we have no reason to suspect systematic bias in reporting
more amicable than hostile transactions. On the contrary, if there is bias, it lies
in the opposite direction. Conflict is far more newsworthy than day-to-day
peaceful interaction. Thus, we may have some confidence that the .ratio is more
or less correct and that there are more pairs of nations which, on balance, strike
an amicable note than ones which are weighted toward hostility.
The findings reported are descriptive, and undoubtedly many more patterns
could be unraveled in the data using other analyses and alternative perspectives.
It is tempting to pursue the question as to why these patterns and relationships
occur in international relations. Perhaps we could bring forth some theoretical
insights, formulate hypotheses, and seek their substantiation in the empirical
findings. For the present, we will focus on one empirical finding which appears in
the global patterning and which is reported in Tables 6 and 7. This concerns the
difference in level of external aggression characterizing the different levels of
development. Can we offer an adequate explanation' for this pattern?
The nonmodern nations (the Mid-Modern as well as the Low Modern) are
more externally aggressive in their international behavior than is the High
Modern group. This observation holds for the overall sample of countries and is
especially striking when we omit the major powers from the sample. We may
illustrate this relationship through another data treatment which also indicates
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country positions on modernity and external aggression. By dividing the sample
of nations on the modernity continuum, we create a modern and a nonmodern
group of nations. The same division may be made on the variable of external
aggression, dividing the sample of nations at the median on the 4-point external
aggression scale, into a peaceful and an aggressive group. If we then compare
these broad modernity groupings for level of external aggression, we have a
fourfold contingency table. (See Table 9.)
Although the relationship between development and external aggression is
not overriding, there is apparent in the table a tendency for modern countries to
be peaceful and for nonmodern nations to be externally aggressive. We may ask
why this difference between modern and nonmodern nations should occur. The
answer suggested lies along lines which we have explored in our previous research
on internal political aggression.25 Identifying internal conflict as systemic ag-
gressive behavior, we applied the frustration-aggression hypothesis 26 to the
problem.
Much has been written since 1939 regarding the validity of this hypothesis
and many refinements in interpretation have been suggested.27 Nevertheless, for
the purpose of rough and preliminary investigation, the basic hypothesis as
originally stated, with only slight modification, seemed applicable to the predic-
tion of political aggression. Identifying political instability as a form of systemic
aggression, we restated the hypothesis as follows: Systemic aggression is the
result of systemic frustration.28
It is suggested that a similar theoretical framework is applicable to expres-
sions of external hostility and aggression. Undoubtedly, individual items in the
Rummel-Tanter data on external conflict denote aggressive events of various
levels of intensity, as do our own data collections. With this view of external
aggression as comprising a diverse set of behaviors of varying levels of hostility,
it is plausible to seek the explanation of external systemic aggression in some
of the sources of systemic frustration. When we add the variable of external
systemic aggression, the systemic frustration-systemic aggression fra~ework
generates the following set of hypotheses:
1. The higher the level of systemic frustration within a polity, the higher the
consequent level of systemic aggression, which may be expressed either in the
form of internal political instability or in external conflict and hostility, or in
both forms of aggression.
2. Sources of systemic frustration within a society identified in previous
studies consist of: (a) the discrepancy between socioeconomic wants and socio-
economic satisfactions; (b) a high rate of change on socioeconomic indicators;
and (c) the coerciveness level of the political regime.
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3. Thus, the greater these three sources of systemic frustration, the higher
the level of external as well as of internal aggression.
This formulation gains support if we remember that by and large the non-
modern countries are more systemically frustrated than are the highly developed
nations. Perhaps the low level of modernity itself is a source of frustration, either
confounding other sources of frustration or contributing to them.
One point to be considered in these hypotheses is whether external aggres-
sion should be viewed as a form of displaced aggression. The notion of displaced
aggression forms an integral portion of the frustration-aggression hypothesis.
According to Dollard, et al., if aggression against the agent perceived to be the
source of frustration is inhibited due to a fear of punishment, the aggressive
impulse may be vented on other substitute objects.29 Translating the notion of
displacement into political terms yields the proposition that when a regime is
sufficiently coercive to inhibit acts of aggression against itself, this aggressive
impulse on the part of the populace may be directed elsewhere, often against
external targets. This proposition, that nations resort to external hostility in
order to divert the attention of dissatisfied segments of the population, has its
supporters.so And the proposition could be investigated empirically using data
on internal and external conflict. It must be said, however, that in this study no
attempt is made to investigate displacement of aggression from the internal to
the external sphere. As a first foray into the area of international conflict using
the frustration-aggression framework, it is merely claimed in the hypotheses
stated above that both forms of systemic aggression, the internal and the ex-
ternal, co-vary with level of systemic frustration.
In order to investigate the hypotheses underlying this study, namely, that
level of external aggression co-varies with level of systemic frustration, we may
check back to the correlational matrix of Table 5. Frustration level may be de-
scribed in terms of three of our indexes: relative socioeconomic deprivation
(systemic frustration index); rate of change on selected socioeconomic indicators,
and level of coerciveness or permissiveness of political regime. We know from
our previous research that there is a relationship between our measures of sys-
temic frustration and internal political instability.s1 The systemic frustration
index, 1948-1955, is related to political instability with a correlation of .50 for
instability measured in the 1955-1961 time period and r = .58 for the 1948-1962
time period. Rate of socioeconomic change, 1935-1962, is correlated .57 with
instability, 1955-1961, and .68 for instability, 1948-1962. Level of coerciveness
of the political regime is correlated .41 with instability, 1955-1961, and .51 with
instability, 1948-1962. Actually, coerciveness is curvilinearly related to political
unrest, with countries at the extreme coerciveness position (that is, countries
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lying at point 6 on the coerciveness scale), experiencing less political unrest than
countries at mid-coerciveness positions 4 and 5. (The eta describing this relation-
ship is .72, which is a significant improvement over the r obtained. F = 14.02,
P < .001.)
If we look now at Table 5 to see what predictive value these three indexes
have for level of external aggression, we find that there are only small positive
correlations ranging from .20 to .30 between these measures and level of external
aggression, measured on either a 7-point or a 4-point scale. Nor do these correla-
tions increase within the various modernity subgroupings. As we have pointed
out earlier, however, level of political unrest does show a stronger relationship to
both scalings of external aggression. Also, the correlations between political in-
stability and external aggression increase within particular modernity sub-
groupings.
As an alternative way of treating the data, each systemic frustration and
systemic aggression index was divided close to or at the median, thus dividing
the sample of nations into two approximately equal groups, one of high- and one
of low-scoring nations on the variable measured. The relationship between these
various indexes is given in Table 10. This and the following tables have the ad-
vantage that specific names of countries may be identified.
In Table 10, countries are characterized as frustrated if they were assigned a
high score on at least two of the three indexes of systemic frustration. Similarly,
countries are classed as satisfied if they scored low on two or more of these three
frustration indexes. Furthermore, countries are divided into three groups with
respect to the variables of systemic aggression:' peaceful and stable countries,
aggressive and unstable countries, and a mixed category combining peaceful-
unstable and stable-aggressive countries.
The consistent relationship between the variables of systemic frustration and
systemic aggression emerges in Table 10. Of eighteen stable, peaceful countries,
fourteen are satisfied and only four deviate from the prediction. In the mixed
category, countries are equally divided between those that are frustrated and
those that are satisfied. And thirteen countries are characterized as frustrated
and appear as both externally aggressive· and politically unstable, whereas six
countries go against the hypothesis. The Chi square for this relationship is 7.99,
with a probability level of less than .02.
The strength of the relationship between external and internal aggression
using the 4-point scaling of external aggression is indicated in Table 11. As may
be seen in this table, of thirty-two stable countries, twenty-three (that is, almost
three-quarters) are peaceful and only nine are externally aggressive. And of
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thirty-five unstable countries, twenty-three are externally aggressive, and the
remainder are peaceful.
This finding is of particular interest, since it has been both denied and
asserted by different researchers. Rummel, for example, as a result of factor-
analyzing variables of internal and external conflict, asserts that the two dimen-
sions are unrelated.32 Tanter finds a very small relationship between the twO.33
Denton, using factor analysis, finds some relationship between level of civil strife
and the occurrence of large-scale war.34 And Haas finds that levels of domestic
violence first increase and then decrease-several years before the onset of
external conflict.35 Most recently, Wilkenfeld intercorrelated country scores on
Rummel's three dimensions of external conflict with scores on his three dimen-
sions of internal conflict for countries falling within the different political group-
ings identified by Banks and Gregg 36 and found substantial intercorrelations
within groupings.37
The moderately high correlation between political instability and external
aggression, as well as the moderately strong relationship between systemic
frustration and political instability, suggested yet another treatment of the data.
An expanded table was constructed employing sixteen possible dichotomized
combinations of the independent variable and four possible combinations of the
two forms of systemic aggression. As may be noticed in Table 12, satisfaction-
frustration, high change-low change, permissiveness-coerciveness, and modern-
nonmodern in the columns, and stability-instability and p~acefulness-aggression
in the rows, are arranged in all possible combinations. The columns are ordered
from highest satisfaction to highest frustration levels. Between these two ex-
tremes are countries satisfied on two or three, or frustrated on two or three of
the four indexes. The center of the table separates the, four satisfaction from the
four frustration categories. Similarly, the rows of the table are ordered from the
peaceful-stable category to the aggressive-unstable one.
The groupings of countries in the table supports the notion that syndromes
may be identified in the present-day international arena. In the upper left-hand
cell of Table 12, a potential nonaggression pattern may be identified. Here are ten
highly developed modern countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay) which
are at the same time satisfied on three measures· of possible systemic frustration
and which are also relatively peaceful and stable. These countries enjoy per-
missive political regimes, experience low rates of change on ecological variables,
and have a small discrepancy between social want formation and social want
satisfaction. As may be seen, this is the most populated cell in -the table. There are
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seven additional countries distributed among the remaining cells of the two ex-
treme left-hand columns, and none possesses a trait combination that would
represent an extreme deviation from the alleged syndrome of six traits. The
lower left-hand cell of the table remains empty; Belgium is peaceful but un-
stable, as is Italy (which is of mid-modern development). Australia, Israel, and
West Germany are aggressive but stable, but Mexico and Pakistan are mid-
modern and low modern countries, respectively, which are both aggressive and
unstable.
At the other extreme, in the lower right-hand cell of the table, are countries
illustrative of a possible external-aggression syndrome. Of the twelve countries
in the extreme rig~t-hand colu~n, six or 50 percent are collected in this cell:
Egypt, Haiti, Iraq, Nicaragua, South Korea, aI'\d Venezuela. They register as
frustrated on the same three measures of systemic frustration, are nonmodern,
unstable, and externally aggressive. Again, as may be seen, this is the second
most-populated cell in the table. Only El Salvador, a mid-modern country, is
peaceful and stable despite being frustrated, coercive, and a high changer, con-
stituting the extreme deviant from the external-aggression syndrome. It should
be noted that there are no high modern countries in this group.
It may also be seen that countries which experience satisfaction on three
measures, and frustration on only one, also fit generally the notion of the non-
aggression syndrome, whereas countries frustrated on three indexes and satisfied
on one only predominantly partake of the external-aggression syndrome. Thus,
of eighteen peaceful, stable countries, eleven are satisfied on three or four indi-
cators, and of nineteen aggressive, unstable countries, fourteen are frustrated on
three or four measures (leaving five deviant countries).
Another finding concerns the deviant countries that are peaceful and un-
stable, or stable and aggressive, recorded in the two middle rows of the table..
The combination of peacefulness and instability occurs fairly frequently, al-
though not as frequently as the two syndrome combinations of peace and sta-
bility or external aggression and political instability. There are eleven countries
in the sample which combine the pattern of external peace and internal insta-
bility and among these only Belgium is a highly developed modern country.
Seven of these stem from the group of countries which are frustrated on three
or four indexes.
On the other hand, the combination of internal stability and external aggres-
sion is rather rare, as was also seen in the larger sample of countries (see
Table 11). Only five countries from the 53 in this table (Australia, Costa Rica,
Israel, West Germany, and Yugoslavia) show this pattern. And these are all
among the more highly developed countries (either high modern or among the
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more highly developed nations of the mid-modern group). This is in striking
contrast to the previous pattern of peace and internal instability which favors
the less developed countries. Looking at the marginals of the expanded table,
this is the rarest combination that occurs and provides further evidence ·of the
underlying relationship between internal and external aggression. It is also
striking that in frustrated countries this pattern is almost nonexistent. Only one
of the frustrated countries in the sample, Yugoslavia, is stable and externally
aggressive.
It is in this respect that the external-aggression pattern finds an important
interpretation. In the face of systemic frustration, although the impulse to
external aggr~ssion seems by far less compelling than the impulse to internal
instability, it has a greater probabllity of occurrence if the country is also un-
stable. It may be that instability is a catalyst or mediating variable for inter-
nation aggression. Systemic frustration, measured here as a combination of the
discrepancy between wants and satisfactions, coerciveness, high change, and low
modernity, may rather be considered the instigating variable to aggression. And
if one considers jnternal and external aggression as two possible manifestations
of the same aggressive impulse, then the relationship between social frustration
and some form of political aggression is quite strong. Of twelve countries frus-
trated on all indicators, only one does not experience either internal or external
aggression. And of twenty-five countries frustrated on three or four indicators,
only four countries show this deviation.
The fact that other patterns of frustration-aggression are also evidenced in
other cells of the table, however, points up the fact that there is less than perfect
predictability of either external aggression or nonaggression. Nevertheless, the
possibility for prediction of a nation's behavior in the international sphere is im-
proved by knowing its level both of systemic frustration and of political in-
stability.
On the basis of these findings, one might characterize the external-aggression
pattern by saying that the nonmodern country which is sufficiently frustrated to
be politically unstable has the strongest probability of also being externally
aggressive. Conversely, the nonaggression syndrome seems to indicate that the
modern satisfied country has the greatest probability of being both internally
stable and externally nonaggressive. This finding is qualified, however, by the
overriding demands of international relations in the case of major powers, which
were excluded from the sample under investigation. The status of the major
powers in the international political system seems to follow a pattern of behavior
sui gene.Tis, although the fact that they come predominantly from the high mod-
ern group of nations does suggest the influence of level of development.
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TABLE ONE
PROFILES: EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, 1955-1961, 7-POINT SCALE
1 2 3 4
52 Iraq 40114
50.5 Greece 40057
50.5 East Germany 40057
49 Poland 40056
48 Yugoslavia 40054
47 West Germany 40051
46 Ghana 40047
45 Venezuela 40041
44 Austria 40036
43 Domin. Republ. 40034
3rd Quartile
3 Ceylon 10005 6 New Zeal. 20021
2 Ireland 10001 5 Bolivia 20012
1 Luxembourg 0 4 Laos 20004
1st Quartile
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19 Japan 30053
17.5 Libya 30021
17.5 Canada 30021
16 Bulgaria 30019
15 Denmark 30017
14 Italy 30015
12.5 Switzerland30014
12.5 S. Korea 30014
11 Romania 30010
9.5 Cyprus 30009
9.5 Philippines 30009
8 Finland 30007
7 Australia 30004
42 Guatemala 40032
41 Chile 40028
39.5 Un. So. Africa 40026
39.5 Colombia 40026
37 Mexico 40025
37 Ecuador 40025
37 Saudi Arabia 40025
35 Uruguay 40022
33.5 Iran 40021
33.5 Panama 40021
32 Cambodia 40020
31 Norway 40019
29.5 Brazil 40018
29.5 Belgium 40018
28 Czechoslovakia 40015
26.5 El Salvador 40013
26.5 Peru 40013
25 Ethiopia 40012
23.5 Sweden 40011
23.5 Malaya 40011
22 Liberia 40010
2nd Quartile
21 Sudan 40007
20 Iceland 40006
5 6 7
68 United States 50481
67 China (Mainland) 50156
66 Tunisia 50153
65 Indonesia 50125
64 Cuba 50107
4th Quartile
63 China (Taiwan)
61.5 Turkey
61.5 Argentina
60 Netherlands
59 Lebanon
58 Thailand
57 Burma
56 Honduras
55 Albania
54 Haiti
53 Paraguay
50075
50052
50052
50050
50044
50040
50037
50023
50020
50016
50015
82 Egypt
81 Israel
80 Un. King.
79 France
78 India
77 Jordan
76 Syria
75 Morocco
74 Pakistan
72.5 Afghanis.
72.5 Nicaragua
71 Spain
70 Costa Rica
69 Portugal
60219
60215
60194
60156
60140
60122
60117
60104
60068
60047
60047
60040
60037 84 U.S.S.R.
60027 83 Hungary
70471
70401
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TABLE TWO
PROFILES: EXTERNAL AMITY, 1955-1961
-
1 2 3 4
78 U.S.S.R. 41035
77 West Germany 40493
76 India 40397
75 Japan 40365
74 Y~goslavia 40260
73 Poland 40292
72 Italy 40266
71 Indonesia 40260
70 Pakistan 40243
69 Iran 40231
68 Turkey 40210
67 Egypt 40207
66 Jordan 40202
65 Tunisia 40177
64 Morocco 40174
4th Quartile
63 Afghanistan 40172
62 East Germany 40170
61 Brazil 40166
60 Ghana 40163
59 Greece 40153
58 Burma 40150
57 Argentina 40146
56 Canada 40138
55 Czechoslovakia 40137
54 China (Mnland) 40130
53 Cuba 40127
51.5 Israel 40117
51.5 Ethiopia 40117
42 Peru 40075
40.5 Belgium 40074
40.5 Australia 40074
39 China (Taiwan) 40073
38 Ceylon 40071
37 Bulgaria 40070
36 Switzerland 40068
35 Thailand 40066
34 Cyprus 40063
33 Albania 40059
32 Libya 40058
31 Netherlands 40051
29.5 Philippines 40050
29.5 Guatemala 40050
28 Sweden 40044
26.5 Un. So. Africa 40042
26.5 Denmark 40042
25 Portugal 40039
24 Haiti 40038
23 Ecuador 40034
22 Venezuela 40033
1st Quartile
1 Honduras 20041
18 Spain 30192
17 New Zealand 30102
16 Romania 30097
15 Norway 30088
14 Chile 30073
13 Bolivia 30056
12 So. Korea 30046
11 Laos 30045
10 Nicaragua 30043
9 Iceland 30042
8 Panama 3003,5
7 Costa Rica 30034
6 EI Salvador 30030
5 Paraguay 30028
4 Liberia 30027
3 Luxembourg 30017
2 Dom. Repub. 30014
50 Austria
49 Lebanon
48 Mexico
47 Hungary
46 Finland
45 Sudan
43.5 Malaya
43.5 Cambodia
3rd Quartile
2nd Quartile
21 Colombia
20 Uruguay
19 Ireland
40109
40106
40101
40090
40088
40087
40086
40086
84 United States 52000
83 Unit.Kingdom 50704
82 France 50423
40031 81 Iraq 50236
40025 80 Saudi Arabia 50130
40020 79 Syria 50126
TABLE THREE
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTRIES IN TERMS OF THEIR DEGREE OF RELATIVE POLITICAL STABILITY, 1955-1961
(stability score shown for each country)
France 499
U. of S. Africa 495
Haiti 478
Poland 465
Spain 463
Dom. Rep. 463
Iran 459
Ceylon 454
Japan 453
Thailand 451
Mexico 451
Ghana 451
Jordan 448
Sudan 445
Morocco 443
Egypt 438
Pakistan 437
Italy 433
Belgium 432
Paraguay 431
Tunisia 328 U.S.S.R. 430
G. Britain 325 Nicaragua 430 India 599
Portugal 323 Chile 427 Argentina 599
Uruguay 318 Burma 427 Korea 596
Israel 317 Yugoslavia 422 Venezuela 584
Canada 317 Panama 422 Turkey 583
U.S. 316 Ecuador 422 Lebanon 581
Norway 104 Taiwan 314 China 422 Iraq 579
Netherlands 104 Libya 309 El Salvador 421 Bolivia 556
Cambodia 104 W. Germany 217 Austria 309 Liberia 415 Syria 554
Sweden 103 Czech. 212 E. Germany 307 Malaya 413 Peru 552 Indonesia 699
Saudi Arabia 103 Finland 211 Ethiopia 307 Albania 412 Guatemala 546 Cuba 699
Iceland 103 Romania 206 Denmark 306 Greece 409 Brazil 541 Colombia 681
Philippines 101 Ireland 202 Australia 306 Bulgaria 407 Honduras 535 Laos 652
N. Zealand 000 Luxembourg 101 Costa Rica 202 Switzer. 303 Afghanistan 404 Cyprus 526 Hungary 652
o 1 2 3 4 5 6
Stability Instability
TABLE FOUR
MODERNITY INDEX
Country Score Country Score
United States 2.54 Colombia -.20
New Zealand 1.91 Lebanon -.21
Switzerland 1.83 Mexico -.21
Australia 1.71 Brazil -.23
Sweden 1.70 Paraguay -.26
Denmark 1.54 Peru -.30
United Kingdom 1.51 Turkey -.36
High Canada 1.49 Ecuador -.37 Mid
Modern Norway 1.41 El Salvador -.40 Modern
Iceland 1.26 Nicaragua -.40
Luxembourg 1.07 Ceylon -.41
Belgium .94 Guatemala -.41
Ireland .93 Dominican Repub. -.46
Netherlands .89 Honduras -.46
Finland .81 Egypt -.47
France .80 Korea -.49
Austria .61 Syria -.49
W. Germany .59 Thailand -.49
Argentina .57 Tunisia -.49
E. Germany .50 Morocco -.50
Uruguay .47 Philippines -.50
Israel .46 Burma -.53
U.S.S.R. .40 Taiwan -.53
Czechoslovakia .34 Jordan -.54
1Hungary .24 Bolivia -.56Japan .20 Iraq -.57Bulgaria .19 Ethiopia -.60Poland .19 Iran -.62Romania .12 China -.65
Mid Italy .11 Ghana -.67 Low
Modern Cuba
.10 India -.70 Modem
Chile .07 Malaya -.73
Costa Rica .03 Haiti -.74
Panama .01 Libya -.77
Spain .00 Pakistan -.87
Union of S. Africa -.04 Afghanistan -.97
Cyprus -.05 Saudi Arabia -.98
Greece -.06 Indonesia -1.13
Yugoslavia -.09 Laos -1.25
Albania -.10 Sudan -1.37
Venezuela -.10 Cambodia -1.46
Portugal -.16 Liberia -1.62
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TABLE FIVE
PRODUGT-MOMENT CORRELATIONS AMONG INTERNATION
AND ECOLOGICAL VARIABLES
1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ext. Ext. Ext. Net Net War DipI. Bellig. DipI. Flights Flights For.
Aggr. Aggr. Amity Aggr. Aggr. Dim. Dim. Dim. Inter. Countr. No. Mail
7-pt. 4-pt. Target Initi.
84 [.52] .24 [.41] [.51] [.58] .38 .30 .37 .23 .11 [-.47]
(72) (84) (84) (84) (71) (71) (72) (84) (82) (82) (51)
84 [.49] .15 [.43] [.55] [.51] .29 .21 .32 .09 -.07 [-.52]
WMP (67) (79) (79) (79) (66) (66) (67) (79) (77) (77) (48)
HI [.60] [.57] [.43] [.42] [.72] [.54] -.03 [.60] [.57] .33 [-.67]
MOD (21) (24) (24) (24) (21) (21) (21) (24) (24) (24) (20)
1 HI
Ext. MOD [.44} .38 [.47] [.46] [.53] .23 .06 [.54] .35 .10 [-.67]
Aggr. WMP (17) (20) (20) (20) (17) (17) (17) (20) (20) (20) (17)
7-pt. MID- [.47] -.02 [.52] [.66] [.53] .33 .17 .06 .02 -.05 -.01Scale MOD (34) (37) (37) (37) (34) (34) (34) (37) (36) (36) (20)
LO [.40] .36 .27 [.44] [.55] .21 .24 [.50] .35 [.40] -.27
MOD (17) (23) (23) (23) (16) (16) (17) (23) (22) (22) (11)
LO
MOD .39 .36 .28 [.43] [.55] .24 .26 [.55] .38 [.43] -.27
WMP (16) (22) (22) (22) (15) (15) (16) (22) (2~) (21) (11)
84 .20 .10 .26 .30 .31 .19 .31 .08 .08 -.33
(72) (72) (72) (70) (70) (70) (72) (71) (71) (42)
84 .12 .10 .28 .24 .27 .23 .29 -.05 -.08 -.35
WMP (67) (67) (67) (65) (65) (65) (67) (66) (66) (39)
HI [.55] .15 .32 [.48] [.40] -.20 [.51] [.42] [.40] -.26
MOD (21) (21) (21) (20) (20) (20) (21) (21) (21) (17)
2 HI
Ext. MOD [.41] .12 .31 .33 .15 -.16 [.51] .16 .24 -.21
Aggr. WMP (17) (17) (17) (16) (16) (17) (17) (17) (17) (14)
4-pt. MID- -.07 .13 .34 .24 .28 .24 .05 -.02 -.12 -.21Scale MOD (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) (19)
LO [.48] -.13 -.05 .07 [.41] .33 [.47] .27 .26 [.45]
MOD (17) (17) (17) (16) (16) (16) (17) (16) (1:6) (6)
LO
MOD [.48] -.12 -.09 .02 [.45] .37 [.48] .33 .30 [.45]
WMP (16) (16) (16) (15) (15) (15) (16) (is) (15) (6)
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Trade Milit. Defense GNP GNP Pop. Area Instab. Instab. Frustr. Mod. Coerc. Change NAch NAch
Pers. Exp. p/cap. 7-yr. IS-yr. 1950 1925
-.38 .15 .28 .18 -.17 .24 .20 .28 .32 -.01 -.17 .27 .20 .28 [-.49]
(70) (82) (73) (84) (84) (84) (84) (84) (82) (61) (84) (84) (78) (39) (23)
-.30 .09 .20 -.05 -.35 .19 -.07 .29 .37 .07 -.30 .32 .28 .29 [-.56}
(65) (77) (68) (79) (79) (79) (79) (79) (77) (58) (79) (79) (73) (35) (19)
[-.59] [.59] [.78] .34 -.13 [.58] .39 [.52] [.53] .22 -.23 .29 .27 .17 [-.53]
(21) (23) (20) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (21) (24) (24) (24) (20) (18)
-.31 [.44] [.58] .13 -.37 .25 -.07 .37 [.54] .27 [-.41] .21 .13 .10 [-.63]
(17) (19) (16) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (18) (20) (20) (20) (16) (14)
-.05 -.04 .11 -.26 -.10 -.23 -.06 .06 .34 .20 -.08 .20 .04 .33 .33
(32) (36) (31) (37) (37) (37) (37) (37) (36) (31) (37) (37) (35) (15) (5)
-.51 .10 .21 .31 -.06 .32 .14 .11 -.06 [-.73] .18 .16 .13 [.84]
(17) (23) (22) (23) (23) (23) (23) (23) (22) (9) (23) (23) (19) (4) (0)
[-.50] .11 .22 .37 .04 .39 .07 .11 -.10 [-.73] .17 .12 .12 [.84]
(16) (22) (21) (22) (22) (22) (22) (22) (21) (9) (22) (22) (18) (4) (0)
[-.47] .11 .31 .18 -.17 .21 .21 [.43] .39 .25 -.22 .20 .25 .35 -.03
(60) (72) (64) (72) (72) (72) (72) (72) (72) (56) (72) (72) (67) (36) (22)
[-.42] .08 .26 -.002 -.34 .14 .10 [.45] [.42] .33 -.34 .24 .32 .34 -.004
(55) (67) (59) (67) (67) (67) (67) (67) (67) (53) (67) (67) (62) (32) (18)
[-.61J .26 [.53J .38 -.04 [.48J .38 [.60] [.45] .32 -.22 .23 .22 [.45J .05
(18) (21) (19) (21) (21) (21) (21) (21) (21) (19) (21) (21) (21) (19) (17)
[-.44] .05 .23 .30 -.29 .39 .23 [.53] [.44] [.40] [-.44] .21 .23 [.44] .21
(14) (17) (15) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (16) (17) (17) (17) (15) (13)
-.17 .06 .20 -.21 .01 -.19 .04 [.43] .33 -.09 -.20 .06 -.03 .21 [.87]
(29) (34) (29) (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) (29) (34) (34) (33) (13) (5)
[-.68] .18 .39 .28 -.14 .28 .24 .21 .34 [-.78] [.53] .03 .18 [.90]
(13) (17) (16) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (11) (17) (13) (4) (0)
[-.67] -.09 .06 .25 -.11 .25 .22 .21 .31 [-.78] [-.52] -.06 .15 [.90]
(12) (22) (21) (16) (16) (16) (16) (16) (16) (8) (16) (16) (12) (4) (0)
TABLE FIVE (Continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ext. Ext. Ext. Net Net War Dipl. Bellig. Dipl. Flights Flights For.
Aggr. Aggr. Amity Aggr. Aggr. Dim. Dim. Dim. Inter. Countr. No. Mail
7-pt. 4-pt. Target Initi.
84 -.20 [-.48] .28 .19 .09 [.45] [.48] [.41] -.04
(84) (84) (71) (71) (72) (84) (82) (82) (51)
84 -.23 [-.51] .09 .09 .14 [.43] .32 .16 -.07
WMP (79) (79) (66) (66) (67) (79) (77) (77) (48)
HI .11 -.18 [.48] .36 -.04 [.60] [.82] [.72] -.27
MOD (24) (24) (21) (21) (21) (24) (24) (24) (20)
3 HI
Ext. MOD .10 -.29 .09 .22 .07 .27 [.62] .38 -.18
Amity WMP (20) (20) (17) (17) (17) (20) (20) (20) (17)
MID- -.26 [-.57] .05 .08 .06 [.44] .33 .18 .25
MOD (37) (37) (34) (34) (34) (37) (36) (36) (20)
La -.27 [-.41] .33 .39 .12 [.43] .30 .17 .27
MOD (23) (23) (16) (16) (17) (23) (22) (22) (11)
La
MOD -.27 [-.43] .35 [.40] .12 [.55] .31 .17 .27
WMP (22) (22) (15) (15) (16) (22) (21) (21) (11)
84 [.65] .23 .16 -.17 -.10 -.19 -.13 .005
(84) (71) (71) (72) (84) (82) (82) (51)
84 [.66] .27 .21 -.17 -.24 -.24 -.19 -.003
WMP (79) (66) (66) (67) (79) (77) (77) (48)
HI l·61] [.42] .07 -.19 .01 .07 -.15 -.19
MOD (24) (21) (21) (21) (24) (24) (24) (20)
4 HI
Net MOD [.59] [.47] .06 -.18 -.07 .04 -.26 -.21
Aggr. WMP (20) (17) (17) (17) (20) (20) (20) (17)
Target
MID- [.68] .21 .38 -.14 -.37 -.39 -.26 .17
MOD (37) (34) (34) (34) (37) (36) (36) (20)
La [.63] .23 [-.41] -.26 -.08 -.23 -.02 [-.41]
MOD (23) (16) (16) (17) (23) (22) (22) (11)
La
MOD [.65] .25 [-.43] -.27 -.09 -.24 -.03 [-.41]
WMP (22) (15) (15) (16) (22) (21) (21) (11)
84 .17 .14 -.03 -.14 -.28 -.22 -.18
(71) (71) (72) (84) (82) (82) (51)
84 .23 .20 -.03 -.31 -.31 -.26 -.19
WMP (66) (66) (67) (79) (77) (77) (48)
HI .38 .06 .04 .03 -.14 -.23 -.17
MOD (21) (21) (21) (24) (24) (24) (20)
5 HI
Net MOD [.47] .00 .05 .02 -.23 -.32 -.19
Aggr. WMP (17) (17) (17) (20) (20) (20) (17)
Initia-
tor MID- .19 .26 .00 [-.51] [-.41] -.36 -.11
MOD (32) (34) (34) (37) (36) (36) (20)
La .12 -.25 .03 .02 -.31 -.06 [-.40]
MOD (16) (16) (17) (23) (22) (22) (11)
La
MOD .06 -.21 .06 -.18 -.28 -.03 [-.40]
WMP (15) (15) (16) (22) (21) (21) (11)
13
Trade
14 15 16
Milit. Defense GNP
Pers. Exp.
17
GNP
p/cap.
18
Pop.
19 20 21 22 23
Area Instab. Instab. Frustr. Mod.
7-yr. IS-yr.
24 25 26 27
Coerc. Change NAch NAch
1950 1925
-.20 .14 .23 .34 .18 .16 .19 .07 -.04 .14 .10 -.08 -.18 .10 .15
(70) (82) (73) (84) (84) (84) (84) (84) (82) (61) (84) (84) (78) (39) (23)
-.09 .06
(65) (77)
[-.52] .32
(21) (23)
.15 .18 -.03 .12 .15
(68) (79) (79) (79) (79)
[.54] [.55] .24 [.49] .21
(20) (24) (24) (24) (24)
.09 - .001 -.01 -.07 .10 - .06 .07
(79) (77) (58) (79) (79) (73) (35)
[.61] .33 .21 .06 .10 .03 .12
(24) (24) (21) (24) (24) (24) (20)
.22
(19)
.04
(18)
-.24 -.005 .06 .34 -.16 .37 .18 [.62] .37 .39 -.37 .17 .31 -.007 .19
(17) (19) (16) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (18) (20) (20) (20) (16) (14)
.10 .12 .13 .21 .13 .22 .15 .27 .17 .09 .06 -.04 -.22 .12 -.21
(32) (36) (31) (37) (37) (37) (37) (37) (36) (31) (37) (37) (35) (15) (5)
[-.60] .02 .13 .06 .25 .05 .09 -.31 -.35 -.009 .31 .11 -.23 -.08
(17) (23) (22) (23) (23) (23) (23) (23) (22) (9) (23) (23) (19) (4) (0)
[-.61] .02 .13 .08 .25 .06 .17 -.31 -.36 -.009 .31 .12 -.23 -.08
(16) (22) (21) (22) (22) (22) (22) (22) (21) (9) (22) (22) (18) (4) (0)
.12 .06 .00 -.08 -.17 -.07 -.15 .16 .13 .06 -.11 .24 .11 .12 -.39
(70) (82) (73) (84) (84) (84) (84) (84) (82) (61) (84) (84) (78) (39) (23)
.12 .05
(65) (77)
.15 [.47]
(21) (23)
.00 -.31 -.19 -.09 -.28 .16
(68) (79) (79) (79) (79) (79)
.12 -.10 [-.46] -.01 -.11 .21
(20) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24)
.13
(77)
.06
(24)
.05 - .11 .25 .11 .11 - .38
(58) (79) (79) (73) (35) (19)
.18 -.35 -.01 .36 -.16 [-.53]
(21) (24) (24) (24) (20) (18)
.23 [.47]
(17) n9)
.18 -.11
(32) (36)
-.01 .11
(17) (23)
.13 [-.45] [-.52] -.34 -.36
(16) (20) (20) (20) (20)
.00 [-.46] -.15 [-.48] -.36
(31) (37) (37) (37) (37)
.04 - .02 [-.62] .01 - .04
(22) (23) (23) (23) (23)
.16
(20)
.12
(37)
.12
(23)
.03 .15 -.36 -.09 .37
(20) (18) (20) (20) (20)
.28 - .001 -.20 [.40] .18
(36) (31) (37) (37) (35)
-.05 -.23 -.16 .28 -.12
(22) (9) (23) (23) (19)
-.18 -.51
(16) (14)
.29 .34
(15) (5)
[.69]
(4) (0)
-.04 .11 .04 .005 [-.63] .05 -.06 .14 -.05 -.23 -.16 .32 -.12 [.69]
(16) (22) (21) (22) (22) (22) (22) (22) (21) (9) (22) (22) (18) (4) (0)
.05 .04 -.03 -.12 -.22 -.03 -.14 .13 .21 .15 -.14 .24
(70) (82) (73) (84) (84) (84) (84) (84) (82) (61) (84) (84)
.05 .05 -.02 -.40 -.21 -.12 -.30 .13 .21 .13 -.12 .22
(65) (77) (68) (79) (79) (79) (79) (79) (77) (58) (79) (79)
.12 [.41] .20 -.10 -.37 -.004 -.11 -.04 .03 .12 -.26 .02
(21) (23) (20) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (21) (24) (24)
.20 .23 [-.52]
(78) (39) (23)
.18 .24 [-.53]
(73) (35) (19)
.22 .04 [-.53]
(24) (20) (18)
.21 [.42] .28 [-.47] [-.40] -.35 [-.43] -.11 .01 .01 -.22 -.07 .14
(17) (19) (16) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (18) (20) (20) (20)
.11 -.24 -.14 [-.61] -.20 [-.57] -.24 -.09 .17 -.07 -.22 .24 .17
(32) (36) (31) (37) (37) (37) (37) (37) (36) (31) (37) (37) (35)
-.05 .32 .20 .24 -.23 .26 .06 .24 .14 -.15 -.04 .26 .07
(17) (23) (22) (23) (23) (23) (23) (23) (22) (9) (23) (23) (19)
.03 [-.52]
(16) (14)
.31 [.52]
(15) (5)
[.88]
(4) (0)
.02 .34 .23 .09 - .21 .12 - .36 .24 .09 - .15 -.07 .18 .04 [.88]
(16) (22) (21) (22) (22) (22) (22) (22) (21) (9) (22) (22) (18) (4) (0)
TABLE FIVE (Continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ext. ·Ext. Ext. Net Net War Dipl. Bellig. Dipl. Flights Flights For.
Aggr. Aggr. Amity Aggr. Aggr. Dim. Dim. Dim. Inter. Countr. No. Mail
7-pt. 4-pt. Target Initi.
84 .20 .18 .37 .29 .23 .02
(71) (71) (71) (70) (70) (41)
84 .13 .31 .31 .02 -.11 -.06
WMP (66) (66) (66) (65) (65) (38)
HI .18 -.11 .38 .39 .25 -.08
MOD (21) (21) (21) (21) (21) (17)
6 HI
War MOD -.15 -.06 [.41] -.06 -.19 -.04
Dimen- WMP (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) (14)
sion [.56]MID- .30 .27 .11. -.02 -.13
MOD (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) (19)
LO -.14 .22 [.41] -.12 -.004 [.67]
MOD (16) (16) (16) (15) (15) (5)
LO
MOD -.09 .27 .32 -.07 .04 [.67]
WMP (15) (15) (15) (14) (14) (5)
84 .03 [.53] .23 .11 -.22
(71) (71) (70) (70) (41)
84 .07 .18 .05 -.10 -.23
WMP (66) (66) (65) (65) (38)
HI -.15 [.74] .36 .12 -.34
MOD (21) (21) (21) (21) (17)
7 HI
Diplo- MOD -.15 .08 .16 -.15 -.28
matic WMP (17) (17) (17) (17) (14)
Dimen-
MID-sion -.02 .13 .01 -.05 -.05
MOD (34) (34) (34) (34) (19)
LO [.51] .35 .32 .24 [.58]
MOD (16) (16) (15) (15) (5)
LO
MOD [.50] [.63] .29 '.21 [.58]
WMP (15) (15) (14) (14) (5)
84 -.001 -.02 -.09 -.20
(72) (71) (71) (42)
84 .20 .02 -.06 -.20
WMP (67) (66) (66) (39)
HI -.14 -.19 -.12 -.08
MOD (21) (21) (21) (17)
8 HI
Bellig- MOD -.24 -.17 -.09 -.11
erency WMP (17) (17) (17) (14)
Dimen-
MID-sion .23 .22 .07 -.15
MOD (34) (34) (34) (19)
LO .13 .18 .21 [.67]
MOD (17) (16) (16) (6)
LO
MOD .29 .15 .19 [.67]
WMP (16) (15) (15) (6)
13
Trade
14 15 16
Milit. Defense GNP
Pers. Exp..
17
GNP
p/cap.
18
Pop.
19 20 21 22 23
Area Instab. Instab. Frustr. Mod.
7-yr. IS-yr.
24 25 26 27
Coerc. Change NAch NAch
1950 1925
-.17 .30 .32 .10 .06 .12 .19 .06 -.01 -.06 .07 .07 -.03 .06 -.11
(59) (71) (63) (71) (71) (71) (71) (71) (71) (56) (71) (71) (66) (36) (22)
-.03' .17 .26 -.10 -.08 .01 -.05 .06 .07 .08 -.10 .15 .07 .04 -.06
(54) (66) (58) (66) (66) (66) (66) (66) (66) (53) (66) (66) (61) (32) (18)
[-.48] [.74] [.60] .06 -.14 .32 .22 .38 .16 .32 -.19 .10 .24 .21 -.20
(18) (21) (19) (21) (21) (21) (21) (21) (21) (19) (21) (21) (21) (19) (17)
-.33 [.80] [.63] -.18 -.04 -.18 -.09 .11 .13 .39 -.26 -.05 .07 .21 .12
(14) (17) (15) (17) (14) (17) (17) (17) (17) (16) (17) (17) (17) (15) (13)
.12 -.12 .36 -.03 -.01 -.01 -.04 .11 .22 .15 -.03 .29 .10 -.23 [.47]
(29) (34) (25) (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) (29) (34) (34) (33) (13) (5)
-.15 .24 .33 .21 -.23 .25 .29 -.19 -.39 -.36 .08 .29 .09 [.82]
(12) (16) (15) (16) (16) (16) (16) (16) (16) (8) (16) (16) (12) (4) (0)
-.004 .27 .38 -.01 -.19 .05 .11 -.21 [-.50] -.36 .04 .17 .03 [.82]
(11) (15) (14) (15) (15) (15) (15) (15) (15) (8) (15) (15) (11) (4) (0)
-.12 .16 .31
(59) (71) (63)
.06 .07 .17
(54) (66) (58)
[-.56] .22 [.67]
(18) (21) (19)
-.10 .05 -.03
(14) (17) (15)
.28 -.06 .15
(29) (34) (29)
-.05 [.56] [.55]
(12) (16) (15)
- .12 [.56] [.55]
(1~) (15) (14)
.~3 -.09 .25
(60) (72) (64)
- .01 - .07 .30
(55) (67) (59)
.06 - .002 .05
(18) (21) (19)
-.04 .06 .32
(14) (17) (15)
.04 -.15 .36
(29) (34) (29)
.08 .15 .19
(13) (17) (16)
.03 .14 .19
(12) (16) (15)
[.41] .17
(71) (71)
-.05 -.06
(66) (66)
[.61] .17
(21) (21)
.03 -.14
(17) (17)
-.19 .24
(34) (34)
.00 .15
(16) (16)
.27 .12
(15) (15)
-.07 -.16
(62) (72)
-.06 -.15
(67) (67)
-.07 .16
(21) (21)
-.003 .28
(17) (17)
-.09 -.18
(34) (34)
-.08 .24
(17) (17)
.06 .22
(16) (16)
.11 [.43]
(71) (71)
.02 .01
(66) (66)
[.80] [.77]
(21) (21)
.16 .27
(17) (17)
-.22 -.19
(34) (34)
-.01 -.09
(16) (16)
.26 .22
(15) (15)
.04 -.05
(72) (72)
.16 -.003
(67) (67)
-.10 -.08
(21) (21)
-.08 -.05
(17) (17)
.01 .07
(34) (34)
-.06 -.17
(17) (17)
.10 -.13
(16) (16)
.27
(71)
.36
(66)
[.47]
(21)
[.59]
(17)
.16
(34)
[.46]
(16)
[.47]
(15)
.09
(72)
.09
(67)
-.30
(21)
-.29
(17)
-.02
(34)
.21
(17)
.21
(16)
.14
(71)
.24
(66)
[.41]
(21)
[.52]
(17)
-.04
(34)
.14
(16)
.19
(15)
.06
(71)
.06
(66)
-.19
(21)
-.18
(17)
.09
(34)
-.02
(16)
.02
(15)
.05
(56)
.17
(53)
-.16
(19)
.03
(16)
.25
(29)
-.08
(8)
-.08
(8)
.13
(56)
.11
(53)
-.24
(19)
-.26
(16)
.14
(29)
-.26
(8)
-.26
(8)
.12
(71)
-.06
(66)
.07
(21)
-.17
(17)
-.16
(34)
.34
(16)
.37
(15)
-.18
(72)
-.18
(67)
.24
(21)
.35
(17)
-.17
(34)
.22
(17)
.24
(16)
.23
(71)
.33
(66)
.38
(21)
[.41]
(17)
.30
(34)
-.09
(16)
.02
(15)
-.01
(72)
-.01
(67)
-.19
(21)
-.21
(17)
-.01
(34)
-.22
(17)
-.18
(16)
.13
(66)
.25
(61)
.29
(21)
.13
(17)
.35
(33)
.25
(12)
.29
(11)
.15
(67)
.14
(62)
-.14
(21)
-.27
(17)
-.02
(33)
-.24
(13)
-.22
(12)
.24 .00
(36) (22)
.31 -.02
(32) (18)
.26 -.03
(19) (17)
.31 .06
(15) (13)
.34 .11
(13) (5)
-.04
(4) (0)
-.04
(4) (0)
.04 .13
(36) (22)
.06 .13
(32) (18)
-.10 .21
(19) (17)
-.08 .21
(15) (13)
-.32 [.47]
(13) (5)
[.70]
(4) (0)
[.70]
(4) (0)
TABLE FIVE (Continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ext. Ext. Ext. Net Net War Dipl. Bellig. Dipl. Flights Flights For.
Aggr. Aggr. Amity Aggr. Aggr. Dim. Dim. Dim. Inter. Countr. No. Mail
7-pt. 4-pt. Target Initi.
[.56] [.57] -.15
84 (82) (82) (51)
84 [.43] .31 -.36
WMP (77) (77) (48)
HI [.61] [.57] -.30
MOD (24) (24) (20)
9 HI
Diplo- MOD .35 [.52] [-.40]
matic WMP (20) (20) (17)
Inter-
MID- [.54]action .37 -.21
MOD (36) .(36) (20)
LO [.44] [.43] [-.51]
MOD (22) (22) (11)
LO
MOD [.71] [.68] [-.51]
WMP (21) (21) (11)
84 [.83] .15
(82) (50)
84 [.78] .17
WMP (77) (47)
HI [.84] -.12
MOD (24) (20)
10 HI
Flights MOD [.74] .06
No. of WMP (20) (17)
Coun-
MID- [.87] [.56]tries
MOD (36) (19)
LO [.86] -.39
MOD (22) (11)
LO
MOD [.85] -.39
WMP (21) (11)
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22· 23 24 25 26 27
Trade Milit. Defense GNP GNP Pop. Area Instab. Instab. Frustr. Mod. Coerc. Change NAch NAch
Pers. Exp. p/cap. 7-yr. IS-yr. 1950 1925
[-.42] .20 .37 [.86] .38 [.43] [.60] .03 -.003 -.16 .28 -.05 -.14 .13 .00
(70) (82) (73) (84) (84) (84) (84) (84) (82) (61) (84) (84) (78) (39) (23)
-.38 .20 .29 [.45] -.16 [.40] .05 .21 .17 .17 -.15 .16 .11 .27 -.28
(65) (77) (68) (79) (79) (79) (79) (79) (77) (58) (79) (79) (73) (35) (19)
[-.68] [.40] [.86] [.89] .39 [.93] [.63] .29 .25 -.07 .24 .13 .07 .19 -.07
(21) (23) (20) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (21) (24) (24) (24) (29) (18)
[-.48] .34 [.45] [.60] -.30 [.74] -.002 .26 [.46] [.55] [-.55] [.42] .06 [.42] -.16
(17) (19) (16) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (18) (20) (20) (20) (16) (14)
-.31 .39 [.48] [.47] .11 [.46] .01 .06 -.04 .10 .21 .06 -.09 .004 [-.87]
(32) (36) (31) (37) (37) (37) (37) (37) (36) (31) (37) (37) (35) (15) (5)
[-.50] -.06 .15 [.78] -.15 [.78] [.73] .25 .17 -.27 .22 .11 .16 [.71]
(17) (23) (22) (23) (23) (23) (23) (2.3) (22) (9) (23) (23) (19) (4) (0)
[-.42] -.02 .26 [.56] [-.51] [.57] [.43] .32 .006 -.27 .20 -.26 .11 [.71]
(16) (22) (21) (22) (11) (22) (22) (22) (21) (9) (22) (22) (18) (4) (0)
-.26 .12 .08 [.51] [.51] .17 .21 -.05 -.20 -.39 [.47] -.38 [-.43] -.10 -.23
(68) (81) (72) (82) (82) (82) (82) (82) (81) (61) (82) (82) (78) (39) (23)
-.15 -.02 -.10 [.61] .33 .28 .10 -.06 -.16 -.31 .32 -.34 -.34 -.21 -.38
(63) (76) (67) (77) (77) (77) (77) (77) (76) (58) (77) (77) (73) (35) (19)
-.35 .32 [.58] [.57] .32 [.55] .19 [.44] .20 .002 .16 -.05 -.14 -.08 -.29
(21) (23) (20) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (24) (21) (24) (24) (24) (20) (18)
.14 -.01 .21 [.54] .05 [.59] -.05 .29 .11 .02 -.12 -.03 -.14 -.33 -.36
(17) (19) (16) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (18) (20) (20) (20) (16) (14)
-.36 .12 .16 [.59] .30 [.53] .11 -.02 -.14 -.25 .27 -.32 -.24 -.14 [-.93]
(31) (36) (31) (36) (36) (36) (36) (36) (36) (31) (36) (36) (35) (15) (5)
[-.48] -.26 -.17 .24 -.01 .22 .11 .16 -.04 .20 .06 [-.44] -.08 .27
(16) (22) (21) (22) (22) (22) (22) (22) (21) (9) (22) (22) (19) (4) (0)
[-.57] -.27 -.18 [.65] -.03 [.63] [.59] .16 -.01 -.20 .08 [-.42] -.06 .27
(15) (21) (20) (21) (21) (21) (21) (21) (20) (9) (21) (21) (18) (4) (0)
VARIABLE CODE NUMBERS
1. External Aggression 7-pt. Scale 15. Defense Expenditure as Percentage of GNP
2. External Aggression 4-pt. Scale 16. GNP, 1957, US $
3. External Amity 5-pt. Scale 17. GNP per Capita, 1957, US $
4. Net Aggression, Target 18. Total Population 1961
5. Net Aggression, Initiator 19. Area in Square Kilometers
6. War Dimension (Rummel) 20. Political Instability, 1955-1961
7. Diplomatic Dimension (Rummel) 21. Political Instability, 1948-1962
8. Belligerency Dimension (Rummel) 22. Systemic Frustration, 1948-1955
9. Diplomatic Interaction, No. of Countries 23. Level of Attained Modernity, 1948-1955
10. Passenger Flights, No. of Countries 24. Permissiveness-Coerciveness of Political Regime
11. Passenger Flights, Total per week 25. Rate of Socioeconomic Change, 1935-1962
12. Foreign Mail Sent per Capita 26. Need Achievement Level 1950
13. Foreign Trade as Percentage of GNP 27. Need Achievement Level 1925
14. Military Personnel as Percentage of Total Pop.
TABLE SIX
MEAN VALUE6 OF INTERNATION TRANSACTIONAL VARIABLES
INCLUDING MAJOR POWERS
High Mid- Low
Modern Modern Modern
External Aggression 7-pt. Scale 3997 4431 4439 X
(1641) (1213) (1203) SD
(24) (37) (23) N
External Aggression 4-pt. Scale 3099 3426 3653
(1231) (924) (800)
(21) (34) (17)
External Amity 5-pt. Scale 39842 37133 39705
(5639) (5661) (4678)
(24) (37) (23)
Net Aggression, Target 976 1037 965
(175) (277) (244)
(24) (37) (23)
Net Aggression, Initiator 927.5 1086 931
(188) (303) (186)
(24) (37) (23)
War Dimension (Rummel) 242 152 164
(330) (196) (97)
(21) (34) (16)
Diplomatic Dimension (Rummel) 221 218 159
(193) (133) (92)
(21) (34) (16)
Belligerency Dimension (Rummel) 172 187 284
(44) (84) (226)
(21) (34) (17)
Diplomatic Interaction, No. of Countries 11 5 6
(18) (4) (4)
(24) (37) (23)
Passenger Flights, No. of Countries 29 16 12
(18) (12) (8.5)
(24) (36) (22)
Passenger Flights, Total per Week 716 189.5 82
(795) (254) (124)
(24) (36) (22)
Political Instability, 1955-1961 268 472 416
(138) (108) (155)
(24) (37) (23)
Political Instability, 1948-1962 2.8.396 4.4.563 4.1.467
(1.1.569) (6.669) (1.1.929)
(24) (36) (22)
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TABLE SEVEN
MEAN VALUES OF INTERNATION TRANSACTIONAL VARIABLES
EXCLUDING MAJOR POWERS
High Mid- Low
Modern Modern Modern
External Aggression 7-pt. Scale 3532 4431 4407 X
(1351) (1213) (1220) SD
(20) (37) (22) N
External Aggression 4-pt. Scale 2808 3426 3619
(1191) (924) (812)
(17) (34) (16)
External Amity 5-pt. Scale 38102 37133 39686
(4021) (5661) (4782)
(20) (37) (22)
Net Aggression, Target 968 1037 967
(188.5) (277) (250)
(20) (37) (22)
Net Aggression, Initiator 921 1086 922
(202) (303) (185)
(20) (37) (22)
War Dimension (Rummel) 135 152 157
(210) (196) (96)
(17) (34) (15)
Diplomatic Dimension (Rummel) 168 218 163
(122) (133) (93)
(17) (34) (15)
Belligerency Dimension (Rummel) 175 187 292
(49) (84) (231)
(17) (34) (16)
Diplomatic Interaction, No. of Countries 4 5 5.5
(4) (4) (3)
(20) (37) (22)
Passenger Flights, No. of Countries 23 16 12
(14) (12) (9)
(20) (36) (21)
Passenger Flights, Total per Week 507 189.5 86
(553) (254) (126)
(20) (36) (21)
Political Instability, 1955-1961 244 472 416
(134) (108) (159)
(120) (37) (22)
Political Instability, 1948-1962 2.7.293 4.4.563 4.0.819
(1.1.819) (6.669) (1.1.825)
(20) (36) (21)
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TABLE EIGHT
COMBINED LEVELS OF EXTERNAL HOSTILITY, AMITY, AND INTERACTION
Hi Inter. Low Inter. Hi Inter. Low Inter. Hi Inter. Low Inter. Hi Inter. Low Inter.
Hi Amity Hi Amity Hostii. > Hostii. > Amity> Amity> Low Amity Low Amity
Hi Hostility Hi Hostility Amity Amity Hostii. HostiI. Low Hostility Low Hostility Totals
Argent. Netherlands Canada Belgium Australia
Austria Czechosl. Denmark Finland
High E. Germany Iceland
Modern France Ireland
Israel Luxembourg
U.K. New Zealand
U.S. Norway
U.S.S.R. Sweden
w. Germany Switzerland
Uruguay
9 0 1 0 2 0 2 10 24
Egypt Cuba Spain Albania Brazil Mexico Bulgaria
Mid- Greece Hungary Thailand Costa Rica Italy Ceylon
Modern Lebanon Tunisia Dom. Rep. Japan Chile
Poland Honduras Colombia
Syria Paraguay Ecuador
Turkey Portugal £1 Salv.
YugosI. Nicaragua Guatemala
Venezuela Panama
Peru
S. Korea
Romania
U. of S. Africa
7 3 2 8 3 1 0 12 36
Burma Afghan. China (T) Iran Cambodia Bolivia
Low China (M) Ghana Haiti Ethiopia Laos
Modern India Jordan Malaya Libya
Indonesia Morocco Saudi Philipp.
Iraq Arabia
Pakistan Sudan
6 4 0 2 1 5 0 4 22
Totals 22 7 3 10 6 6 2 24 82
TABLE NINE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MODERNITY AND EXTERNAL AGGRESSION
(4-POINT SCALE)
Level of Modernity
Hi Mod (-.16 through -2.54) Lo Mod (-1.62 through -.20)
Belgium Norway Brazil El Salvador
Canada Sweden Ceylon Ethiopia
Peaceful Denmark Bulgaria Paraguay Liberia
(0000-4014) Finland Czechoslovakia Philippines Peru
Greece Poland Afghanistan Saudi Arabia
Ireland Portugal Bolivia Thailand
Italy Romania Colombia
Japan Spain Dominican
Netherlands Switzerland Republic
New Zealand Uruguay Ecuador
20 15 35
Australia Hungary Burma Indonesia
Chile U. of S. Africa Cambodia Iran
Aggressive Costa Rica Yugoslavia India Iraq
(4015-4516) Israel Mexico Jordan
West Germany Pakistan Lebanon
Albania Turkey Nicaragua
Argentina Egypt Paraguay
Cuba Guatemala South Korea
East Germany Haiti Taiwan
Honduras Venezuela
12 20 32
32 35 67
Chi Square == 1.86
P == .18
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TABLE TEN
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDEXES OF SOCIOECONOMIC FRUSTRATION,
COERCION, RATE OF CHANGE, AND LEVELS OF EXTERNAL AGGRESSION,
POLITICAL INSTABILITY
Level of Frustration
Level of Satisfied on Two Frustrated on Two
Aggression or Three Indexes or Three Indexes Totals
Peaceful Bulgaria Netherlands Ecuador
(0000-4014) Canada New Zealand El Salvador
Stable Czechoslovakia Norway Panama
(000-422) Denmark Philippines Portugal
Finland Sweden
Greece Switzerland
Ireland Uruguay 14 4 18
Mixed
(Stable- Australia Israel Bolivia Japan
Aggressive, Belgium Italy Ceylon Peru
Peaceful- Brazil Spain Colombia Thailand
Unstable) Costa Rica West Germany 8 Dom. Yugo-
RepubI. slavia 8 16
Aggressive Argentina Mexico Egypt Lebanon
(4014-4516) Chile Pakistan Guatemala Nicaragua
Unstable Cuba u. of S. Africa 6 Haiti Paraguay
(423-699) India S. Korea
Indonesia Turkey
Iran Venezuela
Iraq 13 19
Totals 28 25 53
Chi Square == 7.99
P = <.02
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TABLE ELEVEN
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL STABILITY
AND EXTERNAL AGGRESSION
Level of Political Instability
Level of
External Stability Instability
Aggression (000-422) (423-699) irotals
Afghanistan Netherlands Belgium
Bulgaria New Zealand Bolivia
Peaceful Canada Norway Brazil
(0000-4014) Czechoslovakia Panama Ceylon
Denmark Philippines Colombia
Ecuador Portugal Dom. Rep.
El Salvador Romania Italy
Ethiopi.a Saudi Arabia Japan
Finland Sweden Peru
Greece Switzerland Poland
Ireland Uruguay Spain
Liberia 23 Thailand 12 35
Albania Argentina Iraq
Australia Burma Jordan
Cambodia Chile Lebanon
Aggressive Costa Rica Cuba Mexico
(4015-4516) East Germany Egypt Nicaragua
Israel Guatemala Pakistan
Taiwan Haiti Paraguay
West Germany Honduras S. Korea
Yugoslavia 9 Hungary Turkey
India U. of S. Africa
Indonesia Venezuela
Iran 23 32
Totals 32 35 67
Chi Square = 7.10
P == <.01
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TABLE TWELVE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOURCES OF SYSTEMIC FRUSTRATION,
POLITICAL STABILITY, EXTERNAL AGGRESSION
Peaceful
(0000-4014)
Stable
(000-422)
Canada
Denmark
Finland
Ireland
Nether.
Norway
Sweden
Switz.
Uruguay
New. Zea.10 o o
Czech.
o 1
Bul-
garia
1 0
Aggressive
(4015-4516)
Stable
Peaceful
Unstable
(423-699)
A:ustral.
Israel
W.Germ. 3
Belgium Italy
o
Costa
Rica
o 1
Brazil
o
Spain
o o
Aggressive
Unstable
Totals
1
o
14
Mexico
Pakist.
1
2
3
o
o
o
1
o
2
lA.rgen-
tina
o
1
2
1
D.of
S.Afr.
Cuba
2
4
o
o
o
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NOTES
1 Resear.c'h for this paper has been partially supported by National Science Foundation
Grant No. GS-1417.
2 Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations,"
General Systems, VIII (1963), I-50, and Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Within
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CHAPTER SIX
LEVELS OF POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT &
INTERSTATE CONFLICT
IN SOUTH ASIA
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MOST RESEARCH on the relationship between development and foreign
policy has focused on the question of how the foreign policy of one of the larger
states, usually the United States, can facilitate modernization in the less devel-
oped area.1 Little attention has been given to the link between the level of devel-
opment of a state and how it behaves in the international system, in spite of the
fact that such a link is just as crucial in determining the goals and purposes of
development. Does internal development, for example, tend to induce interna-
tional conflict, qr might it play an ameliorative role?
The notion of national development is a complex one, involving as it does a
multiplicity of meanings. Not only can one conceive of different sectors of
development such as economic, political, technological, and social, but within
each sector there appears to be an unlimited number of criteria and definitions.
Perhaps the critical problem for the developing areas in their fledging at-
tempts to become modernized is that of political development. It might be argued
that all other forms of development hinge on political development. Without
political stability and the development of national unity, economic, social, tech-
nological, and military development will be difficult if not impossible to achieve.
Governments forced to use their resources primarily to preserve themselves and
confronted frequently with the costs of internal conflict will find the path to
development difficult at best.
Most studies that have systematically probed the relationship between in-
ternal political development and foreign policy behavior have been based upon
gross data analysis in which large numbers of countries are examined in an
effort to determine the underlying dimensions of their domestic and foreign
behaviors.2 In a nonquantitative fashion, Richard Rosecrance has also examined
on a longitudinal basis the relationship between internal political development
and foreign conflict in his study of nine international systems since 1740.3
Conclusions with respect to the relationships between internal instability and
external aggressiveness in the various studies are strikingly different; Rosecrance
sees a positive relationship whereas the other studies indicate a negative one.
This study purports to evaluate this relationship in still another way by
examining the effects of national political development upon the rivalry of India
and Pakistan since independence. A case study was decided upon because of its
manageability and because it afforded the opportunity to examine a conflict
situation on a longitudinal basis rather than a cross-sectional one. The question
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is whether the same state tends to behave in different ways as its development
evolves. Although a case study detracts from one's ability to generalize to a
larger population of ~tates, it allows one to analyze a situation in greater depth
in order to ascertain the nuances involved. It also enables one to examine the
fruitfulness of certain research techniques which can then be extended to addi-
tional case studies.
The selection of the Indo-Pakistani conflict was motivated by the availability
of adequate primary and secondary sources and by the fact that the conflict
between the two has been the overriding foreign policy issue for both parties.
One writer has gone so far as to assert that "almost every action of Pakistan can
be interpreted as being motivated by fear of India." 4 Although India has had
broader foreign policy interests, particularly in terms of Nehru's attempts to
playa mediating role in the Cold War, its conflict relations with Pakistan provide
a fairly useful index of its aggressive behavior. The exception to this general rule
might be India's conflict with China, in which case India was clearly on the
defensive, and the Indian invasion of Goa in 1961.
The analysis quite properly could be extended to other all-consuming dyadic
relationships such as Arab-Israeli or even United States-Soviet relations. In some
respects, the developing states such as India and Pakistan provide a much more
interesting case study since they are so deeply involved in the process of political
modernization and consequently hypotheses concerning the effects of rapid
developmental change upon interstate relations can be readily tested on the basis
of recent experiences. On the other hand, the data sources are generally not as
good as those for the more developed states.
In view of the multipleomeanings given the term "political development," one
needs to be precise about its definition. Essentially, most of the definitions boil
down to notions of complexity, efficiency and effectiveness, stability, national
unity, and competitiveness and responsiveness. Since political development
means so many different things it becomes difficult if not impossible to develop
hypotheses linking the abstract notion of development to foreign policy styles.
Instead, one must be satisfied with hypotheses concerning individual aspects of
the developmental process. For example, if one regards development as primarily
the growth of more complex political structures, he might examine the hypothesis
which holds that with such a change foreign policy becomes less dependent upon
the idiosyncratic notions of a ruler, becoming at once both more stable and more
dependent upon governmental structures and roles.5 With increased effectiveness
and efficiency in the formation of foreign policy, one might predict less penetra-
tion from the outside as well as more respect for the foreign policy of a state.
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The image of a highly efficient and effective British foreign policy has tended to
bolster the power position of the United Kingdom, a factor that is often added
to explain calculations of British capabilities. Such hypotheses are difficult to test
in the short term since development of this sort involves a very gradual process
of nation-building. With minimal fluctuation, it becomes difficult to ascertain
what features of political development help in explaining the myriad fluctuations
that one finds in foreign policy behavior. Why do states engage in violent con-
flict with each other in one period and not in another? Obviously, external events
provide the basic explanation, but to what extent might internal development be
a contributing factor to conflict?
It has been suggested that democracies with their tolerance for competitive
structures and beliefs in the peaceful settlement of disputes project these notions
to their behavior at the interstate level. The evidence, however, does not support
this contention, for democracies appear to be no more peace-loving in their be-
havior than are their more dictatorial counterparts.6 Rather than accounting for
variance in foreign policy choices, the salience of democracy as a measure of the
relationship between political development and foreign policy would seem to be
more relevant to questions concerning the speed of decision-making and the
ability to obtain internal compliance once a decision is made. Similarity of values
along a democratic dimension seems to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient
reason for alignment, as democracies have frequently aligned with authoritarian
regimes because of power considerations.
Some of the limitations of the above measures of political development ap-
pear to be relatively unresponsive to changes in the short run; thus, it was
decided to concentrate upon political stability and expressions of national unity
as indicators of the level of political development. By using political stability
and national unity as yardsticks of development, one is able to get around the
value-laden notion of what type of political regime is best. This is particularly a
problem for those who use democracy as their major criterion of political de-
velopment. Ascribing primary consideration to political stability as the main
indicator is not to say that all internal conflict is dysfunctional, for some conflict
has been found by Coser, Simmel, and others to integrate and stabilize social
relationships.7 It is not argued that internal political stability ought to be viewed
as the central notion of national development, for even those regimes with a
highly underdeveloped political structure may be highly stable. Nevertheless,
stability is central to the notion of development, for without it development in
all areas will be affected adversely.
The research strategy used in examining the link between external political
instability and foreign policy involved in the first instance a systematic search of
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chronicles of events in order to obtain as complete a picture as possible of inter-
nal Indian and Pakistani politics as well as their efforts at cooperation and con-
flict at the interstate level. The basic sources utilized for this purpose included the
New York Times Index and Deadline Data on World Affairs, supplemented by
such other chronicles as the Annual Register of World Events and Asian Re-
corder. Secondary materials were also useful as a corroborative source of evi-
dence, suggesting again the vital importance of the area specialist in synthesizing
vast amounts of data.
The essential purpose of the exercise was to examine the patterns of internal
and external behavior in Indo-Pakistani relations. Despite the collection of in-
dividual events, no effort is made to sum them into indexes of internal political
instability or external conflict propensities. Such an accounting is too premature
given the nature of information concerning developing regions. First and fore-
most, one must expec~~aps and errors in the reporting of events from these
regions. The severity of riots and demonstrations, for example, is very much
related to whether Pakistan or India is reporting. There is even a determined
effort to quash reporting of riots because of their epidemic tendencies. Reportage
of a communal riot in India induces retaliation in Pakistan as well as spreading
riots throughout India. Foreign reporters are frequently not allowed to go to the
scene of either internal or external turmoil in developing regions, and their con-
tinued tenure in these countries frequently depends upon their willingness to
withhold information that the regime would prefer not to have transmitted.
Editorial policies, competition with 'other events on any given day, and the
limited number of objective foreign reporters also affect the reporting of events.
Given the reservations concerning ·the completeness and authenticity of the
data involved, it is suggested that less powerful statistical techniques should be
utilized. In the study of the developing nations, particularly when analyzing
events, perhaps we can do no better than to establish rough rank orders in
which it is possible to assert that more of variable x appeared in year 1 than in
year 2. Evidence for these evaluations can come both from the chronicles of
events and from assessments of scholars in the field who have been able to
probe more deeply into a particular period and place in time.
Before presenting data concerning the ranking of internal political instability
during the post-independence period in India and Pakistan, it is necessary to
explain more exactly what sorts of data were important in making the evalua-
tions. In essence, it might be argued that the most important measure of internal
instability is that of the perception of the decision-making elite. What is crucial
is whether or not these elites perceive their power position as being threatened.
Subjective information of this sort is extremely difficult to obtain. Indeed, a
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content analysis of pronouncements of the ruling elite may do little to enlighten
us on this score, for it is quite probable that at the very times in which the elite
feels most insecure, it will publicly state that it has considerable support and
that there is little danger of internal decay. If one were to develop a perceptual
measure based upon content analysis, such a measure may have to be related to
the propensity' to make strong statements concerning the degree of stability
which a given elite argues that it enjoys.
Given the very serious problems of measuring the perceptions, researchers
often retreat to more objective indicators of political instability. Most obvious
among these are violent changes of government through revolution and coup.
Political instability is also indicated by the frequency of governmental crises
and changes of government. Next in importance might be indicators of internal
turmoil and displeasure directed toward the governing elite in the form of riots
and demonstrations. Indirectly, one might even argue that indicators of severe
economic instability tend to correspond with periods of political instability. If
polling techniques tapping public support of governmental regimes were more
sophisticated and employed more frequently in the developing areas, one might
obtain additional evidence for ranking the degree of instability, but unfortunately
reliable polls are not available since polling is in its infancy in this area. Another
piece of information that might affect elite perceptions of stability is the matter
of holding elections. Even though loss of power may not be contemplated, the
ruling elite desires to maximize its power by obtaining as many seats' as possible
for. its given party or political faction. As a result, foreign policy issues fre-
quently assume renewed importance during election years. Conflict patterns
with other states also serve an educational function in behalf of national identity.
In probing for the above sorts of indicators, rough rankings can be given to
the twenty years since independence in terms of relative instability. Although
certain years have obviously experienced greater instability than other years, it
would be difficult to rank each of the years precisely, given the inadequacy of
the data. The difficulties involved are reduced, and, it is hoped, the accuracy of
the estimate increased, if one ranks the years in terms of quartiles rather than on
an individual rank order. An attempt at such a ranking for India and Pakistan is
found in Tables 1 and 2. In interpreting the tables, it is important to note that
these are based only upon relative instability and are therefore noncomparable
for India and Pakistan. On the whole, India has been the much more stable state
politically.
The following discussion is designed to give the reader an impression of why
certain years were ranked in the various quartiles. Only the key events and
evaluations are included.
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In India, the years 1947 and 1948 would have to be included among the most
unstable politically. The new government was seeking to build support for the
symbols of the nation-state, confronted as it was with mass migration and the
spilling of blood following partition. The year 1948, in particular, showed great
instability with Gandhi's assassination and a similar plot to kill Nehru. The year
marked the beginning of a communist-led revolt in Hyderabad and was also a
time of considerable economic difficulty throughout India. The period 1964
through 1966 must also be included in the (irst quartile, for it was a period of
extensive change in the top leadership. Nehru died in May 1964, creating the
problem of a search for a successor. Two months later demonstrations against
the Congress party were initiated in a number of the larger Indian towns, fol-
lowed by continuing nationwide demonstrations over what has been labeled the
most serious food crisis since independence.8 The following year saw minimal
improvement in the food situation. Prime Minister Shastri's position was per-
haps a little more secure, but the general trend toward decentralization of power
into the hands of regional interests continued. A serious internal crisis arose in
Jammu and Kashmir, parts of which had been incorporated into India. The year
1966 was likewise a year of considerable instability as Mrs. Indira Gandhi suc-
·ceeded Shastri following the latter's death in January. The new prime minister
was greeted with a censure motion in February and an extensive series of leftist-
inspired strikes and demonstrations in such places as Kerala, Calcutta, and
Bombay.
Among the least stable years in India in the second quartile is 1963, during
which the increasing power of regional interest~, at the expense of the central
government, inspired the enactment of an antisecession act. Events during the
year led one author to assert that Nehru's political position was weaker than it
had been in previous years.9 Also included are 1950 and 1958, years in which
Nehru threatened to resign. In 1950 his popularity had been reduced to what at
that time was considered a new low,lo and in 1958 Nehru had been concerned
about what he believed to be a deterioration of support within the Parliament.
The outcries of opposition to any consideration of resignation suggest that his
position was not excessively unstable.
One mig~t also expect a lessening of a sense of security on the part of elites
during election years, particularly if there is a threat of decreasing support.
Thus, the second and third national elections in 1957 and 1962, respectively,
were central to the decision to place these years in the second quartile. Concern
about the outcome of the elections was perhaps well founded, for in 1957 a
communist victory was achieved in the state of Kerala. The third national
elections resulted in a new polarization of Left and Right, which made Nehru's
position more precarious.
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Turning to the third quartile in Table I, it should be noted that most of the
years were included because of extensive political demonstrations and riots. This
was true of events in 1949, particularly around Calcutta where the Congress
party was defeated. A critical food shortage was reported in 1951, and the
following year saw the first general elections during which the Congress party
fared better than was the case in subsequent elections. The years 1956 and 1960
were also include~ in this quartile because of the frequency of politically moti-
vated riots which were among the worst since independence. Yet, the stability of
a political system is not only a function of the frequency of rioting, for, if this
were the case, recent developments could be said to reveal the United States as
one of the least stable states in the world. In the absence of other more extreme
indicators, however, riots do provide some basis for ranking stability. The sharp
increase of rioting in 1956 is well documented by data from the Dimensionality
of Nations project, in which only two riots were coded for India in 1955, as
contrasted with twenty-nine riots in 1956, and only eight in 1957.11 An exten-
sive series of riots in 1960 led Nehru to label the events as the most "ghastly and
deplorable happenings in India in the past fifteen years." 12
The years represented in the fourth quartile were placed there because data
suggesting instability were minimal or lacking. Such was particularly the case
with the years 1953 and 1954. During 1955 there were intensified pressures for
an independent Sikh state, but these events appeared to have had minimal
impact upon the central government. The years 1959 and 1961 saw some local
disturbances, but these developments were minor when compared to other years.
Nehru apparently felt strong enough politically to take over the communist-
controlled Kerala government in 1959.
Turning to the assessments of the relative political instability in Pakistan as
shown in Table 2, more persuasive evidence of frequent political instability may
be found. As a result, evaluations can be based to a greater extent upon crucial
indicators of instability such as coups, cabinet instability, political arrests, and
the like.. This is all to the good, since the minor events in Pakistan are not as
fully reported as in India; there are greater restrictions on the press in Pakistan
and, moreover, Pakistan is smaller in population and has less impact in world
affairs, a. fact that is clearly reflected in the coverage of the world press.
The obvious starting point for inclusion in the first quartile is the year 1958,
during which the deputy speaker in East Pakistan was killed, politJcal upsets
occurred in both provincial capitals, and dissident tribal chieftains declared their
independence from Pakistan. Following those turbulent first nine months, Ayub
Khan took over the reins of government and martial law was declared. As a new
state, Pakistan was also confronted with problems of obtaining popular support
following partition. In 1948 there was both a ministerial and a food crisis.
INTERSTATE CONFLICT 197
Refugees from India were forming an aggrieved political bloc, and Mohammad
Ali Jinnah, who was instrumental in bringing Pakistan to independence, died
during that year. The year 1951 was included in the first quartile, for it marked
the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali as well as the discovery of an
abortive communist coup. A state of emergency, the dissolution of the Con-
stituent Assembly, extensive rioting, balance-of-payments problems, and state-
ments to the effect that East Pakistan wished to become an independent state
combined to make the year 1954 a turbulent one worthy of inclusion in the first
quartile.
The common feature of the years included in the second quartile is that of
parliamentary crises either at the national or provincial level. In 1949 parlia-
mentary government was suspended in West Punjab, and in 1953 Pakistan's
prime minister was dismissed amid problems of civil violence in the Punjab and
riots in Lahore. Accusations of plots directed against the government were also
prominent. The years 1955-1957 witnessed the resignation of four prime minis-
ters. In 1956 a parliamentary crisis arose in East Pakistan and during the
following year the constitution was suspended in West Pakistan.
The third and fourth quartiles primarily include years in which Ayub Khan
controlled the government of Pakistan. Even so, all was not calm. The frequency
of political arrests, particularly in 1962 and 1966, suggests a sense of insecurity
on the part of the elite. There were major riots and demonstrations against the
policies of President Ayub during 1962 and 1964. In 1965 Ayub asserted that
external dangers did not concern him so much as internal ones.13 A general strike
demanding East Pakistani autonomy during the following year apparently went
to such lengths that the President declared the government ready to accept the
consequences of civil war if necessary.14 The year 1952 was included in the third
quartile because of some fairly serious economic problems created by food
shortages and price hikes three times the normal rate.
The final quartile involved relatively minor incidents of instability, at least
in terms of the Pakistani experience. During 1950 small riots occurred, but
problems for Liaquat Ali's government seemed minimal in contrast to other
years. Ayub Khan appeared to be in firm control of the government in 1959
during which time he initiated an austerity program. Events during the early
sixties involving occasional arrests of political opponents suggested that perhaps
all was not well with the Pakistani government. Nevertheless, the degree of
stability achieved provided a sharp contrast with earlier events in Pakistan.
Problems of data gaps as well as inaccuracies also plague attempts to quantify
interstate relations but perhaps to a less significant degree than in the case of
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internal events, for by definition interstate relations affect other states, making
it more difficult to hide external conflict behavior.
Just as there is a hierarchy of importance among various behaviors repre-
senting internal political instability, external aggressive moves may be ranked
ranging from the extreme of war to protests and demonstrations directed against
a foreign regime. Along this continuum are such events as border skirmishes,
economic and political sanctions, and threats. Using techniques similar to those
employed above, quartiles of aggressive interstate behavior were established for
India and Pakistan, as shown in Table 3.
Instead of providing separate aggressive measure for India and Pakistan, a
single estimate was assigned to indicate the relative rank of the interstate con-
flict. This procedure evades the problem of attempting to assess blame for
external aggressiveness, a move that was felt to be most desirable in view of the
charges and countercharges and differing interpretations of events.
In assessing the level of interstate conflict behavior, all major conflict issues
between the two states have been examined, including the Kashmir conflict, the
Indus River conflict, and the evacuee problem as well as disputes along the
Indo-Pakistani border.
The first quartile consists primarily of years in which open hostilities and
violence occurred between the two states. Violence, mass emigrations, and the
Kashmir war arising soon after partition make 1947 and 1948 the bloodiest years
in Indo-Pakistani relations. The year of 1956 was likewise a year of considerable
violence along the border, and relations were strained to the breaking point as
Kashmir was made an integral part of India. Prime Minister Nehru also an-
nounced that U.s. aid had completely changed the Kashmir situation and India
would no longer allow a plebiscite.15 Further strains were placed upon relations
between the two states in 1964-1965 following a detente between China and
Pakistan. Open fighting occurred in Kashmir, and deaths numbered in the
hundreds. Fighting between Indian and Pakistani forces in the Rann of Kutch
area was clearly the most violent encounter since 1948.
Although the level of violence was perhaps lower during the years repre-
sented by the second quartile, animosity and conflict remained at a high level.
Although a cease-fire was achieved in January 1949, there were reports of
continued violations. Josef Korbel, who served on the U.N. investigation team in
Kashmir, noted that, although there were several hundred reports of violations
in the armistice, these reports proved with but few exceptions to be "unfounded
or of a civilian, non-military nature." 16 Relations deteriorated during the year
as the two engaged in a bitter economic war involving an official cessation of
trade. Pakistani officials also complained on several occasions that India had
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shut off canal water which was essential to the continued existence of Pakistan.
The year 1951 was included not so much because of border violence but rather
because of a growing concentration of the Indian army near Kashmir. Korbel
argued that during the summer of 1951 India and Pakistan reached the very
brink of all-out war.17 The year 1955 was reported to have marked the first
serious breach of the 1949 Kashmir cease-fire agreement. Some 15,000 Pakistani
volunteers threatened to march across the Kashmiri cease-fire line, and demon-
strations were held in Pakistan calling for a "holy war" with India. The years
1962 and 1963 showed a further deterioration in relations, partially prompted
by increased cooperation between Red China and Pakistan prior to Red China's
invasion of territories held by India. During the course of 1962 several border
clashes between Indian and Pakistani troops were reported as well as troop
movements. In June of that year the first Security Council debates in four years
were held on the Kashmir issue. The severity of relations in 1963 is suggested by
one assessment which called the year the lowest ebb in Indian-Pakistani rela-
tions since partition.18 This view is corroborated by a content analysis of Dawn,
a semiofficial newspaper in Pakistan, in which it was found that during 1963 a
record of 307 daily issues carried at least one front-page item connoting Indian
aggressive designs. This figure averaged twice the level of the early days of
martiallaw.19
The third quartile includes the years 1952 and 1958, which witnessed various
border clashes. Pakistan, for example, in 1952 accused India of 594 breaches of
the cease-fire pact.20 Clashes in 1958 were centered primarily on the border
between India and East Pakistan. Most serious perhaps was the Pakistani accu-
sation that India had cut off Pakistan's water supply, damaging- more than two
million acres of crops. These two years were not assigned to the higher quartile,
for there were moments of hope. In 1952 the two states signed a pact fixing
the boundary between East and West Bengal and also signed a one-year trade
agreement. A Prime Minister's Conference in 1958 settled most of the outstand-
ing issues with respect to both the eastern and western frontier regions.21
Relations between India and Pakistan were somewhat exacerbated by the
U.S.-Pakistani alliance of 1954. The Security Council was again asked by
Pakistan to settle the dispute between India and Pakistan, but there was little
evidence of violence. When Jammu and Kashmir formally became part of India
in 1957, relations between India and Pakistan took a turn for the worse. Indian
threats of cutting all supplies of canal waters by 1962 did little to inspire trust,
nor did the creation of a new Pakistani political party designed to "liberate"
Kashmir help matters. The year 1961 was included in the third quartile primarily
because of the magnitude of the threats issued on each side. Nehru labeled Ayub
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Khan a "warmonger" and was reported strengthening Indian forces on the
Kashmir border.22
Events during the years included in the fourth quartile proved to be some-
what milder, and some success was achieved in settling certain basic differences.
Chief among the agreements was that reached at Tashkent in January 1966,
which brought with it a cessation of hostilities and normalization of relations
between India and Pakistan. According to the Tashkent agreement, the issue of
Kashmir was to be shelved until more crucial matters were settled.23 Consensus
was reached in April 1950 on the protection of religious minorities and on the
restoration of trade. In 1953 another trade agreement removing discriminatory
pricing was reached, and the two states were reported near agreement on a parti-
tion plan for Kashmir-a plan which appears to have been stifled by the
U.S.-Pakistani alliance.24 Also included in the fourth quartile are the years 1959
and 1960, when Ayub Khan demonstrated considerable moderation on the issue
of Indo-Pakistani relations. During 1959 a one-year agreement was reached on
the Indus River, a trade treaty was signed, consensus was obtained on four out
of five disputed areas on the western borders, and security regulations were
established to prevent clashes between border units. During 1960 a preliminary
agreement was reached on financial problems dating from pre-independence,
and further delineation of the western borders was achieved. Finally, the Indus
River treaty was signed, ending twelve years of conflict over the issue.
Having examined the relative degree of internal political instability and interstate
conflict in Indo-Pakistani relations, we can now study the relationship between
these variables. Table 4 summarizes the quartile rankings established for internal
instability in Pakistan and India as well as rankings for degree of interstate
conflict.
With the data in Table 4 it is possible to shed some light on the proposition
found so frequently in writings on South Asia to the effect that both India and
Pakistan have utilized their external differences to divert attention from internal
problems.25 If the proposition were an accurate description, a high ranking on
internal instability might be expected to show a similarly high ranking on
interstate conflict and vice versa. Such, of course, assumes that the interstate
conflict was not so overpowering that it considerably bolstered internal cohesion.
Certain internal differences, for example, were forgotten in India in late 1962,
given the preoccupation with the invasion of Indian territories by Communist
China.
The quartile rankings suggest a number of instances where high instability
in one or the other of the two states 26 was correlated with high interstate con-
INTERSTATE CONFLICT 201
flict. This was particularly true of the years 1947 and 1948, during which time it
was difficult to separate the internal situation from the external one because of
the extensive interstate mobility and bloodshed involving Moslems and Hindus
following independence. Similar first-quartile rankings were found in 1964 and
1965. On the other hand, low rankings on both indicators were involved in the
period 1959 through 1961. A simple Chi-square test suggests, however, that the
relationship is not statistically significant. There are several reasons why this
may be the case. In the first place, if the internal situation is too unstable, the
natural reaction might be one of preoccupation with internal problems rather
than attempts to divert one's internal instability with foreign adventurism.
Engaging in conflict with foreign states always raises the risk that the already
weak social and political fabric might collapse under pressure. If one were to
rate the least stable years as far as Pakistan is concerned, 1954 and 1958 would
have to be included. Although India on the whole has been much more stable
than Pakistan, the one year that stands out in terms of uncertainty in the
stability of the governing elite is 1966, a year that ranked in the fourth quartile
in interstate conflict. Thus, very high instability in either the internal or external
environment may tend to disrupt the positive link between internal instability
and interstate conflict.
A second intervening factor which might tend to undermine the strength of
the relationship is that of inputs from the international environment. Hostility is
often simply a reaction to hostile Il)oves by other states, having little or no
relation to internal conditions. Furthermore, other actors in the international
system such as China, the United States, the Soviet Union, and even the United
Nations have also had some influence upon the course of events. Pressures from
outside powers may serve to ameliorate conflict as shown by U.N. cease-fire
resolutions and the good offices of the Soviet Union at Tashkent in 1966. Military
alignment and support from the outside might also serve to exacerbate relations
between India and Pakistan as the U.S.-Pakistani alliance did. Yet, since align-
ment with the outside world has been considerably more stable than have fluc-
tuations in conflict behavior, one must examine other factors to explain the basis
of the Indian and Pakistani conflict.
Finally, the lack of correlation between internal instability and interstate
conflict may merely illustrate that external conflict is an effective integrator of
national society. In this instance, one is getting into the very difficult issue of
causal relationships. Since the rankings for the two variables were based upon a
large series of events, which fluctuated widely in a given year, it is virtually
impossible to provide conclusive evidence of a causal sort. Nor was the predictive
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capability of the hypothesis improved by lagging interstate conflict a year behind
internal instability.
Further evidence suggesting that perhaps the internal political situation has
some relationship to interstate conflict patterns can be found in terms of state
reaction to negotiation and compromise. Internal political instability in itself
may make negotiation more difficult, thus failing to moderate conflict patterns.
It is~ almost taken as a truism that states do not favor negotiations just prior to
the conduct of an election unless such negotiations are absolutely essential or a
quick diplomatic victory is anticipated. There is always the threat of a long
series of negotiations during which time rumors of appeasement can be circu-
lated. Furthermore, compromise is difficult when the state is politically unstable.
One student of the subject has suggested that since Ayub Khan's and Pandit
Nehru's political positions grew weaker in their respective countries in 1963,
concessions could hardly be expected during a set of negotiations forced upon
them by pressures from the United States and the United Kingdom.27 Indeed,
the years of greatest progress in settling Indian and Pakistani differences tended
to be those in which internal political instability was scored lowest. Among these
years would be 1950, during which an agreement was reached ending a complete
deadlock on trade and another providing for the protection of religious minori-
ties. The period 1959 through 1961 was perhaps the most notable of all, for
during these years agreement was reached on trade differences, the delineation
of the western borders, funds left by refugees, the prepartition public debt, the
use of the Indus River, and security regulations to prevent clashes between
border units.
The problems of controlling for other variables when using a single case
study make it difficult to assess just how important the internal political situation
is as a determinant of foreign policy. Nevertheless, our examination of internal
and external conflict patterns in South Asia allow us to suggest certain conditions
under which internal political instability is more likely to induce foreign
adventurism.
The utility of diversionary tactics for enhancing national unity is dependent
first of all upon the nature of existing loyalties within a state. External agressive-
ness may serve only to split further a weak political and social fabric. Such is
certainly a problem in South Asia with the large minority religious and linguistic
groups in each state. In view of the heterogeneous nature of the populations in
these states, internal conflict of a communal sort between Hindu and Moslem is
highly associated with the level of conflict in Indian-Pakistani relations. It is
perhaps not by accident that the most significant Hindu-Moslem communal
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riots occurred in the years corresponding to the greatest conflict between
Pakistan and India. The years 1947 and 1948 witnessed virtually a blood bath
of communal violence, and 1964 was reported to have been the J;ll.ost serious
Hindu-Moslem crisis since independence. All three years were placed in the first
quartile of interstate conflict.
Further evidence of the relationship between internal political instability and
interstate conflict is suggested by the wave of communal rioting that erupted in
September 1965 after Pakistan sent in regular troops to back Azad Kashmir
(that portion of Kashmir supporting Pakistan) in its conflict with India.
A precise correlation between communal violence and interstate conflict is
impossible, given the fabrication and withholding of information by the Indian
and Pakistani governments. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that this aspect
of internal instability probably represents the highest correlation with interstate
conflict. Indeed, when parts of a population identify to a certain degree with a
foreign belligerent, the line between the internal and the external becomes
exceedingly blurred. Minority groups during periods of conflict tend to be viewed
as fifth columns. Still unanswered is whether internal communal conflict induces
external conflict or the reverse. Perhaps these two are inseparable as each feeds
upon the other.
The close relationship between communal violence and interstate conflict
would appear to create real incentives for a government to minimize interstate
conflict for the sake of domestic tranquillity, but this may not be that simple to
accomplish. As in the case of India and Pakistan, the governments of both states
have been accused of taking a soft position on the issue of the Indo-Pakistani
conflict. For example, the Tashkent agreement of 1966 brought protests from
groups in both states.
The utility of interstate conflict for overcoming internal problems is depend-
ent upon whether the external conflict is salient for all important segments of
the population. The Kashmir conflict, for example, has had limited utility in
uniting East and West Pakistan, for the former simply has not been as concerned
about the issue as has West Pakistan, which borders on the disputed territory.
If a conflict is to be completely unifying, it must be perceived as a threat of all
units of a state. If such is not the case, the conflict may be disintegrative; some
groups may see the attention being given to a situation as excessive, leading to
the neglect of internal problems they see as having greater importance. The
charges leveled against the United States, that it is neglecting the Negro while
concentrating upon the war in Vietnam, is a case in point.
Whether or not a government will seek to take advantage of external conflicts
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to produce internal unity and stability will also depend upon whether it can
minimize internal turmoil by dealing directly with the economic and social
problems creating the turmoil or whether it feels it has to take advantage of the
short-run advantages of interstate conflict. In view of the slow rate of economic
progress and the high internal political instability in Pakistan during the 1950's,
it has been argued _that Pakistan had the greater need for utilizing external
conflict to hold together "a spiritless body politic." 28 The relative position of
India and Pakistan in terms of economic growth has now reversed itself in the
1960's, with the Indian economy showing acertain sluggishness and that of
Pakistan demonstrating an average annual increase of GNP of 5.5 percent be-
tween 1960 and 1965.29 The slow economic progress, coupled with the growing
strength of regionalism in India, may create increased incentives for the elite to
attempt to gain short-term advantages by emphasis upon foreign diversion.
Slow economic progress might affect Indian attitudes toward Pakistan and
Kashmir in yet another way. It has been suggested that during periods of severe
economic crisis the' Indian people are more likely to turn to right-wing religious
parties than toward the Communists.30 With increased power in the hands of
religious conservatives, negotiation with Pakistan becomes more problematical
and pressures toward increased conflict are created.
The above by no means exhausts the many links between national political
development and interstate conflict between India and Pakistan. For example,
one might raise questions concerning the effect of political maturation upon
interstate conflict. Will succeeding generations not involved in the bloody
independence movement be less volatile than current elites who jealously guard
each small parcel of land? What effect will India's efforts and possible successes
toward secularization have upon Indian and Pakistani relations? Daily develop-
ments in the political field continue to have an impact, but our interest has been
directed primarily toward the effects of internal political stability and national
unity upon conflict behavior in South Asia.
Evidence has been collected suggesting that at best there is only a weak
relationship between internal instability and Indo-Pakistani conflict behavior.
The relationship between internal and external conflict is perhaps most pro-
nounced in the case of communal rioting, which tends to blur the division
between the two environments. The utility of interstate conflict for diversionary
purposes is dependent upon whether or not the external threat can unify the
population as a whole or whether it merely integrates the majority, while
widening the breach with the minority. The utilization of interstate conflict for
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diversionary purposes will also depend upon the level of economic progress and
whether or not an elite feels it necessary to take advantage of the short-term
unifying capabilities of external conflic~.
A secondary purpose of this research has been to suggest a systematic way of
looking at the relationship between internal and external events, minimizing as
much as possible the distorting effects of data of dubious validity, which is
particularly a problem in this area of the world because of the incompleteness
and not infrequent falsification of news reporting. The attempt has been to
combine the rigor of quantification with the more subjective evaluation of the
expert as found in a perusal of the secondary literature on the subject.
More case studies of this sort, however, would be necessary to determine
the exact relationship between internal political instability and interstate conflict.
Sometimes there seems to be a relationship and sometimes not. The goal ought
to be one of ascertaining the specific conditions under which political elites are
more likely to favor short-run foreign adventurism over the long-term internal
development in their quest for political stability.
TABLE ONE
RELATIVE INTERNAL POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN INDIA
SINCE INDEPENDENCE
First Second Third Fourth
Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile
1947 1950 1949 1953
1948 1957 1951 1954
1964 1958 1952 1955
1965 1962 1956 1959
1966 1963 1960 1961
TABLE TWO
RELATIVE INTERNAL POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN PAKISTAN
SINCE INDEPENDENCE
First Second Third Fourth
Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile
1947 1949 1952 1950
1948 1953 1962 1959
1951 1955 1964 1960
1954 1956 1965 1961
1958 1957 1966 1963
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TABLE THREE
INTERSTATE CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
First Second Third Fourth
Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile
1947 1949 1952 1950
1948 1951 1954 1953
1956 1955 1957 1959
1964 1962 1958 1960
1965 1963 1961 1966
TABLE FOUR
QUARTILE RANKINGS ON INTERNAL INSTABILITY
AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT
Internal Internal
Instability Interstate Instability Interstate
Year India Pakistan Conflict Year India Pakistan Conflict
1947 1 1 1 1957 2 2 3
1948 1 1 1 1958 2 1 3
1949 3 2 2 1959 4 4 4
1950 2 4 4 1960 3 4 4
1951 3 1 2 1961 4 4 3
1952 3 3 3 1962 2 3 2
1953 4 2 3 1963 2 4 2
1954 4 1 4 1964 1 3 1
1955 4 2 2 1965 1 3 1
1956 3 2 1 1966 1 3 4
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CHAPTER SEVEN
AMERICAN INFLUENCE
IN DEVELOPED
& UNDERDEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
RUPERT EMERSON
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k BE A GREAT POWER, and even more a super power, is to be concerned
with what goes on in every corner of the globe. To be concerned is to seek to
influence the turn of events wherever possible in order to secure a favorable
outcome, or at least to forestall an unfavorable one. With the shrinking of time
and space for both peaceful and belligerent purposes in the contemporary world
and with the transition to independence of almost all the colonial territories, the
interest of the super powers more literally embraces every corner of the globe
than was feasible at any previous time, even though the potential addition to
their strength which the multitude of lesser states might bring is in almost every
instance of minimal significance.
The United States has accepted the necessity of dealing with a greater or less
degree of intimacy with all the countries of the world; or, as its hostile critics
would phrase it, it has reached out imperialistically, or perhaps neocolonially, to
impose itself on as much of the world as it can lay hands on. Whatever version
may be accepted, the United States finds itself involved in the affairs of a large
number of countries and peoples at all levels of development from the most
advanced to the most backward. In these circumstances it becomes a matter of
consequence to explore the opportunities and limitations which stem from the
level of development of the countries that the United States seeks to influence.
A first necessity is to secure some measure of agreement as to the countries
which, for the purposes of this paper, the United States seeks to influence. A
plausible answer in view of America's global role as a super power would be to
say that the United States seeks to influence all countries without exception. In
a sense this is undoubtedly a valid approach, but for the present purpose I
suggest that we eliminate from consideration those states that must be con-
sidered implacably hostile to the United States, where "influence" ceases to have
any appreciable element of friendly persuasion and cannot in any ordinary
course of events be carried on within the framework of the more familiar
channels of diplomacy and interstate relations. To put the matter in the bluntest
terms, those countries that regard the United States as the enemy and are
usually so regarded in return, are here held to fall outside any generally accepta-
ble use of the term "influence." Pointing a gun or a nuclear bomb may be one
way of exerting influence, but it is not the way that is contemplated here.
Even where guns or bombs are not immediately involved, the range of
influence is sharply limited where the rulers of a country assume a basic incom-
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patibility between their view of the world and that of the United States and
seek, wherever possiple, to close their doors to any penetration of American
influence. Thus, to take two cases at one extreme end of the spectrum, the
influence which the United States exerted on North VIetnam through devastating
the country by continuous bombing is not considered here, nor are the embit-
tered exchanges with China. In both instances, and other similar ones, there are
undoubtedly also behind-the-scenes fragments of a more normal intercourse, but
they are slight and currently sadly inconsequential. Other reasonably clear cases
would be the relationship, or lack of it, between the United States and Castro's
Cuba, Albania, North Korea, or East Germany. Obviously, a number of border-
line cases can be brought in to complicate the issues, including even the Soviet
Union itself, insofar as Moscow and Washington have accepted a kind of
reciprocal relationship in which the possibility of discovering some common
purposes is not excluded and an advance for one is not inevitably regarded as a
defeat for the other. A case more nearly approaching the midpoint between the
usual amicable or indifferent intercourse between states and the assumption of
fundamental cleavage between them appears in the relations between the United
States and Yugoslavia.
One other situation that is excluded from consideration here, although some
mention is made of it later in another connection, is the colonial relationship. A
country that possesses colonies has, by definition, the right to exercise its
sovereign authority over them, so long as the colonial relationship exists. How-
ever much it may in fact rely upon influence (in the sense of persuasion of one
sort or another) to accomplish its purposes, the ruling power has the right to
command when it chooses to exercise it. Thus, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and
American Samoa are directly under American colonial jurisdiction; Okinawa
appears to be effectively no less so despite its more uncertain legal status; and in
the Trust Territory of the Pacific, the United States exercises a somewhat more
limited colonial control. Legally it may be that Puerto Rico lingers as a territory
wholly subject to American sovereignty, but the compact creating the Common-
wealth established a unique kind of relationship which the American Congress
would be highly unlikely to override unilaterally.
Lastly, no attempt is made to deal with the vast topic of the kind of influence
the United States exerts in the world by its mere existence and the extent of its
wealth and power. Whether it acts or does not act, whether it intends to
influence or to stand aside, the United States is inescapably a major factor in the
world's affairs, affecting both the developed and the underdeveloped alike. This
paper is confined essentially to conscious and deliberate efforts on the part of the
212 RUPERT EMERSON
United States to influence other countries, although this does not, of course, in
any way imply that the results achieved were those intended.
The first proposition I would advance concerns the primacy of politics. The basic
political posture of countries, which in large measure determines the kind of
outside influences they are prepared to tolerate, is determined by political and
ideological considerations in which their level of development appears to play no
role. Thus, without any change in level of development a coup or governmental
overturn may reverse the political alignment of a country; influences to which it
was formerly open may be ended or curtailed and another source or sources of
influence may be substituted. No doubt it is also true, although it is more difficult
to find concrete examples, that changes in level of development can take place
which have no major bearing on political alignments or readiness to accept the
intrusion of influence from outside sources.
Illustrations of this general proposition abound. Three of particular concern
to the United States and representing different levels of development may be
cited. Cuba was closely bound to the United States and wide open to American
influence and capital until Castro took over. At the outset certainly no change in
level of development was involved, and as the new regime progressed, the
deterioration of the Cuban economy would, under other circumstances, have led
to closer ties to the United States, but the ideological and political orientation of
Castro and American hostility to him led to his opening the doors to the
communist camp.
Because of its magnitude and the shock it gave Americans, the most striking
case is that of China, which had been regarded as a grateful protege and firm
friend of the United States until Mao Tse-tung took command of all mainland
China and denounced America as the leader of imperialist exploitation and
oppression. As in the Cuban case, what had changed was not China's level of
development but the fundamental political outlook of its rulers.
The third example, moving toward the t<?p of the scale of development, is
that of France. In the later phases of World War II, in the Marshall Plan, and in
the common framework of NATO, France was closely linked to the United
States. Since his return to power, Charles de Gaulle has moved France further
and further away from the American orbit and has taken a number of steps to
curtail the extent of American influence, including barring Britain from the
Common Market in part because of her too close association with the United
States.
If a fourth and lesser example, taken from close to the bottom of the de-
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velopment scale, is desired, it might be that of Congo (Brazzaville), where the
amicable if casual relations with the United States were reversed when Fulbert
Youlou was overthrown and his successors moved to the left, leading to with-
drawal of the American diplomatic mission in 1965 after several unpleasant
incidents.
These all happen to be examples of reversals of posture that told against the
United States. Two that worked in the other direction are the coup which left
Kwane Nkrumah in exile from Ghana while the government was taken over by
military and police leaders friendly to the United States and the West in general,
and the long-drawn-out process by which Sukarno was eased from power in
Indonesia, again being replaced largely by the military who wanted no part of
his ties to China and to the Indonesian Communist party. In neither instance
was there any overt shift to alignment with the United States, but in both cases
denunciations of the United States came to an end and doors that were being
closed were opened again.
In the contemporary scene it can usually be taken for granted that the
coming to power of a left-wing regime will bring with it efforts to curb the
influence of the United States, regarded by the left as the ringleader of the
capitalist-imperialist forces. The overthrow.of such. a regime has the reverse
effect of restoring the United States to grace, although it is by no means neces-
sarily the case that only left-wing regimes are hostile to the United States.
It is perhaps also in order to suggest that particularly in the less developed
countries the determination of the basic political alignment of a country is likely
to be the work of the few at the top or of the single leader, in whose hands
effective governmental decision-making rests. The reversal of that determination
through a coup or a revolution is likely to be carried out by an equally tiny
segment of the society with equally little in the way of positive popular approval
or disapproval other than passive acquiescence, even though the new regime, like
the old, can produce popular demonstrations in its support. Such regimes, lacking
any broad base, are obviously unstable and their hold on power is precarious.
Most frequently a change in alignment, with the consequent shift in the outside
influences to which a government is prepared to give access, follows the over-
turn of the established government, as in Ghana or Cuba, but it may also be the
result of other circumstances, as, for example, in the turning away of Pakistan
from the United States when the Chinese attack brought forth a flow of
American arms and aid to India.
What lies behind such reversals of basic political alignment is usually
difficult to determine and seems in many instances to represent little, if anything,
more than one ruling potentate or oligarchy's replacing another, be it military or
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civilian. We live in an age that appears to breed regimes headed by single leaders,
who are often unduly flattered by outsiders as being endowed with charisma, but
who vanish from power leaving few who mourn their disappearance. Almost
invariably they and their followers are charged both with failure to achieve
development and with corruption, nepotism, and similar sins. Particularly where
the military take over, there is likely to be a public demonstration of disgust with
politic& and politicians, regarded as self-serving and incompetent.
The elimination from consideration of countries that deliberately exclude Ameri-
can influence makes it possible to undertake a more meaningful examination of
the question as to whether American influence prospers best in developed or in
underdeveloped countries.
It would be idle to expect a single answer to satisfy the intricacies of such
a question, both because the many states with which the United States is dealing
differ strikingly among themselves and because the results the United States
seeks and the methods it employs in pursuit of them vary greatly. Certain
characteristic differences distinguish the developed from the underdeveloped
countries, but even within each category what evokes a friendly response from
one may antagonize another. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that, particu-
larly in connection with more overtly political matters, the extent to which
American influence can make itself felt is determined far less by degree of de-
velopment than by political attachments and attitudes; Le., a neutralist 'country
benevolent to the East can be presumed to be less receptive to American
influence than one benevolent to the West. As a crude example, one South
Vietnamese may see American intervention as salvation, while another, adhering
to the. Viet Cong, regards it as imperialist oppression. The primacy of politics
again makes itself evident.
The various kinds of influence the United States seeks to exert in the world
can be broken down in a number of ways, but they overlap and criss-cross each
other in such fashion as to guarantee that no scheme of classification can be
regarded as wholly satisfactory. This is particularly true if one attempts to come
at the problem through an analysis of the purposes of American efforts to
influence other countries. The motivations of American policy are likely to be
both multiple and obscure, subject to radically different interpretations. If
foreign aid programs, both economic and military, may be taken as both sig-
nificant expressions of American policy and important channels of influence, the
dilemmas involved in assessing the motives that lie behind them are immediately
evident.1 (The situation is, of course, complicated by the fact that aid programs
serve different purposes in different times and places, and the different phases of
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an aid program even within a single country may serve different purposes.)
Where the hostile interpreter can portray them as a means of moving toward
world domination by corrupting governments and factions and establishing
neocolonial supremacy over satellites, the friendly witness will see them as
serving the long-term interests at once of the United States and the rest of the
free world by aiding in the development of stable, democratic, economically
advancing countries, whose independence is safeguarded. American backers of
such programs can defend them in such various and conflicting ways as that they
are essentially indispensable instruments in the Cold War, that they are wise
and prudent methods of dealing with the problems of the underdeveloped coun-
tries, which also promise to provide fruitful fields for American trade and invest-
ment, or that they represent generous recognition by the United States that the
internationally underprivileged should share in the wealth of the affluent and be
assisted in rising to take their own place in the modern world. These and a
number of other variant defenses have been regularly put forward by the
administration, in Congress, and elsewhere. The assumption is indeed plausible
that all of them play some role in shaping American policy and in winning
support for foreign assistance. The frequently heard plea that it is necessary to
devise some single and logically consistent motivation for the aid programs
ignores the diversity of views which enter significantly into the shaping of
American foreign policy.
The assumption of a diversity of purpose, however, makes it more difficult to
assess the relative success or failure of American influence abroad. What is the
yardstick for measurement: the vehemence and reliability of the anticommunism
that is achieved, the establishment and maintenance of stable democratic gov-
ernment, or the extent of the climb up the ladder of economic development? In
any country the answers to these three questions may give very different results.
Given the primacy of Cold War considerations for so many aspects of
American policy, it is almost inescapable to take as the overall goal in the
political realm the desire to influence countries to collaborate with and accept the
lead of the United States in the global struggle against the oft-depicted dangers
of communist imperialism. If countries cannot be forced to climb on the anti-
communist bandwagon, it is at least desired to keep them safely out of the
enemy camp-a matter that becomes increasingly complex as the communist
world breaks up within itself and loses its monolithic unity.
Whether or not one can buy friends remains a debated issue. There is, I am
inclined to suggest, verbal agreement that it cannot be done and that it has some
tinge of immorality about it, but it would also appear to be an operative belief
that foreign assistance programs in fact have the buying of friends as one of
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their major purposes. To use a somewhat more neutral term, if they fail to
"make" friends, it is generally felt that there is something wrong with them. It
is affirmed from time to time that gratitude is not to be expected in the relations
between states, but when gratitude is lacking, Americans are likely to have at
least a wistful sense that they are being short-changed. Certainly it is evident
that neither need nor ability to develop successfully is an adequate criterion for
the granting of American aid. Both need and ability can be countered by lining
up on the wrong side of the fence; and loud dismay is sure to be voiced in
influential circles in the United States if aid recipients such as Nasser or
Nkrumah publicly criticize American policy.
The more applied and specific political uses of influence are far too numerous
and scattered to allow more than an indication of a few possibilities, such as
persuading other countries to maintain armed forces at given levels of strength
and availability, to grant rights for bases, to limit or end trade with communist
countries, to block mainland China's representation in the United Nations, and
generally to insure that they vote right on U.N. issues (although it does not
appear that the offer or withdrawal of aid has been used to influence votes on
specific issues).
Another range of political uses involves the bolstering up of friendly govern-
ments in time of need, as in the summer of 1967 in sending military transport
planes to the Congo to assist in putting down a revolt, or the delicate and diffi-
cult task of promoting democracy, which AID has recently been instructed to
undertake. The latter step rests on the double assumption that democracy is a
superior form of government and that peoples so governed are likely to be
friendly and congenial to the United States. For similar reasons, American influ-
ence has often been brought into play against a takeover by military regimes in
Latin America, although the military overthrow of a leftist government, as in
Indonesia or Ghana, is likely to be taken calmly by Washington. Despite an
avowed affection for democracy, in many instances the United States has re-
frained from throwing its weight into the scales against authoritarian or dic-
tatorial governments, accepting instead their affirmations of opposition to com-
munism and thus tending to line the United States up with the right wing in
Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. Washington is inescapably in trouble in
trying to weigh the gains hoped for from the ultimate strengthening of democ-
racy in countries which have been assisted to stability and well-being as against
the immediate gains to be derived from backing authoritarian and perhaps reac-
tionary regimes whose anticommunist credentials are impeccable.
Commentators have also from time to time pointed out the dilemma involved
in American enthusiasm, on the one hand, for democracy and social and eco-
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nomic development, including such measures as land reform, which are prone to
disrupt the existing order, and, on the other hand, the fear of losing to revolu-
tionary forces who may see their destiny linked to the Communists.2 During the
Cold War the latter fear has often brought American influence into play on the
side of the status quo, even though it has also been recognized that failure to
reform and develop leaves an attractive field open to the left.
For the most part, these uses of influence are self-regarding in the sense that
they serve what is seen as directly an American interest. A number of other uses
of influence, of significance primarily in relation to the less developed countries,
may properly be held to be other-regarding in that their essential purpose is to
establish the conditions which the American authorities see as necessary for the
effective use of American aid. Similar conditions, often more rigid and more
rigorously insisted upon, have been laid down by the International Bank and
Monetary Fund. These may range from specific administrative acts which will
clear the way for some particular project or involve acceptance of such rules of
the game as those laid down for handling counterpart funds to a basic overhaul
of the political-administrative structure in order to create the preconditions for
development. Pressures for actions of this kind directly serve the American
interest only insofar as they improve the prospects for development, which is,
for whatever reason, regarded as constituting an American interest. Uses of
influence that perhaps fall in between the self- and the other-regarding categories
are the injunction that private enterprise should be promoted, and, further over
in the self-regarding column, the disfavor with which nationalization and ex-
propriation are regarded, although part of the argument for such an attitude is
based on the conviction that moves toward socialism inhibit rather than advance
development.
Given the diffuseness and uncertainty of the criteria to be applied, what is the
verdict on the success or failure of American influence when in the case of two
countries more or less equally in the good graces of the United States and sharing
in the American bounty, country A maintains a reasonable facsimile of constitu-
tional democratic government, is making praiseworthy headway in economic
development, but is insistent on following a policy of nonalignment favorable to
the East and indulging in at least ritual denunciations of the United States from
time to time; whereas country B has an authoritarian and arbitrary government,
absorbs American aid with no visibly significant effect on either development or
the general standard of living, but gives ardent political and military support to
American anticommunist activities?
In general terms it can be said that the opportunity open to the United States is
greater in the more developed than in the less developed countries for the simple
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reason that the advanced countries are better organized, more capable of achiev-
ing what they set out to do, and able to produce greater economic and military
strength. By definition they are abreast of the modern world and able to com-
mand much of the new-found power that is one of the distinguishing features of
modernity, whereas the underdeveloped are still only wistfully eyeing that
power. But, as I h~ve already suggested, whether the United States can enlist
the more advanced countries in its cause depends not upon their degree of ad-
vancement but on their political decision as to where they line up in the world.
Without attempting to work out meticulously accurate gradations of develop-
ment, it seems appropriate to assume that Germany, Italy, and Japan were to be
listed in the ranks of the developed at the time of World War II, but they ob-
viously offered no sphere in which American influence might operate except
strictly on their own terms. Much the same can be said of the Soviet Union, with
only minor qualifications and adjustments, throughout the half-century of its'
existence.
Where the political circumstances allow or encourage it, the magnitude of
the collaboration that can be achieved between the advanced countries runs well
ahead of what can be expected between the advanced and the underdeveloped.
One important element is that where only the advanced are involved, there is a
much greater degree of equality and reciprocity of influence, as contrasted with
an almost wholly one-way flow of influence from the advanced to the developing
country. Advancement also brings with it a muitipli~atioll of interests, employ-
ments, agencies, organizations, and the like, which make po~sible the contact
between societies over a much wider range than is possible for the under-
developed countries whose social, political, and economic structure is less in-
tricately evolved.
The most successful of large-scale postwar American ventures was un-
doubtedly the series of steps taken in relation to Europe, of which the two most
striking manifestations were the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic alliance em-
bodied in NATO, which also led to the creation of the western European sUl?ra-
national functional organizations. Although the European powers had wills and
voices of their own, American influence reached an expansive plateau which
was higher and more extensive than any attained before or since. A number of
factors may be picked out as the essential conditions of the successes which were
then achieved. (a) The level of development of the countries principally con-
cerned was relatively similar. All had a firsthand acquaintance with the modern
world and several were outstanding leaders in it. This made possible a degree of
high-level collaboration that is not possible where the advanced-underdeveloped
relationship is involved. (b) However difficult it may be to pin down, a sense of
common European identity, to which the United States was by no means wholly
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a stranger, eased the process of bringing sovereign states within a common
framework and made it seem a natural rather than an externally forced and
artificial device. The pulls and strains were real enough, but an underlying sense
of traditional unity gave new institutions an emotional support. (c) The Euro-
pean countries were all in varying degree war-devastated and in grave need of
outside aid to set their economies in motion again. The United States was the
one country that could furnish such aid on a large enough scale to turn the trick
and could also furni~h the necessary leadership to get Europe rolling. (d) They
all came to be moved by a common belief, varying in its bearing and intensity,
that their security was threatened by the Soviet Union, which had absorbed the
Baltic countries, established its East European satellites, reached out menacingly
toward Greece and Turkey, and forced Czechoslovakia into its subordinate
entourage. It is highly likely that no driving force is as impressive as a felt threat
to national security i and in the postwar years not only did the threat seem real,
but the United States with its economic and military strength, including atomic
power, was the one available safeguard.
It need scarcely be added that as these conditions changed, the centrality of
the United States was constantly lessened and the scope and weight of its influ-
ence began to fade. To mention only two items, the success of the Marshall Plan
meant that European economies could stand on their own feet, and the end of
the Stalin era in addition to other developing conditions in the U.S.S.R. made it
far more difficult to conceive of the threat of a communist military attack on
western Europe as a real danger. Precisely those conditions which had most en-
hanced American influence underwent drastic change. Britain, with some hesita-
tion and uncertainties due perhaps to recollections of a greatness so recently
vanished, decided to remain largely within the sph~re of American influence,
although it also sought to join the Europe of the Six, while de Gaulle appeared as·
the increasingly ardent champion of a national France and of a nationally or-
ganized Europe which would as far as possible insulate itself against American
influence.
What kind of balance sheet can be drawn up? It remains the fact that the
advanced countries can contribute much more to the realization of American
purposes than can the underdeveloped-always granted they are prepared to
make the contribution, as some are and some are. not. One type of leverage the
United States has in a number of the advanced countries, but obviously not in
the advanced communist countries, is that American private finance and industry
penetrate very deeply and widely. With rare exceptions, the underdeveloped
countries have not proved attractive enough to the private investor to draw in
large amounts of American capital or encourage the establishment of branch
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plants. The smallness of the market, the instability of governments, the fear of
nationalization, the restrictions on the repatriation of profits, all combine to
limit the interest of potential American investors except in a few extractive in-
dustries and particularly in the search for and the marketing of oil and its deriva-
tives. The advanced countries, in contrast, have experienced a growing flood of
American investments and, like Canada, become more and more aware of the
vast economic power of the United States which threatens to dominate them.
Any spectacular increase in the American involvement in the economy of an-
other country is almost certain to rouse nationalist hostilities which may lead to
restrictive or punitive measures intended to preserve or restore domestic control
over the economic life of the country. When American economic expansion is
combined with what is regarded as an undue extension of American political
influence, and cultural influence as well, a nationalist reaction can be expected
to erupt.
It is a plausible approximation of the facts to see the position of the developed
and the underdeveloped countries in relation to the United States as the reverse
of each other. The wealth and strength of the advanced countries both limit
American attempts to influence them and make their potential support of
America~ policies and actions highly valuable, whereas the poverty and weak-
ness of the underdeveloped make access to them easier because of their greater
need for what the affluent can provide them, but poverty and weakness also
mean that their political and military specific gravity is minimal.
On the face of it, it might be thought that the lack of wealth and strength
would make the underdeveloped more susceptible to external influence, and par-
ticularly to that of the United States as the major overall donor of foreign aid,
but the record does not bear this out. Much of what has just been said about the
advanced countries in reference to their hostility to American or other domina-
tion applies more or less equally to their less developed brethren. In fact, the
wariness and suspicions of the less developed may be more acute than those of
the advanced countries because so many of them have recently emerged from a
detested colonialism whose return they dread. The neocolonialism against which
the Left warns the new countries is closely akin to the kind of economic sub-
ordination, slipping all too easily into de facto political subordination, to which
China, much of Latin America, and a few other countries have been subjected
in the era of Western imperialism. How real the dangers of a return to colonial-
ism or of a spread of neocolonialism may be at the present time is open to argu-
ment, but in the eyes of many of the ex-colonial peoples the dangers are real
indeed; they consequently set limits to any attempt to exert external influence,
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limits that can be ignored only at the outsider's peril. Thus, the tying of political
or military strings td foreign aid is notoriously resented and can on occasion be
disastrous, as in the case of the effort to draw Indonesia into alignment with the
free world.3
On several counts it is inevitably an unsatisfactory task to seek to draw up a
catalog of the successes and failures of American efforts to influence other
countries. In many instances, the raw materials on which judgment must be
based are lacking because it has not appeared on the public record what goals,
if any, the United States set itself nor what methods were used to achieve them.
Thus, it is often left as a matter of surmise whether Washington intervened or
not, and in what fashion. By its enemies, if by no means always by its friends,
the CIA is given credit for many exploits and upheavals abroad. It is likely that
the CIA can achieve more with less effort in the underdeveloped than in the
developed countries because of the instability of their political institutions and
the small number of politically active persons who must be dealt with; but the
ratio of fact to rumor remains almost wholly obscure. Nor is it possible to dis-
cern with any precision what the state of affairs would have been if the United
States had kept its hands entirely off this or that situation in which it is credited
with either a bulls-eye or a miss.
On the most general and superficial grounds it can be argued that American
influence has been exerted successfully among the underdeveloped countries
since so many have retained a nonalignment benevolent to the West, so few
have joined the communist ranks, and some among those who seemed tempted
to swing all the way to the left have moved back to something more nearly ap-
proaching a middle-of-the-road position. But in trying to allocate p~ai~e or blame
for such an outcome, we can render only a most inconclusive verdict :when our
knowledge of the underlying facts is so limited and when we can do no more
than make an instructed guess as to what the world would look like today if the
United States had let the underdeveloped countries follow their own sweet
pleasure.
Certainly any assumption that, since the United States is a super power in a
world in which many of its fellow states are pygmies, it can accomplish what it
pleases is far off the mark. As powers armed with the most modern and sophis-
ticated weapons have found themselves baffled by guerrilla warfare, so the
United States has been baffled by its inability to keep puny third-world govern-
ments in line uridermodern conditions even though it seems to have completely
the upper hand. The two most striking examples which come immediately to
mind are South Korea and South Vietnam, each of which has managed to main-
tain a surprising and often distressing freedom of movement despite the fact
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that both presumably owe their continued existence to the United States, which
also contributes a substantial part of their support and has stationed overwhelm-
ing military force within their boundaries. A few well-known examples will
illustrate the laxity of American influence or control. Syngman Rhee and Ngo
Dinh Diem were both able to consolidate dictatorial regimes that became so
obnoxious to their people that they were overthrown by violent uprisings. In
the case of Diem the United States is said to have signaled its readiness to see his
regime disposed of by suspending the vital commodity import program to Viet-
nam in October 1963, shortly before his ouster and assassination, but an in-
tolerable situation had already been allowed to build up. In both instances the
former leaders were followed by military regimes, in the Korean case at least
neither of American choice nor to American pleasure. In the operation of these
governments the United States obviously has a powerful influence and can exert
some ultimate control, but much of what happens appears to be outside the
American orbit. An extraordinary, but far from unique, sample is furnished by
the tragicomic goings-on surrounding the Vietnamese elections of September .
1967. That the elections were held at all, however, is a product of American
pressure, which also played a significant and probably determining role in. the
transition in Korea from outright military rule to quasi-civilian rule under a new
constitution following the election of General Park Chung-hee as president in
1963.
On June 11, 1967, the New York Times carried a Saigon dispatch by
Jonathan Randal which reported American disaffection with the weaknesses of
the Army of 'the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the disinclination of General
Westmoreland and his predecessors to come to a showdown with top Vietnamese
.military commanders over the removal of poor ARVN field commanders. "Since
the American generals refuse to insist on unified command-on the ground such
a step would validate enemy charges that the United States has taken over
control of its 'puppet troops'-bad ARVN leaders enjoy virtual immunity from
removal."
Ten days later, on June 21, the Times carried another Saigon dispatch which
cited the dependence of the Vietnamese economy, military forces, and govern-
ment on the United States and proceeded to quote"a ranking American official"
who stated that "we really have almost no leverage over these people." The
maneuvering of Premier Ky, the imposition of an unconstitutional censorship,
and the campaigning ahead of the specified time were brought out in the story
and were followed later by the banning of candidates whose voice deserved to
be heard. The correspondent added, "These developments have deeply dis-
tressed the U.s. Embassy, because they conflict with the picture of the elections
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that the United States had hoped to be able to show the world. They also bode
ill for rallying the South Vietnamese public behind the eventual victor. But
embassy officials refused even to contemplate punitive steps against Mar-
shal Ky." 4
The curious counterpart of the ability of the Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese forces to hold the American military at bay is the ability of Ky in South
Vietnam and Park in South Korea to play thei~ own game in their own fashions.
Ky and his fellow generals are in power on American sufferance, but it is a
sufferance Washington would find painful and costly to terminate. The men who
should by all past reckoning be American puppets turn out in fact to have an
identity of their own.
Apart from American inexperience in such matters, an element that seems to
me of central significance in the contemporary scene is that"all past reckoning"
has by now lost much of its validity. The colonial era has vanished, and the
crude but forceful means of dealing with recalcitrant regimes of which an ad-
vanced power disapproves can no longer be brought into play. A few decades
ago, if full-scale colonial rule were not established in countries that made them-
selves annoying in the fashion of Korea or Vietnam, at least blockades, bombard-
ments, or temporary occupations probably involving the displacement and exiling
of independent-minded political figures would have taken care of the situation.5
Such measures are no longer available even though Washington did, in the spe-
cial circumstances of the Caribbean, turn the clock back by its military interven-
tion in the Dominican Republic. If remedies and, sanctions of a colonial type
cannot be brought into play, outlawed by the revolution in world opinion, by
the principles of the free world which the United States claims to lead, and by
traditional American anticolonialism, then the local regimes of the third world
are given a freedom that the imperialist era denied them.
There are, I assume, few who would contemplate a return to the high-
handed methods of imperialism and the strict controls of colonialism, but an
embarrassing dilemma remains. In Korea and even more in Vietnam the United
States has effectively, be it for good or for ill, taken on responsibilities and ad-
vocated reforms that require colonial-style control if they are really to be lived up
to and put through; but colonialism has been repudiated.6 The question: if the
United States has committed itself to programs that can only be carried out in a
colonial situation, should it pull back and re-evaluate the dilemma it has created
for itself? Is "influence" enough to accomplish what the United States has found
itself involved in? In a monumental way the United States has imposed itself
on the Vietnamese society, distorting the pre-existing culture and internal bal-
ance of forces and opening the way to almost unlimited corruption of the society
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in various senses, but it does not accept the responsibility colonial governments
assumed for what were often lesser interventions in the affairs of other peoples.
To put it in part in personal terms: what has been the effect of allowing General
Ky to represent to the world an American-controlled Vietnam, or, alternatively,
could the United States afford to take the steps that would be needed to keep Ky
in line or to repla~e him by a more acceptable and trustworthy, subservient
leader? For a traditionally anticolonial power to take on the substance of colonial
responsibilities in an era of anticolonialism is to assume an unconscionable
burden of grief and pain. A credibility gap of even global dimensions inevitably
divides proclaimed American intentions and what is actually done on the spot.
Korea and Vietnam are extreme cases of American influence in under-
developed countries, examples which one can hope will not be repeated. In many
other areas the United States, far less deeply involved, has tried to make its influ-
ence felt through manipulation of foreign aid and by other means drawn from
the older, established diplomatic cupboard.
The relationship in theory and practice of foreign assistance to the foreign
policy of the donor country has been constantly under review and debate.
Among the many questions that may be raised, one of central importance may
be phrased as follows: where the avowed goal of foreign aid is economic and
social development, is it legitimate-and effective-to use it as an instrument
for short-run political goals? One of the most realistic or, perhaps more ac-
curately, hardboiled versions of an answer is contaiI'\ed in .an.. ~rticle written by
Hans Morgenthau a half dozen years ago in which he made it his basic assump-
tion that foreign aid is politically motivated and is to be evaluated as a weapon
in the political armory.7 He saw development as only one of a number of uses of
foreign aid, and one that is often more of a front than a reality, a buying of
political advantage under the pretense that economic development is the goal.
Reduced to its simplest terms, it was his contention that "much of what goes by
the name of foreign aid, today is in the nature of bribes./I If one seeks a more
elaborate version, including a quick look at some of the history of internatio~al
bribery, George Liska, in a book on American policy explicitly inspired by Pro-
fessor Morgenthau, elaborates on the thesis that "the object of foreign aid, both
economic and military, is to create a condition that would induce or consolidate a
relationship which in turn would generate desirable acts./I 8
Although a good case can perhaps be made for the proposition that foreign
aid should not be used for political purposes, it is surely beyond argument that
it has consistently been so used, and I cannot see the faintest reason to doubt
that such uses will continue. I have suggested earlier that it is among the expec-
tations of those who appropriate the necessary funds, as well as of many others,
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that foreign aid should both win general favor for the United States and, as
occasion offers, secure particular benefits. Undoubtedly it is a blunt and clumsy
instrument, ill-designed for bringing political pressure, but it has its obvious
utility, particularly as some of the more direct and forceful measures of the past,
including forthright bribery, have been outlawed by the change in international
mores and in the makeup of the international community.
In some instances, particularly where military or military-related assistance
was involved, the grant of aid was clearly and immediately linked to the benefits
received. Thus, George Liska, writing of the aid programs of the late 1950's,
listed: "First, military facilities and assets, such as bases and installations: in
Spain, Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea in return for
defense support; in Libya, Morocco, and Ethiopia in return for special assistance;
and in Saudi Arabia in return for sale of military equipment under Section 106
of the Mutual Security Act and economic assistance for projects of mutual
benefit in the field of air and naval transport. Or a country may receive aid for
its armed forces, as do Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philip-
pines, the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Second, the donor
may acquire an alliance commitment or another form of desirable international
behavior. Turkey is a good example." 9
The most interesting and perhaps the most difficult aspect to examine is the
extent to which political results can be achieved, results that appear to make a
significant change in the position which the country concerned would otherwise
have adopted. It is the sound conclusion of Edward s. Mason, one of the most
experienced of the practitioners of and commentators on foreign aid, that the
chief lesson to be learned "from the two decades of post-war experience is that
aid is not a very effective political instrument, at least for short-term objectives.
Aid can help countries whose political stance we approve of grow stronger and
the withholding of aid can inflict some degree of damage on the economies of
countries pursuing political objectives of which we disapprove. But the help
bestowed or the damage inflicted is not likely to induce significant change in the
political objectives pursued by these countries." 10
The primacy of politics again asserts itself. In marginal cases aid can save a
government when it might otherwise go under or the denial of aid in special cir-
cumstances may give the final push to a regime that is tottering on the brink.
It can be persuasive where there is already a readiness to listen sympathetically,
and.a government somewhat casually wavering between one decision or another,
as in relation to a vote on a U.N. resolution of no great concern to that country,
may be swung in the direction Washington desires. On the other hand, aid can-
not be expected to reverse strongly held political positions.
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The hope that foreign aid might influence countries in a large variety of
directions has been a constant one in Congress, reflected over and over again in
the relevant legislation and evidently intended primarily for the less developed
'countries. Thus, there have been legislative pleas not only for the achievement of
economic development but also for social justice, a more equitable distribution of
wealth, and maximum participation on the part of the people in developing
countries in democratic institutions. The administering authorities have also
been instructed to take into account in providing development loans and tech-
nical assistance the degree to which the recipient country is making progress
toward respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression, and recognition of the
importance of individual freedom, initiative, and private enterprise. The 1963
AID Program Guidance Manual set as the political goals of the aid program "a
community of free nations cooperating on matters of mutual concern, basing
their political systems on consent and progressing in economic welfare and social
justice." 11
In more specific relation to international politics, American foreign assistance
has been tied to efforts to promote the security of the free world, to back the
Korean war, to stop trade with Cuba and North Vietnam, and to promote the
development of regional institutions in several parts of the world. Other devices
have been utilized to try to induce or compel more advanced countries to observe
the American ban on intercourse with the "enemy." It is, regrettably, doubtful
that these various injunctions have been successful.
The need of the less developed for aid and their yearning for development
are in the ordinary course of events not great enough to induce them to reverse
deep-seated political convictions nor to abandon their socialist inclinations in
favor of a private-enterprise system they view with grave suspicion. In most
instances, neither their political sophistication nor their existing institutions lend
themselves conveniently to the substance of democracy, stable constitutionalism,
or individual freedom.
A far larger number of specific political goals have been pursued than can be
mentioned here, but a few outstanding cases of success and failure may serve to
illustrate the problem. It should be remarked, incidentally, that for the external
observer failures are generally more easily accessible and recognizable than
successes, except in the general sense, already mentioned, that the so-called
free world has suffered little attrition since the great and major loss of China.
The use of foreign aid as an instrument to influence major policies of coun-
tries of the third world appears to have scored few triumphs, at least where it
ran counter to what it is plausible to think the country would have done in any
event. This comment is based in part upon what appears to be the widely ac-
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cepted view that the removal from power of Sukarno in Indonesia and of Nkru-
mah in Ghana is not to be attributed to American machinations but was brought
about essentially by internal forces and disaffections. Furthermore, American
attempts to keep Sukarno and Nkrumah in line during their years of power
through manipulation of foreign aid and other devices were, on the whole, clear
failures, although Nkrumah demonstrated a distinctive agility in publicly de-
nouncing the United States and all its works while in fact maintaining friendly
relations with American agencies and private economic interests, particularly
those having any concern with the Volta Dam and activities subsidiary to it. As
one sample of this agility, ten days after the publication of a book by Nkrumah
in which the Peace Corps was damned as only one phase of a "huge ideological
plan for invading the so-called Third World," the Ghana government requested
that almost double the number of Peace Corps teachers be sent to replace those
whose terms were expiring.12 When Sukarno embarked on his policy of "con-
frontation" of Malaysia, American and other aid programs were virtually wholly
abandoned,13 but the confrontation continued until Sukarno was eased out of
power.
A detailed study of the vagaries and effects of the American manipulation of
military and economic assistance for India and Pakistan would be revealing as
a study of what can, and even more of what cannot, be done. Professor Mason
concludes from his survey of American relations with the two Asian countries
that all three seriously overestimated "the political leverage to be derived from
foreign assistance and that "the very large amount of economic assistance pro-
vided to India and· Pakistan has, to date, given the United States a very small
amount of influence on political attitudes and behavior in those countries." 14
As in other parts of the world, the United States cherished the peculiar belief
that it could provide arms for a country to be used solely for defense against
the proper enemy, the communist powers, and not against its actual enemy~ its
neighbor. In fact, neither India nor Pakistan was prepared to heed the advice of
the United States. The Kashmir controversy remains as much a fighting issue
between the two countries as ever and open warfare has broken out between
them, with Pakistan deeply offended by the fact that its ally, the United States,
moved speedily to the military assistance of India when attacked by c;hina.
Perhaps the American curtailment of aid to both India and Pakistan when hos-
tilities broke out between them had some effect in hastening the adoption of a
cease-fire, but, however it is calculated, the American record of political influence
successfully exerted in the subcontinent is very slight. On the face of it, it is folly
to assume that a country of the size of India, or of Pakistan for that matter, can
be diverted from its own major purposes by turning on or turning off the stream
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of aid, although both have been persuaded to adopt major economic measures
regarded as necessary for development.
The conclusions to be drawn from the cases cited are further borne out by
relations between the United States and Nasser in the U.A.R. The net effect of
American influence seems to be of the same order as that described for India
and Pakistan: a series of efforts to persuade Nasser to mend his ways have
achieved substantially nothing whatsoever except bad feeling. The most dramatic
event was, of course, the decision of Secretary of State Dulles to withdraw from
support of the Aswan Dam project, which led directly to the ruinous Suez crisis
of 1956 and to the assumption by the Soviet Union of responsibility for Aswan
with a consequent drop in the standing of the United States. An equal lack of
success has attended the American effort to bring down President Duvalier in
Haiti, where aid was cut off in 1962. In the neighboring Dominican Republic aid
was deliberately manipulated for political purposes on several occasions and did
in fact achieve certain specific goals after the fall of Trujillo, but as the situation
deteriorated Washington concluded that it could secure its broader objectives
only through a military occupation.15 It was, of course, grossly improbable that
after its long span of dictatorial rule the country could be transformed into a
functioning democracy in a couple of years. The same proposition was, inci-
dentally, presumably even more true of Vietnam in view of its political history
and its decades of ruinous warfare. The long history of American attempts to
influence the turn of political development in Latin America has often been
examined and is on the whole a chastening demonstration of the immense diffi-
culty of securing in another country the kind of political outcome that is sought.
The ambitious slate of reforms called for in the Alliance for Progress has also
been ignored on too many occasions.16
Although it is obviously debatable whether it was either justifiable or de-
sirable, the American intervention in British Guiana (later Guyana) achieved at
least for the time being the desired result. In collaboration with the British (to
what extent were they themselves operating under American pressure?), Wash-
ington succeeded in ousting Cheddi Jagan, who learted too far to the left, and
substituted for him the more acceptable and amenable Forbes Burnham, under
whose auspices the country moved to independence. Among other devices the
United States,. having kept up a small-scale aid program when Jagan was in
power in order to keep its foot in the door, in 1965 extended more than $5 mil-
lion in aid to the Burnham government, whose total budget was some $45 million,
which enabled Burnham, among other things, to build roads into the Indian-
inhabited areas, where Jagan's strength lay, and to maintain the subsidized rice
price at the level set by Jagan for the predominantly Indian rice growers.
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Benjamin Higgins has contended that the motto most clearly established by
the foreign aid experience would seem to be that "the feeding hand shall be
bitten." That the feeding hand shall be loved or earn meaningful gratitude is
improbable, but to predict that it shall be bitten reaches extravagantly beyond
what the record justifies. In point of fact, a number of countries continue com-
placently or even enthusiastically to receive aid and demonstrate no particular
desire to bite.
Two different unfortunate side effects accompanying aid are, however, well
established and work to curtail the influence of the donor. The first is that once a
pattern of granting assistance has been established, particularly in the case of
the underdeveloped country whose need is inexhaustible, the recipients assume
that it will be continued, and they regard any cessation or significant curtailment
as an insult and intervention in domestic affairs-as it often is when the purpose
is to inspire some action or inaction on the part of the recipient. In addition to
the prevalent belief, for which a strong case can be made, that the internationally
underprivileged have a right to share in the wealth and skills of the affluent,
there develops a further belief that a particular country has a right to the con-
tinuance of specific aid programs of which they have been the beneficiaries.
Nasser vigorously expressed his indignation when American aid" was curtailed,
and Indian authorities, with greater justification, have resented delays in com-
pleting arrangements for the delivery of food under Public Law 480. Under such
circumstances it becomes an open question whether the delays and vexations
accompanying American aid are not sometimes greater than the satisfactions
the aid is supposed to provide.17
A second unfortunate side effect is that the grant of aid, most notably in the
military sphere, may have the result of prejudicing the relations of -the donor
with neighbors or rivals of the recipient and may, on the insistence of the re-
cipient, make it impossible to extend aid to such neighbors or rivals. That this is
no new phenomenon is well illustrated by George Liska, who has surveyed the
severe limitations imposed on French policy before World War I because of the
extensive politically motivated French investment in Russia.18 A particularly
poignant contemporary example, already referred to in another context, is the
bad feeling between India and Pakistan, which makes aid to either immediately
suspect in the eyes of the other and which was exacerbated when Pakistan be-
came an ally of the United States. Similar situations exist in the relations be-
tween Israel and the Arab states, and between Ethiopia and Somalia. In the
latter instance, the American military and other aid to Ethiopia, in good part
designed as recompense for the important American communications center at
Asmara, has worked to alienate Somalia, which has been offered and has ac-
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cepted substantial aid from communist sources. These countries thus secure a
kind of reverse influence over the donor, who may be debarred from embracing
other countries that would otherwise be open to its influence.
Such unintended political consequences of foreign aid must add up to an
impressive total. Whether economic or military or some mix of the two, aid in
any substantial quantity cannot help but have a bearing on both the internal and
international political relationships of the aided countries. Given the instability
of governments in the third world and the usual thinness of their domestic po-
litical base, the injection of aid in one or another fashion or its later withdrawal
may have a decisive impact on the ability of a government to survive and per-
haps on the dominance of a particular faction within the government.19
A frequent complaint against American aid policies and practices is that they
involve too much meddling in the political life of other countries, but John D.
Montgomery has argued that Americans, setting off from a doctrine of non-
intervention in the affairs of other people, have been more deceived by assertions
of the nonpolitical character of foreign aid than have the leaders of the under-
developed countries. He went on to complain, "The noninterventionist dogma
has been strictly followed to the point that the working out of the aid program
has discouraged democratlc forces in the host country and has restrained the
expression of concern in cases where undemocratic forces have harvested the
principal benefits of aid. . .. The view that the American presence is divorced
from the politics of a recipient nation and from the social progress of its people
has contributed to the shallowness of much of the public and private debate
over issues of foreign aid." 20
It is to be feared that the United States is in the position of being damned if
it does and damned if it doesn't. On a visit early in 1967 to east Africa I was
impressed by the frequency and vehemency of the complaint that the United
States was sticking its fingers into far too many African matters and trying to
push African states and peoples around. In many parts of the world one can hear
the grievance that the United States is meddling too much in other people's
affairs, but at the same time it is held against the United States that it is pre-
pared to work on friendly terms with oppressive and dictatorial governments and
lend them its support rather than to seek their overthrow. In some part, of
course, the explanation is that American power and wealth open this country to
attack by all concerned, but a real dilemma exists for which it is difficult to con-
ceive any universally satisfactory answer: nonintervention remains a doctrine to
which peoples are still generally inclined to subscribe and which has obvious
merit, and yet intervention for good cause, to promote freedom and advancement
and overcome evil, also has its attractions. Condemnation of the United States
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for the way in which it has used or abused its influence is likely to come from the
Left which, as has been seen, tends to assume an anti-American position from
the outset. Regrettably, the charge that Washington has been prepared to col-
laborate with and bolster up governments of the Right has enough substance to
make defense of the American position difficult. In the eyes of much of the third
world, the United States has also prejudiced its position by its negative attitude
toward anticolonialist resolutions in U.N. and by its reluctance at the United
Nations Conference on Trade and D~velopment, to consider new approaches to
the problems of development and international trade which even its NATO
colleagues were prepared to examine sympathetically.
Our primary attention has been given to the use of American influence to
achieve political objectives involving other countries. Another large sphere men-
tion~d earlier is the use of influence to achieve reforms in aid-receiving countries,
the purpose of which is to make American and other economic assistance more
effective and to speed and strengthen the processes of development. In this sphere
much of what has already been said as to the expectation of resistance to alien
pressures is obviously relevant. It is, however, difficult to compare the limitations
and opportunities stemming from the level of development because the problems
which the highly developed and the underdeveloped present differ so greatly
from each other. The Marshall Plan could achieve its success because all the
foundations of development, including the existence of highly skilled personnel
of all kinds, had already been laid, and efficient, specialized, and sophisticated
governments were available to oversee the proceedings. When questions of eco-
nomic, administrative, legal, or judicial reform were brought up, the European
countries were equipped with experts who were familiar with the issues and who
could through the machineries of the Organization of European Economic Co-
operation collaborate to arrive at high level common understandings.
On the other hand, it is precisely the nature of underdevelopment that, in
principle, all that has just been said of the advanced countries is at best only
meagerly applicable to the countries just starting to develop.21 The opportunities
open to American influence are far greater in the sense that so much more needs
to be accomplished if development is to be carried through; but the stumbling
blocks are increasingly evident as the years go by. The limitations the harsh facts
of underdeveloped life impose are disheartening. A few countries like India
possess highly trained men who can carryon a fruitful dialogue with American
and other experts and help them implement the resulting programs; a few like
Tunisia have the effective political and administrative systems that are the
indispensable prerequisites of development; a few like the major oil-producing
countries have resources that provide a surplus above subsistence for develop-
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ment; and most of the African countries are free of the pressure of population
which constantly encroaches on advancement elsewhere; but such bright spots
are still far outweighed by the limitations inherent in the condition of under-
development. The grave shortcomings of the Alliance for Progress demonstrate
the difficulties blocking the path to reform because of national resistance to
external intervention and bec~use the ruling elements who control the inward
flow of aid are naturally resistant to change that threatens their power and
privilege.
Even where there is full readiness to work with the United States and gen-
erally accept its advice, American success in effectively influencing under-
developed countries is drastically limited by the inability of governments to
carry through reforms of procedures which they have endorsed and accepted:
Leaving aside the effect of corruption, which, it has been p~ausibly argued, may
on occasion promote rather than impede development, the issue concerns the
incompetence of the administrative structures to perform the functions they are
supposed to perform. Characteristically, bureaucracies are swollen far beyond
what makes sense and at the same time the large array of often seriously under-
paid government employees is unable or unwilling to take the necessary deci-
sions. The multiplicity of official endorsements can receive the final sanction that
makes them operative only when the cabinet minister or the head of government
has himself acted; and it is only at that point that the perhaps impossible task
begins of translating words on paper into administrative acts throughout the
country.
None of this, of course, is intended either to question the need for aid of all
available and appropriate kinds, nor to deny that valuable specific results have
already been achieved and that more are undoubtedly to come. Even though
spectacular breakthroughs may be lacking, the cumulative effect of years of
exposure to foreign experts, the need to justify official policies and programs to
the donor countries or international agencies, the working of a number of pilot
projects and plants, the building up of some of the indispensable infrastructure
-these must surely bring about changes that gradually open the door to a more
sustained and widely embracing development. The prospects for' significant de-
velopment are essentially long range-at the present growth rate it would take
India 137 years to catch up with Japan's present economic level 22-and imme-
diateshowy gains are likely to be more illusory than real.
One vital element that is still missing is that the donor governments and
peoples will have the patience to wait out the gradualness of advance and suffer
through the ipevitable shortfalls and failures. As has already become evident,
donors may increasingly refuse to face up to the needs of the world's under-
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privileged. A quite different type of reaction would be to demand more intensive
and extensive control over the recipients if it comes to be argued that the inade-
quacies in development are to be attributed to the sins and deficiencies of the
underdeveloped countries. The same result might follow from large-scale defaults
when debt repayments fall due. Both responses are in fact quite possible. Coun-
tries not of any particular concern to major donors might be .left by the wayside,
whereas those in which the maintenance of influence is seen as important might
be more closely controlled.
It is obvious that the advanced countries, or at least the major ones which in
the past would have an uncontested claim to be great powers, have enough
wealth, strength, and command of further scientific advancement to make the
opportunities which they open to the United States and its communist rival or
rivals of real importance. On the other side, one of the most recent commentators
on the relations between the developed and the underdeveloped countries .has
protested that as a matter of Realpolitik lithe fate of the underdeveloped
countries has only the remotest direct connection with the survival of the great
powers ... because there is almost nothing that those countries can do politically
to harm or help the great powers." 23
All of which may be true and which presumably finds a reflection in the
growing disinclination to continue with expansive aid programs; and yet I take
it to be, in fact, almost wholly divorced from an actual Realpolitik. The oppor-
tunities in the underdeveloped countries may be outweighed by the limitations,
but these countries will be courted for humanitarian, political, economic, and a
variety of other reasons. It may well be that the major reason, like that which
spurs on the climbers of Mt. Everest, is that they are there and occupy a great
share of the world's surface.
NOTES
1 I am grateful to Miss Joan Nelson both for valuable advice in connection with this article
and for letting me see the manuscript of her Aid, Influence, and Foreign Policy (New York,
1968), from which I have drawn much useful material.
2 See, for example, Robert L. Heilbroner, "Counterrevolutionary America," Commentary
(April 1967).
3 Jacob J. Kaplan has cogently contended that the resentment derives less from the partic-
ular strings than from antagonism to American views and behavior in the more traditional
spheres of foreign policy, "an antagonism that has been the traditional fate of world powers,
whether or not they were conducting foreign aid programs. Rather, the programs should be
regarded in large measure as a technique for mitigating this normal resistance to predomi-
nance and leadership." The Challenge of Foreign Aid (New York, 1967), 226.
4 The House Committee on Government Operations complained that the u.s. Congress and
taxpayer expected more cooperation than they were getting from the government of Vietnam,
adding that with half a million men and billions of dollars of u.S. aid annually, "we should
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at least be able to count' on the wholehearted cooperation of Vietnamese officials in rela-
tively minor economic matters." New York Times, Aug. 28, 1967.
5 South Korea is reported to be making effective economic headway, even though it con-
tinues to be afflicted by severe political divisions and shortcomings.
6 Gayl Ness has pointed out in Chapter Two the value of the relationship of a subordi-
nate state to a subordinate territory if far-reaching reforms are to be carried out by the
former.
7 IIA Political Theory of Foreign Aid," American Political Science Review, LVI (June 1962),
301-309. Kaplan also explicitly accepts the proposition that aid should be used to supplement
American diplomacy, interests, and ideals. lilt is indefensible to deploy u.S. foreign aid re-
sources as though they had no relation to the nation's international concerns." The Challenge
of Foreign Aid, 249.
8 The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1960), 62.
9 Ibid., 97. See also John D. Montgomery, Foreign Aid in International Politics (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J., 1967), 1off. With reference to Spanish bases and other such concessions,
he remarks, "The commonest forms of these international exchanges involve the use of a
military base, air rights, and adherence to alliances, ail of which have been 'purchased' with
substantial economic or military assistance instead of cash payments," 16.
10 The Diplomacy of Economic Assistance (Samuel S. Stratton \,ecture, Middlebury Col-
lege, Oct. 27, 1965, published at Middlebury, Vermont, 1966), 12. As examples of the da~gers
involved in tying political strings to aid, he cites the familiar cases of the overthrow of an
Indonesian government and the rejection by Burma of further aid.
11 Cited by E. S. Mason, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York, 1964), 49. Although
AID held that such a community of free nations 1I0 ffers the best prospect of security and
peace for the United States," Mason expressed his skepticism that free nations would co-
operate more with the United States than their view of their national interest would dictate.
12 See my Africa and United States Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967), 44-45.
13 See Richard Butwell, Southeast Asia Today-and Tomorrow, rev. ed. (New York, 1964),
108.
14 The Diplomacy of Economic Assistance, 20-21. It is Professor Mason's belief that "politi-
cal conditions attached to aid are unlikely to be effective except in that limited number of
situations in which economic assistance is the junior partner in an extensive mutual security
program designed to counter actual or impending aggression," 25.
15 For one segment of this story, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, IIForeign Aid as a Political
Instrument: A cCase Study of the Dominican Republic 1961-63" in Public Policy, ed. John D.
Montgomery and Arthur Smithies (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), Vol. 14.
16 See Andrew F. Westwood, Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework (Washington,
D.C., 1966), 85.
17 Referring to Washington officials who allegedly linked delays in meeting a UAR request
for wheat with American disapproval of Nasser's foreign policies, The Egyptian Gazette on
March 19, 1967, rhetorically asked IIwho cannot fail to be amazed at the unashamed con-
firmation by Washington officials of the most cynical charges brought against its manipula-
tion of food aid for the Third World as a lever to either destroy non-alignment, or, as in this
case, to directly intervene in internal Arab affairs and shape the policies of an independent
nation?"
18 The New Statecraft, 45ff.
19 Putting forward a proposition that may be seen as the reverse side of that advanced
by Jacob J. Kaplan (see n. 3, above), Andrew F. Westwood has contended that the effective-
ness of American aid in many situations, such as military assistance for Turkey, massive aid
to the Diem government in early stages, and President Kennedy's endorsement of the Alli-
ance for Progress, was due less to the specific aid provided than to the fact that it came with
the backing of the United States, the greatest world power; Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy
Framework, 102.
20 The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York, 1962), 252.
21 According to Theodore Geiger, the Marshall Plan experience of Europe's ability to ini-
tiate and execute its own recovery programs led to unrealistic expectations for Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. The reaction then went to the other extreme; the aid-givers, notably the
United States and France, handled development programs largely through their own per-
sonnel at the expense of stimulating a sense of responsibility and self-confidence on the part
of the countries concerned. ilLessons of the Marshall Plan," Africa Report, June 1967, p. 18.
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22 See Herbert Feldman, "Aid as Imperialism?" International Affairs (London), April 1967,
p.221.
23 John Pincus, Trade, Aid, and Development (New York, 1967), 10. He also contended
that, although aid is given primarily in order to secure influence over others, with the passage
of time it has become increasingly clear that the elements of Realpolitik in the official
rationale of aid are nof valid. "The North has given aid to Indonesia, Cambodia, Ghana,
Burma, and Iraq without winning their political allegiance or suffering markedly from their
hostility. From the viewpoint of self-interest, it was largely money down the drain. Appeals
to self-interest are therefore becoming increasingly implausible as a basis for aid," 14.
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